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Abstract
This thesis analyses empirically the determinants of company performance. Its scope 
is restricted to private companies and to the issues of control, risk and incentives.
Chapter two studies the effects of the private benefits of control on private British 
companies with limited liability. We hypothesise that companies in which existing 
owners would lose more control if they expanded, have smaller equity increases, are 
more highly levered and grow more slowly. Potential loss of control is measured as the 
difference in the probability of winning a vote for the largest owner before and after 
a hypothetical equity increase. The empirical results are broadly consistent with the 
hypotheses.
Chapter three studies the influence of owners’ underdiversification on the profitabil­
ity of private US companies. Theory suggests that underdiversification increases the 
returns required for investment. We find a strong positive relationship between under­
diversification (measured as the share of personal net worth invested), and profitability 
(measured as the return on equity). The analysis identifies two causes for this effect: 
higher required returns and higher effort.
Chapter four studies the influence of owners’ underdiversification on the financial 
structure of their companies. Higher underdiversification is related to a higher demand 
for loans, higher leverage and lower liquidity. Bank loans are therefore used as an 
alternative source of financing that reduces the exposure of the owner to company- 
specific risk caused by the equity investment.
Chapter five studies the effects of the share of managerial ownership on performance 
and the determinants of this share for German private companies with limited liability. 
Ownership up to around 80 percent has a positive impact on performance (incentive 
effect), for higher ownership the effect becomes negative (entrenchment effect). The 
risk-aversion of owner-managers and signalling of company quality lead to a non-linear 
relationship between the company’s riskiness and ownership.
11
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introductory Remarks
Economic activity in market-based economies mainly takes place through companies. 
It is therefore important to have a good understanding of the internal workings of a 
company. The economics profession has so far mostly concentrated its analysis on pub­
lic companies (see, for example, the seminal book by Berle and Means (1932)). This 
restriction can partly be explained by better data availability. But recently, there has 
been an increased interest in private companies. This seems to be an appropriate devel­
opment, since in industrialised countries the vast majority of companies are privately 
held. Private companies also contribute an important share to overall economic activity 
in terms of employment and turnover.
This thesis studies the determinants of company performance specifically for private 
companies. The scope of the thesis is restricted to the empirical analysis of issues of 
control, risk and incentives. More specifically, chapter two of this thesis addresses the 
influence of private benefits of control on the capital structure and the growth of private 
companies, using a sample of British companies. Chapters three and four concentrate 
on the underdiversification of owners. The influence of underdiversification on company 
profitability and on the financing of a company is studied through a sample of private 
companies in the USA. Finally, chapter five studies the relationship between the owner­
ship share of managers and company performance through a sample of German private 
companies. The determinants of managerial ownership are also discussed.
Private companies are different from public companies in several ways. By the very 
definition of a private company, they are excluded from a listing on a stock exchange;
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their equity must be privately held. In contrast, public companies have the option 
to offer their shares to the public. Another distinguishing feature is size. Whereas 
private companies are typically small, public companies are usually above a certain 
size threshold. There are, of course, exceptions. Virgin in the UK and Robert Bosch 
GmbH in Germany are examples of large companies not listed on a stock market. 
Another distinguishing feature is the number of owners. Private companies typically 
have less than 10 owners, and often have only between one and five. In addition, private 
companies are on average younger than public companies. One reason for this is a 
pronounced entry and exit activity. Also, most public companies started out in private 
form. Finally, private companies are often in family ownership, although, depending on 
the country, this can also be true of public companies.
It is possible to subdivide private companies into different legal forms. The most 
important differences are according to the number of owners (one or more), the personal 
liability of owners (unlimited or limited) and the tax status (profits being subject to the 
corporate tax rate or subject to the personal income tax rate of the owner). The specific 
legal rules differ between the three countries that are included in the empirical analysis 
of this thesis, but on a crude basis the following three types can be distinguished. Sole 
proprietorships have only one owner with unlimited liability and profits are subject to 
income tax. Partnerships have several owners with unlimited liability and profits are 
also subject to income tax. Corporations have one or more owners with limited liability 
and profits are subject to corporate tax. Depending on country specific regulations, 
additional forms are possible. Chapters two and five of this thesis focus on private 
companies with limited liability. In chapters three and four, however, all possible legal 
forms are included.
A major difference between private and public companies lies in the availability of 
different forms of financing. Private companies are typically restricted to equity in­
vestments from a limited number of owners and bank loans (Berger and Udell (1998)). 
For companies with large capital requirements, the organisational form of the private 
company is therefore impractical. The private wealth of a few individuals is not suffi­
cient for the demands on equity capital. Public companies, in contrast, can raise larger 
investment amounts, because they can offer their shares to the public. Furthermore, 
they can approach financial markets with a bond issue.
Other important differences are agency costs and the opportunities for risk diver­
sification. Private companies provide managers with good incentives to exert effort,
14
because managers are often also significant shareholders. On the downside, the con­
centrated investment in the private company exposes managers to idiosyncratic risk. 
The situation for public companies is just the opposite. There is an agency problem 
between the managers and the owners of the company, because their objectives can 
differ. Managers may pursue interests besides maximising the value of the company, 
because they often only own a small share. However, the wide-spread ownership allows 
risk diversification.
In the empirical analysis in the main chapters, we will return to some of the charac­
teristics of private companies highlighted in this introduction.
1.2 Economic Importance of Private Companies
This thesis concentrates on private companies. It would therefore be interesting to 
present the relative importance of private and public companies for the countries that 
are covered in the empirical analysis. However, data on legal forms are less widely 
available than data according to the size of companies. Since private companies are 
typically small, their relative importance can also be gauged by concentrating on the 
small and medium-sized companies.
The following tables group companies into different size classes according to their 
number of employees. They show the number of companies as a percentage of the total 
number of companies. The contribution to overall employment and the contribution to 
overall turnover is also given according to size class. Each country that is covered in 
the empirical analysis is considered: UK, USA and Germany.
The following table 1.1 gives an indication of the significant importance of small and 
medium-sized companies for the UK economy. Focusing on the 2002 figures, ‘micro’ 
companies with nine or fewer employees make up almost 95% of all companies in the 
UK. When looking at small and medium-sized companies with fewer than 250 employ­
ees, we find that they account for almost the entire company stock with 99.7%. The 
picture changes somewhat, when the share of employment and the share of turnover is 
considered, but the importance of small and medium-sized companies is still clearly visi­
ble. Small and medium-sized companies contribute more than 50% to total employment 
and total turnover. The remaining half is contributed by large companies.
Of the small and medium-sized companies, many will be privately owned. They are 
the focus of this thesis. For comparison with other countries below, it should be noted
15
Table 1.1: Size Distribution of UK Companies
Year
Number of Employees
0-9 10-49 50-249 250+
Number of Companies (in %) 1996 94.7 4.4 0.6 0.2
2002 94.6 4.4 0.7 0.2
Employment (in %) 1996 30.6 15.3 12.5 41.8
2002 29.4 14.3 11.9 44.4
Turnover (in %) 1996 25.0 17.3 14.0 43.7
2002 22.0 15.0 15.0 48.0
Source: DTI (2000) for 1996, Small Business Service (2003) for 2002. Some figures do not add up to 
100 due to rounding.
that the smallest category (with zero to nine employees) includes companies without 
employees and also the self-employed.
Table 1.2 shows the size distribution of companies for the US. Similar to the UK, 
small and medium-sized companies with fewer than 500 employees account for almost 
the entire company population (99.7%) in 2001. The smallest size category with zero 
to nine employees is responsible for about 11% of total employment and for about 
9% of turnover. These numbers are significantly lower than in the UK, which can be 
explained by discrepancies of data definition. In the company statistics for the US, 
“non-employers” without a payroll are not included; i.e. the smallest category excludes 
those companies without employees and also the self-employed. The reason that the 
counting of employees is started from zero is that employment is measured once a year 
in March. Some companies, for example start-ups after March and closures before 
March, will have zero employment at that date but some on the annual payroll. They 
are therefore included in the statistics. The economic importance of small and medium­
sized companies is clearly also evident for the US. This size group contributes to about 
50% of employment and to about 40% of turnover.
Table 1.3 displays the size distribution for German companies. These data are not 
directly comparable with UK and US data, because companies are not always counted 
as one entity. Plants that are in one area and have the same sectoral orientation 
are counted as one unit. In addition, for Germany, there axe no statistics available on 
turnover according to size class. Nevertheless, with respect to the number of companies,
16
Table 1.2: Size Distribution of US Companies
Year
Number of Employees
0-9 10-19 20-99 100-499 500+
Number of Companies (in %) 1990 78.3 11.1 9.0 1.4 0.3
1995 78.8 10.8 8.8 1.4 0.3
2001 78.1 10.9 9.2 1.5 0.3
Employment (in %) 1990 12.2 8.1 19.0 14.5 46.3
1995 11.8 7.7 18.4 14.6 47.5
2001 10.7 7.2 17.7 14.3 50.1
Turnover (in %) 1992 10.9 6.3 15.7 12.9 53.6
1997 9.0 5.2 13.8 11.9 59.1
Source: US Small Business Administration (www.sba.gov/advo). Some figures do not add up to 100 
due to rounding.
the small and medium-sized companies also dominate. Companies with fewer than 500 
employees account for 98.2% of all companies in 2003. Due to the mentioned differences 
in statistical methodology, the employment share of the largest size class of companies 
(with 500 or more employees) is significantly lower than in the US. This size class 
reaches only 21.5% of employment.
Job creation by private companies should also be taken into account when discussing 
the economic importance of private companies. It is often claimed that small companies 
are important contributors to job creation. In Germany, for example, small companies 
have created more jobs than they have destroyed in every year from 1985 to 2000 (see
Table 1.3: Size Distribution of German Companies
Year
Number of Employees
1-9 10-19 20-99 100-499 500+
Number of Companies (in %) 1999 80.6 9.5 8.1 1.6 0.2
2003 80.6 9.4 8.1 1.7 0.2
Employment (in %) 1999 18.4 10.0 25.5 24.5 21.6
2003 18.2 9.7 25.5 25.1 21.5
Source: German Labour Office (http://statistik.arbeitsamt.de).
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Mittelstandsmonitor (2004, p. 91ff.)). A small company is defined here as one with 
fewer than 50 employees. For companies with more than 50 employees, the balance was 
negative from 1993 to 2000 -  more jobs being lost than created. In contrast, in the 
period 1985 to 1992, companies with more than 50 employees had both positive and 
negative balances, depending on the year. One does admittedly have to be careful with 
the interpretation of these statistics. When large companies re-organise, they sometimes 
create smaller, independent entities. They will be included in the job creation of smaller 
companies, even though no genuine creation of employment has taken place.
1.3 Chapter Summaries
This thesis studies determinants of company performance from an empirical perspective. 
The scope of the thesis is restricted first to private companies and second to the issues 
of control, risk and incentives.
1.3.1 The Role of Control
Chapter two studies the influence of the private benefits of control on the capital struc­
ture and the growth of private companies. Surveys document the importance that 
owners give to keeping control of their companies (e.g., Cressy and Olofsson (1997); 
Poutziouris et al. (1998)). However, so far, it is unclear what effect this may have 
on company characteristics such as the use of different financing instruments and the 
growth of companies. This chapter tries to answer this question.
In order to investigate the consequences of the private benefits of control, it is im­
portant to be able to quantify them. We approximate the extent of control by the 
probability that the largest owner will win a vote. We then calculate this probability 
after a hypothetical equity increase. Potential loss of control is measured by the differ­
ence in the probability of winning a vote before and after a hypothetical equity increase. 
This potential loss of control can then be related to specific company characteristics of 
interest. If potential loss of control is higher, then the owner would lose more private 
benefits in an equity-driven expansion.
This chapter investigates three hypotheses. First, we expect a negative relationship 
between potential loss of control and the size of equity increases. Owners who lose more 
control for a given equity increase face a cost component in addition to the required
18
return on the new equity -  the cost of losing influence. This makes equity increases 
less attractive. Second, it is hypothesised that potential loss of control is positively 
related to the leverage of companies. Companies where existing owners would lose more 
control in an expansion will rely more extensively on bank financing and will therefore 
have higher leverage than otherwise comparable companies. Owners are prepared to 
pay higher interest rates for additional loans in order to keep control. Third, the 
relationship between potential loss of control and company growth is anticipated to be 
negative. This is a consequence of the first two hypotheses. Some growth opportunities 
become unprofitable, if they are financed with debt in a situation when debt levels are 
already high. Even if the returns of the growth opportunity exceeds the cost of equity 
capital, equity finance may not be used, because a control premium is demanded. Fewer 
growth opportunities will be realised as a result, and company growth will be smaller.
To study these effects, information on private UK companies with limited liability 
is used. The data set comprises 8,964 companies and covers the years 1997 to 2001. 
Only independent companies are included in the data set, because a company that is 
100% owned by another company has no direct owner who would care about control. 
Also, independent companies whose largest owner is a company, or neither a company 
nor an individual (e.g. a trust or a fund), are excluded. These types of owners will not 
have an interest in control comparable to that of individuals.
There is a clear indication that potential loss of control has a negative effect on the 
size of equity increases. Since the majority of companies have a zero equity increase, 
we use a tobit model to measure the effect. We also find that potential loss of control 
has a positive influence on leverage. Owners who would lose more influence in an 
equity-driven expansion prefer to use debt more extensively. Finally, there is a negative 
relationship between potential loss of control and company growth. Owners are willing 
to give up some growth opportunities in order to stay in control.
1.3.2 The Role of Risk
Chapters three and four study the influence of owners’ underdiversification on the prof­
itability and financing of their companies. Owners of private companies are often highly 
underdiversified. They have a large share of their net worth invested in one company, 
which exposes them to idiosyncratic risk (see Moskowitz and Vissing-Jprgensen (2002)). 
It is often necessary that entrepreneurs invest their own wealth, because their companies
19
provide no collateral. Since banks are confronted with problems of asymmetric infor­
mation, they are reluctant to extend unsecured loans. By investing their own money, 
entrepreneurs also document their confidence in the quality of their company. This can 
help to overcome the problems of asymmetric information that banks are confronted 
with. We expect underdiversification to have important consequences for the effort ex­
erted by owners who are at the same time managers, the selection of projects, and the 
financial structure of private companies.
Empirically we measure underdiversification as the share of the personal net worth of 
an owner that is invested in the company. We use two measures of underdiversification. 
The first considers only the value of the equity investment. It is calculated as the 
ownership share in the company times the total value of the equity divided by the net 
worth of the owner. The second measure takes into account that the equity investment 
is not the only way in which the owner’s assets are tied to the company. Owners can 
also give personal guarantees for company loans, they can use private assets as collateral 
and they can extend loans to the company. For the calculation of the second measure, 
these commitments are added to the value of the equity investment.
Effects on the Profitability of Private Companies
Chapter three concentrates on the relationship between underdiversification and the 
profitability of private companies. The theoretical literature suggests that underdiver­
sification increases the returns that are required for investment. This is because owners 
are exposed to idiosyncratic risk. So far, we only know that average returns on public 
equity are not higher than average returns on private equity, i.e. there seems to be 
no compensation for idiosyncratic risk at the aggregate level (Moskowitz and Vissing- 
Jprgensen (2002)). However, we do not know how the situation looks like when analysed 
at the company level.
We investigate two possible responses to underdiversification. First, owners can se­
lect the projects in which they invest such that the expected returns are sufficient to 
cover the cost of underdiversification. To depict the mechanism involved, we present 
a microeconomic model that derives a positive relationship between underdiversifica­
tion and required returns in a simple framework with investment opportunities in one 
safe and one risky asset. Second, owners who are at the same time managers can 
work harder to ensure the success of their company. The more underdiversified they
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are, the more does their financial well-being depend on the profitability of the com­
pany. Both responses predict a positive relationship between underdiversification and 
company profitability
Two separate data sources are used for the analysis: the Survey of Consumer Fi­
nances (SCF, wave 1989 to wave 2001) and the Survey of Small Business Finances 
(SSBF, wave 1998); they both include information on companies and households in 
the USA. Their specific advantage for this chapter lies in the provision of information 
on the characteristics of private companies and on the private wealth of their owners. 
Both surveys were conducted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Washington, DC.
In our empirical analysis we find a positive, significant relationship between underdi­
versification and the profitability of companies. Profitability is measured as return on 
equity. The effect of underdiversification is smaller for richer owners, which is consistent 
with decreasing relative risk aversion. For a sub-sample of owners who do not have an 
active management interest in the private company they own, we also find a positive 
relationship between underdiversification and profitability. In this case, higher effort 
can be excluded as a cause and it is possible to tie down the result to higher required 
returns. We also find that owners who axe at the same time managers exert more effort 
if they have a higher degree of underdiversification. Effort is measured as self-reported 
weekly hours worked. Underdiversification is therefore a source of incentives.
Our findings imply that the realisation of a business idea can depend on the net 
worth of the potential owner. If the investment volume is large relative to the net 
worth, then the business idea needs to have a higher expected return in order to be 
realised. Furthermore, the available loan volume of additional bank finance can also be 
crucial, since it allows the potential owner to scale back the use of own resources.
Effects on the Financial Structure of Private Companies
Chapter four studies how the owner’s underdiversification affects the financial structure 
of the company. Private companies are restricted in the choice of financial resources 
they can tap. They have to rely on two main sources for their financing. On the one 
hand, equity is provided by a limited number of owners; on the other hand, loans are 
taken out from banks (Berger and Udell (1998)). To a certain degree, equity and bank 
financing are substitutes. Since the cost of equity capital increases in underdiversifi­
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cation, we hypothesise that owners with a higher degree of underdiversification have a 
higher demand for bank finance. As we have seen in chapter 3 that companies with 
more underdiversified owners are more profitable, we also expect that the supply of 
loans is increasing in underdiversification. From these considerations it follows that 
underdiversification should be related to higher leverage. There is no clear prediction 
for the equilibrium interest rate, since higher demand should increase and higher sup­
ply should decrease the interest rate. We also hypothesise that liquid asset holdings 
are lower if owners are more highly underdiversified, because the opportunity costs of 
liquidity are higher.
The empirical analysis is based on the 1998 wave of the Survey of Small Business 
Finances (SSBF). The survey gives not only a detailed account of the financial structure 
of private companies, but also information on the most recent loan application. For 
example, it is asked whether the most recent loan application was approved, for which 
amount the company applied and which interest rate the company had to pay.
Our hypotheses are broadly confirmed by the data. More underdiversified owners, 
confronted with a higher cost of equity capital, have a higher demand for bank loans. 
Underdiversification increases not only the probability of a loan application, it also 
increases the loan volume applied for. With respect to the supply of loans our expecta­
tion was not confirmed. Underdiversification has no strong influence on the probability 
that a loan application is approved. As hypothesised, there is a significant positive 
and large effect of underdiversification on leverage. There is no clear hypothesis with 
respect to the interest rate and in the empirical analysis we also find that underdi­
versification does not influence the interest rate. With respect to liquidity, we find a 
clear negative relationship between underdiversification and liquid asset holdings. This 
confirms that the opportunity cost of liquidity is higher for owners with a higher degree 
of underdiversification.
These findings add to our understanding of how underdiversification of owners affects 
the financial structure of private companies. Owners try to reduce their risk exposure 
from underdiversification with the help of additional bank finance. This also implies 
that the availability of bank finance is important for the scope of business activities 
that private companies engage in.
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1.3.3 The Role of Incentives
Chapter five studies the effects of the share of managerial ownership on performance 
and the determinants of this share for German private companies with limited liability. 
The ownership share of managers can have two opposing effects on performance -  
the incentive and the entrenchment effect. Managers with a higher ownership share 
have better incentives to exert effort, because they can keep a higher portion of the 
resulting increase in profits (the incentive effect). The incentive effect predicts a positive 
relationship between ownership share and company performance. However, if managers 
hold large shares of the equity, it becomes more difficult for outside owners to exercise 
control (the entrenchment effect). This effect is especially important for high ownership 
shares. It predicts a negative relationship between ownership share and performance.
We also investigate the relationship between the riskiness of the company and the 
ownership share of managers. The risk aversion of managers predicts a negative rela­
tionship between riskiness and ownership. However, managers also use their ownership 
stake to signal company quality to banks. Since banks are especially reluctant to lend 
money to risky companies, there can also be a positive relationship between the riskiness 
of the company and the ownership share of managers.
The analysis is based on information about small and medium-sized private compa­
nies with limited liability (GmbHs) in the German business-related service sector. The 
sample includes 2,797 observations referring to 1,351 companies. It is an unbalanced 
panel that covers the years 1997 to 2000. Since there is no accounting information avail­
able for this type of German company, we base our performance measure on a business 
survey that is conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in 
Mannheim, Germany. The data derived from the survey are merged with company 
information provided by Creditreform, a German credit rating agency.
We address the potential endogeneity of managerial ownership share by estimating 
lagged specifications as well as employing instrumental variable methods. Furthermore, 
we investigate the dynamic structure of the panel using the Arellano-Bond GMM esti­
mation technique.
The analysis shows that the ownership share of managers is associated with the in­
centive as well as the entrenchment effect. Increasing the ownership share up to around 
80 percent has a positive impact on company performance. The effect becomes nega­
tive for higher values of ownership share. The positive effect reflects better incentives,
23
whereas the negative effect is due to an entrenchment effect.
Risk has a non-linear influence on the ownership share of managers. For high and low 
levels of risk, the relationship is positive, whereas for medium levels, it is negative. The 
positive relationship between risk and managerial ownership share can be an indication 
of signalling of company quality by management; the negative relationship can be due 
to the risk aversion of managers.
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Chapter 2 
Private Benefits of Control, Capital 
Structure and Company Growth
2.1 Introduction
In many industrialised countries, governments are concerned that small companies find 
it difficult to obtain enough finance to realise their growth potential (e.g., Cressy (2002); 
Wren and Storey (2002)). However, owners would sometimes not accept additional 
finance, even if it were available, because they want to remain in control of their com­
panies. They want to remain in control because they obtain private benefits over and 
above the financial return on their investment. In order to stay in control they need to 
forego some growth opportunities, if the opportunities are too extensive to be realised 
with debt finance alone. This means that companies do not reach their growth potential 
and employ fewer people than would otherwise be the case.1
Surveys document the importance that owners give to keeping control of their com­
panies (e.g., Cressy and Olofsson (1997); Poutziouris et al. (1998)). However, so far, it 
is unclear what effect this may have on company characteristics such as the use of dif­
ferent financing instruments and the growth of companies. This chapter tries to answer 
this question.
A possible method of investigating the consequences of the private benefits of control 
is first to calculate how much control the largest owner would lose in a hypothetical 
equity increase. This potential loss of control can then be related to company charac­
1 There is also an argument that overlending occurs (see, for example, de Meza and Webb (1987) 
and de Meza (2002)).
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teristics of interest. The extent of control is approximated by the probability that the 
largest owner will win a vote. Potential loss of control is calculated as the difference in 
the probability of winning a vote before and after a hypothetical equity increase.
This chapter tests three hypotheses. The first two hypotheses are related in that 
they are concerned with the use of financing instruments; the last hypothesis is related 
to company growth. First, we expect a negative relationship between potential loss of 
control and the size of equity increases (HI a). Owners who lose more control for a given 
equity increase face a cost component in addition to the required return on the new 
equity -  the cost of losing influence. This makes equity increases less attractive. Second, 
it is hypothesised that potential loss of control is positively related to the leverage of 
companies (Hlb). Companies where existing owners would lose more control in an 
expansion will rely more extensively on bank financing and will therefore have higher 
leverage than otherwise comparable companies. Owners are prepared to pay higher 
interest rates for additional loans in order to stay in control. Third, the relationship 
between potential loss of control and company growth is anticipated to be negative 
(H2). This is a consequence of the first two hypotheses. Some growth opportunities 
become unprofitable, if they are financed with debt in a situation when debt levels are 
already high. Even if the returns of the growth opportunity exceed the cost of equity 
capital, equity finance may not be used, because a control premium is demanded. Fewer 
growth opportunities will be realised as a result, and company growth will be smaller.
To study these effects, information on private UK companies with limited liability is 
used. The dataset comprises 8,964 companies and covers the years 1997 to 2001. Private 
companies are used because their ownership is typically more concentrated than that of 
public companies. Owners of companies with dispersed ownership do not suffer a loss 
of control in an equity expansion, because they have negligible influence to start with. 
There are also public companies with concentrated ownership but because private and 
public companies are different in many respects, it would be difficult to combine them 
in one analysis.
For the identification of the effect of potential loss of control on company charac­
teristics, it is important to deal with two related econometric problems. First, for the 
econometrician it is not possible to observe whether companies have growth opportuni­
ties and yet do not use them, as the owners want to stay in control. It is only possible 
to work with proxies for growth opportunities, but the proxies themselves are typically 
influenced by decisions taken by the owners or managers. For example, expenditure on
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R&D is often used as a measure of growth opportunities. However, an owner who wants 
to stay in control would not undertake R&D in the first place, even if possibilities to ex­
pand existed. Second, it is not possible to directly investigate the relationship between 
loss of control due to actual ownership changes and the dependent variable of interest, 
because actual ownership changes are inherently endogenous. For example, an owner 
would only give up control if he had profitable growth opportunities. It would therefore 
not be surprising to find that companies in which the largest owner lost control are 
growing faster.
One way of dealing with the above-mentioned problems is to work with hypothetical 
equity increases that are the same for all companies. This mitigates the endogeneity 
problem and does not require a good measure of growth opportunities. The loss of 
control resulting from the hypothetical equity increase needs to be quantified and can 
then be used in the regression analysis. Section 2.3 of this chapter gives a detailed 
description of how potential loss of control is calculated.
The empirical results confirm the expected effects of potential loss of control. Com­
panies in which the largest owner would lose more influence in the face of an equity 
increase have smaller equity increases, are more highly levered and exhibit slower growth 
than comparable companies.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 gives an overview 
of the related literature. Section 2.3 covers the measurement of potential loss of control. 
Section 2.4 highlights important institutional details of private companies in the UK. 
Section 2.5 explains the dataset. Section 2.6 presents the empirical analysis. Finally, 
section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
2.2.1 Theoretical Background
What are private benefits of control? Although the theoretical literature has analysed 
the effects of the private benefits of control, there is rarely a specific analysis of the 
sources of the benefits. In general, benefits can be divided into two categories: pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary. The pecuniary benefits can be a managerial salary that is higher 
than the market rate or perks that can be taken, for example, an expensive company car. 
The non-pecuniary benefits can be even more important than the pecuniary ones. They
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include the prestige and social status that comes with ownership as well as the power to 
decide on the business strategy of the company and independence from superiors. Non- 
pecuniary benefits can be especially strong if the owner is the founder of the company 
or if the company has been controlled by the owner’s family for a long time, because 
then the relationship between owner and company is closer.
There are two main ways in which private benefits are modelled. One strand of the 
theoretical literature assumes that private benefits reduce company resources and are 
costly to extract, i.e. for each pound of private benefits enjoyed, the company’s value 
decreases by more than one pound. This fits well for private benefits that are mainly 
pecuniary (e.g., Burkart et al. (1998); Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000)). A second 
strand models private benefits as existent 'in addition to monetary benefits. Their 
enjoyment is not using up company resources (e.g., Aghion and Bolton (1992); Zwiebel 
(1995)). This approach captures more the non-pecuniary elements of private benefits 
since no costly diversion strategy is required. For private companies the non-pecuniary 
benefits seem to be more important, since all owners typically have a significant stake 
and axe therefore informed about the situation of the company. No owner would allow 
other owners to divert substantial resources for private benefit.
How do the private benefits of control affect company characteristics? In the fol­
lowing, some recent contributions incorporating private benefits will be discussed. The 
model by Anderson and Nyborg (2001) is probably most closely related to the empirical 
analysis in this chapter. It sheds light on how the choice of financing and growth of 
a company are related. The companies are characterised by a contracting inefficiency 
that allows insiders to divert cash flow for their private benefit, i.e. the model assumes 
pecuniary benefits of control. In the first stage, an entrepreneur can do R&D and 
start a company. In the second stage, the company can either be financed with outside 
equity or with debt. If debt financing is chosen, the entrepreneur may remain in the 
position even if an outside manager could do the job better. If equity is chosen, the 
entrepreneur risks being replaced by a more able outside manager. It can be seen that 
equity promotes higher second stage growth than debt, but this advantage must be 
traded off against the disadvantage of reduced incentives to do R&D in the first stage.
Cressy (1995) focuses on loss of control due to bank loans, leaving loss of control due 
to equity aside. It is assumed that the larger the bank loan is, the larger is the loss of 
control. Then, since the utility of entrepreneurs depends negatively on the size of the 
bank loans, companies will borrow less than is optimal. For some of the entrepreneurs
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the loss aversion diminishes over time; they start to borrow more and their companies 
grow.
A strand of the literature that is less directly related to this chapter concerns models 
that analyse ownership structures after an original owner sells shares to obtain finance. 
Bebchuk (1999) looks at the choice between a concentrated and a dispersed owner­
ship structure in the context of an IPO, when private benefits of control exist but are 
not necessarily costly to extract. He finds that larger private benefits tend to favour 
concentrated ownership, because by either keeping a controlling stake or by selling a 
controlling stake to one new owner, the original owner can enjoy the private benefits.
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) derive efficient ownership structures for the case 
where private benefits are costly to extract. The founder of the company can choose an 
ownership structure with several large shareholders. They find that for every possible 
constellation there is a one-share one-vote ownership structure that maximises efficiency. 
This is due to the alignment effect, from which it follows that the company value 
increases in the cash flow stake of the controlling coalition. They also derive a coalition 
formation effect which says that the coalition with the smallest cash flow stake wins, 
because it has the largest group of shareholders from whom to expropriate.
In sum, there are theoretical models that derive the implications of private benefits 
of control on company characteristics, but there is no model that brings out the hy­
potheses concerning the effect of private benefits on capital structure, equity issuance 
and company growth that are tested empirically in this chapter.
2.2.2 Previous Empirical Evidence
Survey evidence shows the reluctance of many owners to make use of private equity or 
venture capital, because they do not want to lose control over their company. In a survey 
of private companies in the UK, Poutziouris et al. (1998) find that 50% of the owners 
would not consider issuing external equity. They indicate that ‘maintaining control /  
keeping the company in the family’ is one of their main business goals. This attitude 
was also found in a survey of Swedish small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) in 
which many owners indicated that they would rather sell the whole company than take 
on additional owners (Cressy and Olofsson (1997)).
Indirect evidence for the existence of non-pecuniary benefits in private companies 
has been provided by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jprgensen (2002). They find for the
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USA that equity holdings in private companies yield about the same return as equity 
holdings in public companies. However, the volatility of an index on private companies 
is, if anything, higher than the volatility of an index on public companies. Given that 
households are typically not well diversified in private equity, it is difficult to explain 
why households hold private equity at all if only the financial return is being considered. 
The authors suggest that non-pecuniary benefits of control might be one explanation.
So far, there is no direct evidence on the size of the private benefits of control for 
private companies. For public companies the importance of private benefits can be 
inferred from the price differential in take-over contests between voting shares and non­
voting shares (e.g., Lease et al. (1983); Zingales (1994)). Another possibility is to gauge 
private benefits from block trades of shares by looking at the difference between the 
price of a share in the block and the price of a share on the stock exchange. Barclay 
and Holderness (1989), for example, find that equity blocks of at least 5% of common 
stock trade at an average premium of 20% for a sample of 63 US block trades between 
1978 and 1982. This suggests that there are private benefits that only accrue to holders 
of large blocks.2
2.3 M easurement of Potential Loss of Control
It is crucial for the analysis to find a measure that describes how much influence the 
existing owners would lose in an equity expansion. Influence is measured by means of a 
probabilistic voting model; more specifically, the measure of influence is the probability 
of winning a vote for the largest owner in a yes-no decision that is taken with a simple 
majority. The measure for a decrease in influence is therefore the difference between the 
probability that the largest owner will win a vote given the current ownership structure 
and the probability that the largest owner will win a vote in a new ownership situation 
after a hypothetical equity increase. The difference between the two probabilities is 
termed ‘potential loss of control’. For the calculation of the measure it is assumed that 
all owners vote independently of each other with equal probability for or against the 
largest owner. It is now possible to calculate the probability that the largest owner 
will win by considering all possible voting patterns. Cubbin and Leech (1983) used 
this probabilistic voting model to identify the influence of shareholders in UK public
2For more recent analyses of the private benefits of control see, for example, Nicodano and Sem- 
benelli (2000) and Dyck and Zingales (2002).
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companies.3.
For the equity increase it is assumed that all but the largest owner increase their 
stake. Here the idea is that the largest owner is more likely than the others to be 
wealth constrained, because the largest owner has already a considerable investment in 
the company. First, an equity increase of 10% is considered, because this volume is the 
most prevalent in the sample. Second, an average loss of control measure is calculated 
that considers different volumes of equity increases with the relative frequency in which 
they occur in the sample.4 The two measures, calculated under the assumption that 
each owner votes individually, are denoted by Ind_10 for the 10% increase and by 
Ind_avg for the average of different sizes of equity increases, respectively.5
A short example should help clarify the measure. Consider a company with three 
owners of which the largest owner holds 40% of the equity, the second largest 35%, and 
the smallest 25%. In a vote, the largest owner will always vote ‘yes’ and the other two 
owners vote independently of each other. There are four cases to consider. First, all 
three owners vote ‘yes’ and the largest owner wins the vote. Second and third, only 
one of the smaller owners votes ‘yes’ but the largest owner nevertheless wins the vote. 
Fourth, both smaller owners vote ‘no’ and the largest owner loses the vote. It follows 
that the largest owner has a 75% probability of winning a vote. The probability of 
winning can be calculated in the same fashion after a hypothetical change in ownership.
Because family ownership is very common for private companies, it is worth trying 
to incorporate family structures into the voting behaviour as a robustness check. It is 
possible that family members have the same opinion on company matters and therefore
3Cubbin and Leech (1983) developed a formula to calculate approximate probabilities in the case of 
many owners with this voting model. For this analysis, it is possible to calculate the exact probabilities, 
because the number of owners is smaller in private companies. Felsenthal and Machover (1998, p. 36; 
p. 171f.) discuss the interpretation of measures of voting power. The Banzhaf measure reflects voting 
power as the degree to which an owner’s vote is able to influence the outcome of a decision; and the 
Shapley-Shubik measure reflects voting power as the expected payoff that an owner gets from a fixed 
prize that is allocated to the winning coalition. Leech (2002) finds that the Banzhaf measure reflects 
variations in the power of shareholders of British listed companies better than the Shapley-Shubik 
measure. The measure used here is a linear function of the Banzhaf measure. It was, among others, 
also used by Nickell et al. (1997)
4The relative weights are 0.71 for a 10% increase, 0.1 for a 30% increase, 0.07 for a 50% increase, 
0.03 for a 70% increase and 0.09 for a 90% increase.
5As a robustness check the potential loss of control was calculated for the case that equity is 
increased by an additional owner who enters the company. The results were very similar.
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vote most of the time together. However, it could also be that family quarrels lead to 
family members expressing opposing views. In order to model family voting behaviour, 
it is assumed that all owners with identical last names belong to one family and that 
members of one family vote as one bloc, i.e. all members of a family vote either ‘yes’ or 
‘no’. This is one of several possibilities to model family voting behaviour, but it has a 
specific advantage. It is possible that some owners transfer part of their ownership to 
their spouse for tax reasons. The decision on how to vote the shares remains, however, 
with the original owner, i.e. own and transferred shares are voted identically. The 
potential loss of control measure incorporating family structures takes this possibility 
into account. Again, a 10% equity increase (Fam_10) and a weighted average of different 
sizes of equity increases (Fam_avg) are considered.6
The measure of potential loss of control has specific strengths and weaknesses. An 
advantage of this measure is that it takes the whole distribution of ownership into 
account, i.e. it has different values depending on whether the remaining shares are 
dispersed or concentrated. For example, if the largest owner is the only one with a 
substantial stake and the other owners hold only a negligible investment, then the 
largest owner will have much more influence than when faced with only a few other 
owners, who also have a large number of shares.
This measure can best be viewed as a reflection of a priori voting power that abstracts 
from particular personalities and ignores affinities or disaffinities between voters. It is 
important to recognise that independent voting is part of the definition of the extent 
of control, not an assumption about how the world works.
A potential limitation of this measure is its focus on the effect of an equity expansion 
on the largest owner. This implicitly assumes that the largest owner is influential in 
decisions regarding the capital structure, equity issuance and growth. Although this 
need not be the case in every company, it can be regarded as a good first approximation.
Potentially, there are other measures that could be used as an approximation for loss 
of influence in a hypothetical equity increase. The ownership share of the largest owner 
is a possibility. However, for decisions taken by simple majority it does not matter 
whether the largest owner is marginally or significantly above 50%, a point that is not 
reflected by this measure. The use of the part of the largest owner’s share that exceeds
6Restricted by the information available in the dataset, a company is defined to be in family 
ownership, if two or more owners have the same last name. This is the case for 44% of companies in 
the sample.
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50% is also problematic. This could be seen as a measure for a buffer zone, reflecting 
how much ownership the largest owner could give up before losing influence. However, 
once the ownership falls below 50%, the distribution of shares among all other owners 
becomes of crucial importance for the amount of influence the largest owner would lose.
A measure of potential loss of control derived from hypothetical ownership changes 
is used in this analysis in order to mitigate the problem of endogeneity. This problem is 
encountered when looking at actual ownership changes. One could try to measure the 
loss of control afflicting the largest owner after an actual increase of equity. This could 
be related to company growth after the change. To the extent that companies with 
ownership changes grow faster than other companies with the same characteristics in 
the same industry, one would have a measure of the reward required for relinquishing 
control. However, since only companies with good growth opportunities would consider 
issuing new equity, a problem of reverse causality would be encountered. Of course, 
one could try to find instruments for the actual loss of control. It would, however, be 
extremely difficult to find a variable that is related to the decision of owners to give 
up control, but not to resulting company characteristics such as the capital structure 
or the company’s growth. Furthermore, the use of actual ownership changes would not 
allow us to investigate how private benefits of control affect the leverage of a company, 
because, by an accounting identity, all increases in equity will lead to a reduction in 
leverage.
It can be argued that the potential loss of control measure does not solve the endo­
geneity problem completely. The measure is a function of the ownership structure, and 
if the ownership structure is endogenous, so will be potential loss of control. However, 
by analysing hypothetical and not actual ownership changes this problem is reduced. 
It would still be desirable to instrument potential loss of control, but no suitable in­
struments are available.
2.4 Institutional Details
2.4.1 Voting Rights
In order to determine the probability that the largest owner will win a vote, it is 
necessary to know the percentage of votes held by each owner. This task is complicated 
by the fact that private limited companies can have several classes of shares and voting
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rights can vary according to share class. However, many companies have only one class 
and, in general, the smaller a company is, the fewer share classes it has.
For the calculation of voting rights, the most important distinction is between or­
dinary and preference shares. Ordinary shares confer voting rights and the right to 
obtain a dividend should one be declared. Preference shares, on the other hand, usu­
ally have no voting rights attached, and the owners are not directly involved in decisions 
concerning the company’s affairs. To make up for this disadvantage, preference shares 
have the right to a fixed dividend. Owners of ordinary shares only obtain a dividend 
if the amount distributed is sufficient to satisfy the claims of the owners of preference 
shares. Preference shares are typically cumulative, which means that skipped dividends 
of previous years must be made up as soon as dividend payments are resumed. For ex­
ample, an owner of a 7% preference share would have a right to a payment of 14% of 
the nominal value of the share should dividends have been skipped once. Preference 
shares often become voting shares should no dividend be paid over a specified number 
of years.
The dataset allows us to differentiate between ordinary and preference shares. For 
this analysis, ordinary shares are treated as voting shares and preference shares are 
treated as non-voting shares. In rare cases, the voting rights could be arranged differ­
ently.
One might think that the issuance of non-voting equity is a possible way to raise 
funding without losing control, because voting rights remain concentrated with the 
original owners. Although this mode of financing avoids costs related to loss of control, 
there are other disadvantages to be considered. It is difficult to find investors who are 
willing to invest money without having any influence on company strategy. If owners 
are willing to do it, then they will need to be compensated by higher expected dividend 
payments, which makes this form of financing expensive.7 The empirical analysis will 
separately control for the potential loss of control and the use of preference capital.
2.4.2 Decision Making
Owners of private companies come together in annual general or extraordinary meetings 
to decide on company matters. Decisions are normally passed with a simple majority.
7The optimality of one-share one-vote was studied by Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and 
Raviv (1988) in the context of public companies faced by take-over threats.
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However, the Companies Act lists a few decisions that require a 75% majority or indeed 
unanimity. In the Articles of Association, the owners can also agree to have stricter 
majority requirements for some decisions than are prescribed by the Companies Act.
Most decisions are taken by ordinary resolutions, which require a 50% majority. For 
example, they are used to increase share capital or to give authority to the directors 
to allot shares. Ordinary resolutions are used for all matters unless the Articles of 
Association or the Companies Act require another type of resolution. Extraordinary 
resolutions require a majority of 75%. These are necessary to modify the rights of classes 
of shareholders or for winding-up a company. Special resolutions, also requiring a 75% 
majority, are used for important matters such as alterations to the Memorandum or to 
the Articles of Association as well as for reductions of capital. There are also elective 
resolutions that must be passed by unanimous agreement. These resolutions are used 
to amend the duration of the authority of directors to allot securities or to dispense 
with the holding of annual general meetings.
Since ordinary resolutions are the most common type, this analysis will concentrate 
on them and will use a 50% majority requirement to determine the probability of 
winning for the largest owner. Furthermore, for a 75% majority requirement a different 
measure of control would be necessary. It is not sufficient to take into account that 75% 
of the votes are required to pass a decision. One also needs to consider that to preserve 
the status quo, only one vote above 25% is required.8
2.5 D ata
The database FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy), distributed by Bureau van Dijk, 
is used as the basis for the analysis. It includes all companies in the UK that satisfy 
at least one of the three following criteria: a turnover higher than £750,000, a pre-tax 
profit higher than £45,000, or shareholder funds greater than £750,000.
The detail of the information available in FAME depends on the publication re­
quirements, since only publicly available information can be included. In the UK all 
companies with limited liability are required to deposit their accounts with Companies 
House, so that their trading partners and the general public can inquire. The specific 
publication requirements depend on the size of the company.
8The information on institutional details in this section are taken from the Companies Act 1985 
and 1989 (Dey (1994)) and from the internet site of Companies House (www.companieshouse.gov.uk).
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The database provides information on financial data from balance sheets and from 
profit and loss accounts for the years 1989 to 2001. However, information on owners and 
directors is only provided from the year 1997 onwards. This restricts the time period 
covered by the analysis to the years 1997 to 2001. Since the database contains only 
the current ownership structure and the current directors, it was necessary to extract 
information from older versions of the database to construct time-series for the variables 
relating to this information.
The dataset used for this analysis includes companies that went out of business 
between 1997 and 2001. Companies that changed their legal form from private with 
limited liability (Ltd) to public with limited liability (PLC) are, however, not covered. 
This is a limitation of the analysis, since companies that change the legal form have 
probably better than average growth opportunities.9
Only independent companies axe included into the dataset, because a company that 
is 100% owned by another company has no direct owner who would care about control. 
Also, independent companies whose largest owner is a company or neither a company 
nor an individual (e.g. a trust or a fund) are excluded. These types of owners will 
not have an interest in control comparable to that of individuals. Companies from 
the financial sector, i.e. in financial intermediation and insurance, are also excluded 
since their capital structure will differ systematically from the capital structure of the 
rest of the companies. Furthermore, the 1st and the 100t/l percentile of financial ratios 
and growth rates have been deleted, because they contained implausibly large or small 
values. All reported results in this chapter relate to the trimmed sample.
Table 2.5 in the appendix provides, for easy reference, the structure of a private 
company’s balance sheet. The definitions for all the variables used are listed in table 2.6 
and 2.7, also in the appendix. Most variable names explain themselves, but some 
concepts should be emphasised. It is important to note that the term ‘equity’, as 
employed here, refers to the issued capital, i.e. to the nominal value of the shares. It 
does not include accumulated profits. Therefore, all observed equity increases are due 
to an issuance of additional shares.
‘Preference ratio’ is the ratio of preference capital to total equity capital. Preference
9It should be noted that merger and acquisition (M&A) activity is not important for the results. 
With the use of the Zephyr database, distributed by Bureau van Dijk, the companies engaging in 
M&A have been identified. The results axe not affected when those companies axe excluded from the 
analysis.
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capital is equity capital that is not vested with voting rights. The ‘capital expenditure 
ratio’ is the ratio of capital expenditure and other investments to total assets. It is used 
as a proxy for growth opportunities in the analysis.
2.6 Empirical Analysis
2.6.1 Stylised Facts
This subsection provides a short overview of the main characteristics of the companies, 
their growth and their financing patterns. It also presents additional information on 
the potential loss of control measure.
Table 2.8 in the appendix presents full descriptive statistics of the companies that 
are included in the sample. One can see that the companies are relatively small; the 
median number of employees being 53, whereas the mean is 130.
In contrast to public companies, private companies are generally characterised by 
a limited number of owners. The average company in the sample has 2.7 owners and 
companies with more than ten owners are exceptional. The full distribution of the 
number of owners is given in figure 2.1 in the appendix.
Figure 2.2 in the appendix displays the relationship between the average share of the 
largest owner and the age of the company. In fact, the share first increases and then 
decreases. The increase, in the beginning, can be caused by some owners buying out 
others while the company is still relatively young and is maybe in some difficulties. For 
companies over 30 years old, the share of the largest owner decreases, presumably due 
to expansion and ownership splits after the death of previous owners.
The distribution of the share of the largest owner has two mass points. There is only 
one owner with 100% ownership in about 27% of the companies, and in about 18% of 
the companies the largest owner has exactly 50% of all shares.
The development of leverage as the companies get older gives insight into the dynam­
ics of the capital structure. This information is presented in figure 2.3 in the appendix. 
Companies in the lowest age category, from one to nine years, have the highest lever­
age of about 70%. This number decreases continually till the companies reach the age 
range of 50 -  59 years and then stabilises at around 40% -  45%. This pattern shows 
the importance of internal finance in the growth process of companies. As companies 
get older, they can rely more heavily on retained profits as a source of financing, and
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consequently leverage decreases. It can also be interpreted as an aversion to bank fi­
nance. Companies need bank finance to start, but they try to reduce their exposure 
over time.
In order to judge the implications of a possible negative effect of potential loss of 
control on equity increases, it is necessary to know if fast growing companies use equity 
more extensively as a means of finance compared to slow growing companies. Table 2.1 
gives mean and median growth rates for total assets and financing choices. Internal 
financing refers to the sum of the profit and loss account (retained earnings), revaluation 
reserves and other reserves. In the sample period 1997 to 2001, companies use all three 
types of financing -  namely increases in equity, increases in liabilities and increases in 
internal financing. Companies that grow faster than the median company with respect 
to total assets also increase their equity more, but the median equity increase is still 
zero. This shows that faster growing companies make more use of equity financing.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 in the appendix allow a better understanding of the potential loss 
of control measures by plotting them with respect to the share of the largest owner. It 
can be seen that potential loss of control is especially high for medium-sized ownership 
shares. If the largest owner holds a share that is sufficiently above 50%, then potential 
loss of control is equal to zero, because the owner has full control before and after the 
hypothetical equity increase.
In many instances of the hypothetical ownership change the largest owner does not 
lose any control. If all but the largest owner increase their stake by 10% (Ind.lO), then 
the largest owner will not lose any control in 63% of cases. The respective value for
Table 2.1: Financing Choices
All Companies Only Fast Growing Companies
Mean Median Mean Median
Growth in total assets 6.4% 4.1% 19.1% 13.9%
Growth in equity 0.07% 0% 0.24% 0%
Growth in liabilities 6.1% 2.1% 23.0% 16.5%
Growth in internal financing 9.9% 7.2% 17.4% 12.3%
Note: Number of observations is 13,125. The subgroup ‘only fast growing companies’ contains only 
companies that grow faster than the median company with respect to total assets. This table is based 
on fewer observations than the regressions, since growth rates for all types of financing need to be 
observed. Annual growth rates are reported.
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the measure considering an average of different volumes of equity increases (Ind_avg) is 
37%.
2.6.2 Effect on Growth in Equity
This subsection presents the test of hypothesis HI a by relating the potential loss of 
control to the size of the equity increase. A negative relationship is expected, because 
owners who lose more control for a given equity increase find equity increases more 
costly. In the sample, the equity growth rate is zero for the vast majority of observations. 
Only 3.8% of observations have a positive growth rate, and 4.4% of observations have 
a negative growth rate. From a theoretical point of view there is no prediction on 
the relationship between potential loss of control and equity decreases. Therefore only 
companies with a zero or positive growth rate in equity have been chosen for this 
analysis. In order to get unbiased results, a tobit model with robust standard errors is 
used.
The dataset covers the time period 1997 to 2001, but on average a company is 
observed for less than three years. Some companies went into or out of business during 
the sample period and, over time, more companies have been covered in the ownership 
section of the database. Because the information on the time-series dimension is very 
limited, the tobit regression is done as a pooled time-series cross-section analysis. The 
standard errors are corrected to allow for heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation of the 
observations pertaining to one company. Since there is persistence in the characteristics 
of companies, it is likely that the error terms from observations relating to one company 
are correlated.
As can be seen from table 2.2, there is a clear indication that potential loss of 
control has a negative effect on the size of equity increases, which is consistent with 
hypothesis HI a. This table shows full regression results for the two potential loss 
of control measures Ind.lO and Ind_avg. The results for the measures that take the 
family structure into account (Fam.10 and Fam_avg) are very similar and therefore 
only presented in abbreviated form. Potential loss of control has a negative coefficient 
that is significant to at least the 5% level for the assumption of individualistic voting. 
For the assumption of family voting the coefficient is negative but not significant. The 
effect is also of high magnitude. As calculated for regression (a), the marginal effect 
for the unconditional expected value of equity growth (zero or positive growth rate) is
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Table 2.2: Effect on Growth in Equity
Dep. Variable: Non-negative Growth Rate Equity (in %)
(a) (b)
Potential loss of control -20.48*** -19.93**
(8.01) (8.36)
Share largest owner -9.17** -9.40**
(4.04) (4.09)
Dummy largest owner manager -11.14*** -11.32***
(2.14) (2.14)
Leverage 27.28*** 27 14***
(4.67) (4.67)
Preference ratio 16.89** 16.99**
(8.32) (8.32)
First lag ROA -15.07 -15.21
(12.06) (12.06)
Ln employees 3.99*** 4 02***
(0.764) (0.764)
Ln age -8.28*** -8.23***
(1.53) (1.53)
Equity 1.27 1.27
(0.781) (0.784)
Number of observations (companies) 25,360 (8,859) 25,360 (8,859)
Wald test, x2(58) 493.0*** 490.8***
Abbreviated further regression results: (c) (d)
Potential loss of control -10.17 -5.50
(8.67) (8.60)
Note: ***,**,*=significant on the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Tobit estimation considering non-negative 
growth rates of equity. 980 observations are uncensored (larger than zero), 24,380 observations are 
censored (equal to zero). The regressions differ according to the potential loss of control measure 
used. The regressions shown in full refer to individualistic voting; regression (a) employs Ind_10 and 
regression (b) Ind_avg. The abbreviated results refer to family voting; (c) employs Fam_10 and (d) 
Fam_avg. The regressors are expressed as ratios. Robust standard errors allowing for heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation are in parentheses. The regressions contain industry and year dummies as well as 
their interaction terms.
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—0.64. Using this marginal effect, an increase of potential loss of control of one standard 
deviation leads ceteris paribus to a decrease in equity growth of 0.1 percentage points. 
This effect is larger if only companies with equity increases are considered. The marginal 
effect conditional on being uncensored (positive growth rate) is —2.52. This translates 
into a decrease of the equity growth rate of 0.4 percentage points for a one standard 
deviation increase of potential loss of control ceteris paribus.10
To identify the influence of the private benefits of control, it is necessary to control 
for other characteristics of the ownership structure that could have an influence on the 
dependent variable. As further control, the ownership share of the largest owner is 
included. Since the appropriate functional form was unknown, this variable was first 
included as a polynomial of order four. The highest power was then dropped, if it 
wasn’t significant to at least the 10% level. Ultimately, only the linear term was kept.
In around three quarters of the companies, the largest owner is also a manager. In this 
case, the ownership share of the largest owner proxies for the incentive to exert effort in 
managing the company. If the largest owner is not a manager, then the ownership share 
proxies for the intensity of monitoring. Larger owners have a better incentive to monitor, 
because they reap a higher proportion of the gains from monitoring. Their decisions 
are less affected by the possibility of free riding. In an exploratory specification, the 
ownership share was interacted with the dummy for the largest owner being a manager. 
Since the difference of the two effects was not significant, results are shown without the 
interaction term.
From the negative coefficient of share of the largest owner, it can be concluded that 
better incentives to exert effort or better incentives to monitor lead to smaller equity 
increases. It could be that empire building, i.e. growing the company above a level that 
maximises value, can be prevented.
A dummy that equals one if the largest owner is at the same time manager is also 
included. The significant negative coefficient shows that equity increases are smaller, if 
the largest owner is at the same time manager. This could also be an indication that 
empire building is prevented.
Two controls for the company’s capital structure are included: leverage and the 
preference ratio (ratio of preference capital to total equity capital). The regression 
shows that companies with higher leverage rely more on equity financing. The positive
10Conditional on positive equity growth, the mean growth rate is 20.2% and the median is 4.8%.
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effect of leverage is consistent with the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf (1984)). 
Companies will use debt financing until their debt capacity is reached, only then will 
they issue new shares. The proceeds of an equity increase can be either used to finance 
future growth or to reduce leverage. Pagano et al. (1998), for example, find that Italian 
companies used the proceeds of an initial public offering mainly to reduce leverage.
The preference ratio shows the extent of the use of preference capital. The use of 
preference capital gives an indication of the control aversion of owners since it allows the 
raising of equity without losing control. It is also an expensive form of financing since 
the shareholders need to be compensated for their lack of influence on company strategy 
through higher dividends. The positive influence of this variable on equity increases is 
difficult to interpret, because it is not possible to observe whether the equity increase 
relates to ordinary or preference stock. However, most equity increases will concern 
ordinary stock, since only 4.4% of the companies in the sample use preference capital.11 
The positive influence can therefore indicate that companies with a high preference ratio 
have exhausted their ability to issue non-voting stock and are forced to issue ordinary 
stock.
Past profitability has no effect on equity increases. This could be because past 
profitability has two conflicting effects on equity growth. First, companies that were 
successful in the past will have accumulated retained earnings and don’t need to rely 
on equity finance. Second, if success if persistent, then profitable companies have more 
growth opportunities and require more capital to expand. Neither of the effects is 
dominant in the regression.
The regression also includes two controls for company size. Size measured as the 
natural logarithm of the number of employees has a significant positive effect on equity 
increases. The absolute amount of equity is also related to size. It is included to control 
for any level effects. This variable is not significant in the current specification, but it 
has a significant positive effect once the natural logarithm of the number of employees 
is excluded. Older companies have smaller equity increases. One reason could be that 
retained earnings are sufficient for the investment needs.
As a robustness check, the effect of potential loss of control on the probability of 
an equity increase was tested with a probit regression (not reported). The dependent 
variable is equal to one for equity increases and equal to zero for no changes in equity.
11 The preference ratio, i.e. the ratio of preference capital to total equity capital, is quite high for 
companies that use preference capital. Its mean is 40.7% whereas its median is 35.7%.
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Potential loss of control has a significant negative influence on the probability that an 
equity increase is observed. Also, the coefficients of the other regressors keep their sign 
and significance level. As in the tobit regression, observations with negative equity 
growth rates have been disregarded.
To summarise, the results of this subsection show strong evidence for the negative 
influence of potential loss of control on the size of equity increases. Overall, the results 
are consistent with hypothesis HI a.
2.6.3 Effect on Leverage
Table 2.3 presents the results for the leverage equation. Consistent with hypothesis 
Hlb, potential loss of control has a positive influence on leverage. Owners who want to 
stay in control prefer to use debt more extensively than owners who are not confronted 
with a potential loss of control. In order to stay in control, they may accept paying a 
higher interest rate to obtain further loans. The results are significant to the 1% level 
for all potential loss of control measures. The economic significance of this effect is also 
not negligible. For regression (a) it has been calculated that a one standard deviation 
increase of potential loss of control increases leverage ceteris paribus by 0.96 percentage 
points.
This specification contains more observations than the previous one explaining eq­
uity growth. Here all companies are included, whereas the equity growth specification 
excluded companies for the years in which they had negative equity growth.
The share of the largest owner has a positive influence on leverage.12 The size of 
the ownership share can be used to signal company quality to banks. The owner is 
only willing to invest a large amount of private wealth, when convinced of the quality 
of the company. Banks may give more loans to companies that have at least one large 
owner. This reasoning relates to the work of Leland and Pyle (1977) who made a 
similar argument about the ownership share of managers. The positive effect of the 
largest owner being at the same time manager can have a similar interpretation. The 
additional commitment of the largest owner increases the debt capacity of the company.
12 This specification was also first estimated with the ownership share of the largest owner included 
up to its fourth power. The third power was significant, but since the cubic form showed a positive 
relationship over the relevant range, the specification with only the linear term is shown. This makes 
the results better comparable across the three subsections. The results of the other regressors were 
not affected.
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Table 2.3: Effect on Leverage
Dep. Variable: Leverage (in %)
(a) (b)
Potential loss of control 6.81*** 6.63***
(1.48) (1.57)
Share largest owner 4.32*** 4.39***
(0.885) (0.904)
Dummy largest owner manager 3.66*** 3.72***
(0.455) (0.455)
Preference ratio 5.95*** 5.90***
(1.71) (1.71)
Capital expenditure ratio -6.19** -6.21**
(2.92) (2.92)
First lag ROA -64.7*** -64.6***
(2.29) (2.29)
Ln employees 2.80*** 2.79***
(0.177) (0.177)
Ln age -11.04*** -11.07***
(0.307) (0.306)
Number of observations (companies) 26,522 (8,964) 26,522 (8,964)
R squared 0.23 0.23
Abbreviated further regression results: (c) (d)
Potential loss of control 11.12*** 9.66***
(1.73) (1.78)
Note: ***,**,*=significant on the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level. OLS estimation. The regressions differ 
according to the potential loss of control measure used. The regressions shown in full refer to individu­
alistic voting; regression (a) employs Ind_10 and regression (b) Ind_avg. The abbreviated results refer 
to family voting; (c) employs Fam_10 and (d) Fam_avg. The regressors are expressed as ratios. Robust 
standard errors allowing for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are in parentheses. The regressions 
contain industry and year dummies as well as their interaction terms.
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The regression also includes a control for the use of preference capital. The results 
show that a higher preference ratio is related to higher leverage. This is consistent with 
the view that more excessive use of debt finance is a means for the original owners to 
keep control.
In regressions explaining leverage, it is common to control for growth opportunities. 
It is, however, difficult to find a good measure of growth opportunities for private com­
panies. For public companies, the market to book value is commonly used. However, it 
is not available for private companies, since there is no observable market value. R&D 
expenditure is a further frequent choice, but it is not available in the dataset. For 
this analysis the capital expenditure ratio (ratio of capital expenditure to total assets) 
is chosen. Companies with good growth opportunities will in general invest more in 
machinery and equipment than other companies. The coefficient of this variable shows 
that companies with more growth opportunities, i.e. a higher ratio, have lower lever­
age. This result is consistent with the theory on underinvestment as described by Myers 
(1977) which concludes that companies with many growth opportunities should use less 
leverage.
The control for past profitability shows that profits are partly used to reduce leverage. 
This observation is consistent with an aversion to losing control to banks.13
The positive influence of size on leverage can be attributed to a more stable cash flow 
stream and therefore a higher debt capacity for larger companies. Age has a negative 
effect on leverage because retained profits become more important over time, increasing 
shareholders funds and reducing leverage. This was already shown in figure 2.3 in the 
appendix.
2.6.4 Effect on Company Growth
The third specification is concerned with the explanation of company growth. In gen­
eral, company growth is volatile, fluctuating from one year to the next depending on the 
market conditions the company is confronted with. This makes it more difficult to iden­
tify the influences on company growth. In order to reduce the noise in the dependent 
variable, a growth rate that is averaged over a time period of four years (1998-2001)
13There can also be an effect of reverse causality. If companies with high leverage need to pay higher 
interest rates, then profitability can be reduced. The results for the other regressors remain the same, 
when the first lag of return on assets is excluded.
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is chosen. The regressors refer to the beginning of the period (1998).14 Consequently, 
ordinary least squares with standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity is an 
appropriate method to apply to the cross-section of observations.
Table 2.4 presents results on the testing of hypothesis H2.15 It can be seen that 
companies whose owners would lose more control in an expansion indeed grow more 
slowly. This is consistent with the hypothesis that owners who want to stay in control 
are willing to give up growth opportunities. The effect is negative and significant 
to at least the 5% level for all potential loss of control measures. The size of the 
effect, calculated for regression (a), is substantial. A one standard deviation increase 
in potential loss of control leads ceteris paribus to a 0.44 percentage points decrease in 
annual growth.
The share of the largest owner has a negative effect on company growth. As in the 
previous specifications, this variable was first included as a polynomial of order four. 
However, only the linear term showed ultimately a significant effect. The negative effect 
of the share of the largest owner is consistent with the argument that better incentives 
to exert effort or better incentives to monitor can prevent empire building. The dummy 
variable indicating whether the largest owner is a manager has no significant influence 
on company growth.
Leverage has a significant negative effect on growth, which is consistent with the 
pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf (1984)). A company with financial slack will 
take all profitable growth opportunities, but if only risky debt can be used, some growth 
opportunities will be passed up.16 A negative relationship between leverage and growth 
is also found by Lang et al. (1996) for public companies. When splitting the sample 
into companies with high and low growth opportunities, however, they find the
14The results axe qualitatively identical when the time period 1997-2000 is considered.
15 The company growth regression covers fewer companies than the previous ones because not all 
companies are observed over this period. An estimation with a Heckman correction for attrition bias 
has therefore been employed. But since the error terms of the selection and the main equation have 
not been correlated, the results using the standard OLS technique are shown.
16It can be argued that leverage is endogenous in this regression. Companies in difficulties will 
have small growth rates and low profitability. Leverage can build up, if interest and capital cannot be 
serviced any more. This leads to an effect from small growth rates to high leverage. In this situation 
it would be appropriate to instrument leverage, but no good instruments are available. Therefore 
a specification without leverage was tested. The signs and significance levels of the other regressors 
remain the same.
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Table 2.4: Effect on Company Growth
Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth of Total Assets, 1998-2001 (in %)
(a) (b)
Potential loss of control -3.14** -3.44**
(1.34) (1.45)
Share largest owner -2.13*** -2.30***
(0.793) (0.826)
Dummy largest owner manager -0.472 -0.493
(0.491) (0.490)
Leverage -2.65*** -2.65***
(0.926) (0.926)
Preference ratio -3.51** -3.53**
(1.75) (1.75)
First lag ROA 21.94*** 21.92***
(2.56) (2.56)
Ln employees 0.024 0.026
(0.150) (0.150)
Ln age -0.862*** -0.851***
(0.268) (0.268)
Number of observations (companies) 4,377 (4,377) 4,377 (4,377)
R squared 0.05 0.05
Abbreviated further regression results: (c) (d)
Potential loss of control -6.12*** -5.69***
(1.76) (1.80)
Note: ***,**,*=significant on the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level. OLS estimation. The regressions differ 
according to the potential loss of control measure used. The regressions shown in full refer to indi­
vidualistic voting; regression (a) employs Ind-10 and regression (b) Ind_avg. The abbreviated results 
refer to family voting; (c) employs Fam_10 and (d) Fam_avg. The regressors are expressed as ratios 
and refer to the year 1998. Robust standard errors allowing for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. 
The regressions contain industry dummies.
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negative relationship only confirmed for companies with low growth opportunities.
This regression also includes a control for the use of preference capital. More ex­
tensive use of preference capital is related to slower growth. A high preference ratio 
is a sign that it is getting more difficult to issue additional preference capital. The 
alternative of issuing common (voting) stock is not attractive for owners who want to 
stay in control.
Controlling for past profitability shows that companies that were profitable in the 
past are likely to grow more in the future; a persistence of company success can be seen.
In addition, the size and age of companies have been controlled for. The regressions 
show no relationship between the size of a company and its subsequent growth. The 
age of a company, however, has a negative effect.
2.7 Conclusions
This chapter studies the influence of private benefits of control on the issuance of 
new equity, leverage and company growth. It is hypothesised that companies in which 
existing owners would lose more influence in an expansion have smaller equity increases, 
use more debt and grow more slowly. Evidence supporting the predicted effects on the 
size of equity increases, leverage and company growth is found. The effect of loss of 
control on company growth is especially important in economic terms.
Overall, these findings are consistent with the view that there are demand side 
constraints of finance. These results also agree with previous survey evidence that 
highlighted the importance that owners attach to control (Cressy and Olofsson (1997); 
Poutziouris et al. (1998)). This chapter takes the analysis a step further by showing 
that the owner’s fear of losing control can affect company characteristics such as capital 
structure and growth.
These results have important implications for economic policy. The main impli­
cation is that it is important to differentiate between the demand and supply side 
constraints of finance. The UK government, for example, has started the ‘Enterprise 
Investment Scheme’ (EIS) in order to help small companies raise equity capital. This 
was in response to evidence that showed an equity gap for companies who want to raise 
moderate amounts of equity between £100,000 and £500,000. The scheme gives various 
tax advantages for individuals investing in a company with which they were previously 
unconnected (Bank of England, 2001). However, it seems that few companies axe af­
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fected by supply side constraints of finance. Only 1.7% of the companies mentioned 
‘access to finance’ as their main problem in the NatWest/SBRT Quarterly Survey of 
Small Business in Britain (NatWest/SBRT, 2002). The caution that emanates from 
this chapter is that when observing companies that have growth opportunities but do 
not grow, one needs to be careful to consider both demand and supply side constraints. 
One should not immediately conclude that there is a market failure in the provision 
of equity capital. It is especially important to consider demand side constraints of 
finance when designing government programmes to support small and medium-sized 
companies.
The negative effect of loss of control on company growth has possible implications 
for the aggregate growth of economies. The fact that owners value control implies that 
their companies do not exploit all growth opportunities and therefore do not create as 
much employment and value added as they could. This can have an effect on aggregate 
growth, if some growth opportunities are idiosyncratic to a certain company, for exam­
ple, if specific knowledge is required or if synergies with existing activities are necessary. 
Under such circumstances, it may not be possible for other companies to exploit the 
growth opportunities.
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2.8 Appendix
Table 2.5: Balance Sheet of a Private Company
A ssets Liabilities
Fixed assets Current liabilities
Current assets Long-term liabilities
Shareholders funds
• Issued capital
• Total reserves
o Share premium account
o Profit and loss account
o Revaluation reserves
o Other reserves
Total assets Total liabilities
Shareholders funds represent the book value of assets that belong to the shareholders. 
This position can be divided into the issued capital, which corresponds to the nominal 
value of the shares, and the total reserves. The components of the total reserves are: the 
share premium account (premium that was paid in excess of the nominal value of the 
shares at the issuance date), the profit and loss account (the accumulation of retained 
profits), the revaluation reserves (the upward or downward revaluation of assets), and 
other reserves.
The term ‘equity’ in this chapter refers to the issued capital.
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Table 2.6: Definition of Variables I
Variable Definition
Equity (Issued capital)
Share largest owner
Dummy largest owner 
manager
Leverage
Preference ratio 
Capital expenditure ratio
ROA
Ln employees 
Ln age
Industry dummies 
Time dummies
Nominal value of issued shares
Ownership share largest owner
Dummy equal to 1 if the largest owner is manager,
0 otherwise
Ratio of the sum of current and long-term liabilities 
to total assets
Ratio of preference capital to total equity capital
Ratio of capital expenditure and other investments 
to total assets
Ratio of profit before taxes to total assets 
Natural logarithm of the number of employees 
Natural logarithm of the age of the company in years 
One digit level of the UK SIC code 
Year of the observation
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Table 2.7: Definition of Variables II
Variable Definition
Several potential loss 
of control measures, 
variable names listed 
below
Ind-10
Ind_avg
Fam_10
Fam_avg
Potential loss of control incurred by the largest owner due 
to a hypothetical equity increase. All owners but the 
largest increase their stake. Overall, four measures are 
employed:
First, it is assumed that each owner votes individually. 
Two measures of potential loss of control are calculated, 
differing in the size of the equity increase.
Equity is increased by 10%.
Different volumes of equity increases are considered with 
the relative weight that they have in the sample.
The relative weights are 0.71 for a 10% increase, 0.1 for 
a 30% increase, 0.07 for a 50% increase, 0.03 for a 70% 
increase and 0.09 for a 90% increase.
Second, as a robustness check, the family structure of the 
owners is taken into account. It is assumed that members 
of the same family vote as a single block.
Equity is increased by 10%.
Different volumes of equity increases are considered with 
the relative weights as in Ind_avg.
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Table 2.8: Descriptive Statistics
Variable M ean M edian Stdev. M in M ax
Number of employees 130 53 573 1 34,763
Age (in years) 27 21 20 1 145
Total assets (in m. £) 8.5 3.2 47.9 0.015 4,368
Equity (Issued capital) (in m. £) 0.246 0.025 1.52 0.000001 77.8
Growth equity (in %) 0.30 0 7.89 -35 150
Avg. annual growth of
total assets 1998-2001 (in %) 5.89 4.54 13.4 -44.8 87.6
Leverage (in %) 56.6 58.5 23.5 0 119.0
Preference ratio (in %) 1.78 0 10.3 0 90.0
Capital expenditure ratio (in %) 2.54 0.70 5.10 -18.7 28.6
ROA (in %) 6.31 5.08 9.07 -25.2 49.6
Number of owners 2.74 2 2.02 1 26
Share largest owner (in %) 64.8 54.0 26.2 8.3 100
Dummy largest owner manager 0.75 1 0.43 0 1
Potential loss of control
Ind_10 0.087 0 0.14 0 0.5
Ind_avg 0.11 0.054 0.13 0 0.5
Fam_10 0.046 0 0.11 0 0.5
Fam_avg 0.066 0 0.11 0 0.5
Note: Number of observations is 27,800-28,366.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of the Number of Owners
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Figure 2.3: Average Leverage by Age of Company
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Figure 2.4: Potential Loss of Control (IncLlO) vs. Share Largest Owner
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Figure 2.5: Potential Loss of Control (Ind_avg) vs. Share Largest Owner
Share Largest Owner (in %)
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Chapter 3
Underdiversification, Required  
R eturns and Incentive Effects
3.1 Introduction
Private companies rely for their financing mostly on the equity investment of a limited 
number of owners and on bank loans (Berger and Udell (1998)). Problems of asym­
metric information influence the financing, because the effort of the entrepreneur and 
the riskiness of projects are difficult to observe for outsiders. It follows that banks need 
to cope with moral hazard and adverse selection, which can lead to credit rationing 
(Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). This situation is aggravated by a lack of collateral in many 
companies, which could be pledged to make the lending less risky. Because of the prob­
lems of asymmetric information it follows that entrepreneurs need to invest their own 
wealth and that non-managing owners need to invest an amount high enough to justify 
the monitoring costs. The required investment volume is often large in relationship 
to the net worth of the owners -  owners are therefore often highly underdiversified. 
Underdiversification means that a high share of the personal wealth is invested in one 
company.
Moskowitz and Vissing-j0 rgensen (2002) document that average returns to private 
equity are not higher than average returns to public equity, even though owners of 
private companies are often highly underdiversified. This is puzzling, since theoretical 
models show that underdiversification increases the cost of equity capital substantially 
(see Kerins et al. (2004) and Heaton and Lucas (2000a)). We would therefore expect 
that owners require a compensation for their exposure to idiosyncratic risk reflected
57
in higher returns to private equity. So far, it remains unclear whether owners of pri­
vate companies do not require compensation for their exposure to idiosyncratic risk 
or whether other reasons are responsible for the relatively low returns to private eq­
uity. Or, to pose the problem differently, it is not known whether idiosyncratic risk is 
priced in private companies. The answer to this question has important implications 
for the investment decisions at private companies. If idiosyncratic risk is priced, then 
the selection of projects depends on the underdiversification of the owner, since the 
underdiversification influences the return required to make a project profitable.
We test empirically whether there is an underdiversification effect, i.e. whether un­
derdiversification is related to higher company profitability. We investigate two ways in 
which owners can respond to underdiversification. First, owners can require higher re­
turns. They can select the projects in which they invest such that the expected returns 
are sufficient to provide compensation for the exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Second, if 
owners are at the same time managers, they can work harder to ensure the success of 
their company. The more underdiversified they are, the more their financial well-being 
depends on the profitability of the company.
Two data sources from the USA are used for the analysis: the Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF, wave 1989 to wave 2001) and the Survey of Small Business Finances 
(SSBF, wave 1998). Both surveys were conducted by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC. They are well-suited for this analysis, be­
cause they provide information on private companies and on the wealth of their owners.1 
The SCF data has the further advantage of differentiating between owners with and 
without an active management interest. This allows the separate identification of the 
two channels of the underdiversification effect. Owners who are not at the same time 
managers do not influence company profitability through managerial activity. If there 
is a positive relationship between underdiversification and profitability it must be due 
to higher required returns. In contrast, for owner-managers any positive effect could 
also be driven by higher effort. The SCF provides information on weekly hours worked 
for owner-managers, which can be used as a proxy for effort. It is therefore possible 
directly to test the second channel of the underdiversification effect, namely whether 
underdiversification increases effort.
1 These surveys have been widely used in the literature, e.g. to examine lending relationships 
(Petersen and Rajan (1994); Cole (1998)), agency costs (Ang et al. (2000); Bitler et al. (2004)), and 
returns to private equity (Moskowitz and Vissing-J0rgensen (2002)).
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Empirically, we measure underdiversification as the value of the equity investment 
in the private company divided by the net worth of the owner. It is important to note 
that there is no benchmark of zero underdiversification. Every individual is exposed to 
some idiosyncratic risk. For example, employees typically depend on the success of one 
company for most of their labour income. Also, even if investments in the stock market 
are divided between many companies, most investors do not achieve the theoretical 
ideal of full diversification of idiosyncratic risk. We approach underdiversification from 
a relative and not from an absolute perspective. The empirical measure allows a com­
parison of underdiversification between owners; it determines which owner has a higher 
degree of underdiversification.
In our econometric analysis we find that underdiversification has a positive, signifi­
cant effect on the profitability of companies, which can be either due to higher required 
returns or to higher effort. This effect is smaller for richer owners, which is consistent 
with decreasing relative risk aversion. For a sub-sample of owners who do not have an 
active management interest, we also find a positive relationship between underdiversi­
fication and profitability. This supports the view that underdiversified owners require 
higher expected returns, since higher effort can be excluded as a cause. For owners who 
are at the same time managers we establish a positive relationship between underdiver­
sification and effort, measured as self-reported weekly hours worked. Owner-managers 
who are financially more dependent on the success of their companies have a higher 
incentive to work hard.
The plan of the chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 provides an overview of the related 
literature; Section 3.3 gives more detail on the data sets and defines the variables used 
in the analysis; Section 3.4 develops the hypotheses; Section 3.5 presents the results, 
and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
The prevalence of underdiversification has been documented for the USA by Moskowitz 
and Vissing-Jprgensen (2002). Households with an investment in private equity have, on 
average, 41% of their net worth invested in private equity. In addition to the concentra­
tion with respect to the asset class, there is a concentration with respect to the selected 
investments. 85% of the total investment in private equity is, on average, invested in 
one actively managed company. Owners are therefore exposed to the idiosyncratic risk
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of the company. The main interest of the authors is the returns to private equity. With 
the SCF data they calculate value-weighted returns for the intervals between two waves 
that take the appreciation of the market value of equity and the retention of earnings 
into account. The returns are calculated under several differing assumptions and fig­
ures that range from 12.8% to 19.0% on average over the three intervals covered are 
obtained. The authors draw attention to the puzzle that the average return on private 
equity is not higher than the average return on public equity, even though the owners 
are underdiversified. On average there seems to be no compensation for idiosyncratic 
risk.
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jprgensen (2002) analyse average values, i.e. their study is at 
an aggregate level. It has therefore to remain as open question whether underdiversified 
owners do not receive a compensation for their exposure to idiosyncratic risk or whether 
the low returns have a different explanation, for example the existence of non-pecuniary 
benefits or overoptimism by the owners. With an analysis at the company level, we 
directly test in this chapter whether underdiversification and profitability are related.
For public equity, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) predicts that idiosyn­
cratic risk is not priced, since investors have the opportunity to diversify. There is only 
a compensation for the systemic risk component of the stock. In contrast, investors 
in private equity cannot diversify. Theoretical models show that underdiversification 
increases the cost of equity capital for private companies. Kerins et al. (2004) use the 
CAPM to derive the cost of capital for an underdiversified entrepreneur. In their model, 
the entrepreneur can choose between an investment in the own company and the mar­
ket. The relative weights of the two assets determine the total risk of the portfolio. 
This total risk can be duplicated by leveraging an investment in the market. From the 
levered market investment it is possible to calculate the returns that can be achieved 
in the market. These returns are the opportunity cost of capital for the underdiversi­
fied portfolio. The authors use data on recent high-technology IPOs to calculate the 
opportunity cost of capital. Information on the betas and on the variance of returns of 
these companies is used. There is no information on actual underdiversification needed 
for this analysis -  the authors calculate the cost of equity capital for different assumed 
levels of underdiversification. This method shows that underdiversification consider­
ably increases the cost of equity capital. This is also the conclusion reached by the 
model of Heaton and Lucas (2000a). The theoretical models are complementary to the 
analysis of this chapter. The models establish that there are costs due to underdiver­
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sification, but they cannot test whether owners actually demand a compensation for 
their exposure to idiosyncratic risk.
So far, data on underdiversification has been rarely used in the literature. Heaney and 
Holmen (2004) are an exception. They measure underdiversification due to concentrated 
investments in public companies for a sample comprised of the richest Swedes. The 
authors use the cost of underdiversification as a proxy for the value that controlling 
shareholders attach to their control.
Himmelberg et al. (2002) argue that concentrated ownership should be related to 
better company performance, since concentrated ownership leads to underdiversification 
for which a compensation is necessary. In a sample of public companies they find a 
positive effect of concentrated ownership, which they interpret accordingly. However, 
the authors do not use information on the actual underdiversification of owners. In 
order to clearly differentiate between a positive incentive effect from ownership and a 
positive effect due to underdiversification, it is necessary to separately control for the 
ownership share and the personal underdiversification of the owner.
This chapter analyses how exposure to idiosyncratic risk influences required returns 
and effort by owners. Related to this topic is the literature considering the effects of 
exposing risk-averse managers to idiosyncratic risk through stock or stock options. For 
example, managers value stock or stock options in their compensation contracts less, 
when they already have greater parts of their wealth correlated with the value of the 
company (Lambert et al. (1991), Kahl et al. (2003)). Also, risk aversion can influence 
the investment decisions of managers, when they are exposed to company specific risk 
(Parrino et al. (2002), Morellec (2003)).
3.3 D ata
3.3.1 D ata Sources
The analysis is based on information from two different surveys. Both the Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF) and the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) provide 
information on the financial situation of owners and on their companies. The surveys 
aim to be representative for households and companies in the USA. From the SCF 
the waves 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998 and 2001 are used. From the SSBF only the wave 
1998 is used, because this is the only wave with information on the net worth of owners.
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Both surveys were conducted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Washington, DC.
The Survey of Consumer Finances has the household as the primary unit of interest. 
The main purpose of the survey is to document the amount and the composition of 
household wealth. It therefore includes some questions on private companies owned by 
households. For the purpose of this analysis two sub-samples are used. The first sub­
sample selects all households with an active management interest in a private company. 
For households that own several private companies, only the information about the 
largest one is used.2 Overall, the sub-sample contains complete information on 4,973 
households with an active management interest in a private company. Of these, 4,324 
companies are finally included in the analysis. Observations for companies with an 
equity value below US-$ 1,000 are deleted, because such small values of equity can lead 
to very implausible returns on equity figures. Furthermore, companies are required 
to have positive sales and owners are required to have positive private wealth, i.e. 
positive net worth not considering the equity investment. As a further measure to 
ensure plausible return on equity values, the smallest and largest 1% of observations of 
this variable are excluded. Although the ownership share of the household is known, it 
is not clear whether the household is the largest owner. Households are asked to give 
an estimate of the market value of their equity share. Since there is no quoted price 
available, this value may be measured with error.3
For the second sub-sample of the SCF all households with ownership in a private 
business in which they do not have an active management role are selected. The survey 
provides information on the market value of the equity share owned and on the income 
that the household has received from the company. This information is given separately 
for companies of different legal forms. Should a household have ownership in two or 
more companies of the same legal form, then this information is only available as a 
sum for those companies. Overall, information on 1,486 households with ownership in 
2,090 (partly combined) companies is available. The same selection rules as for the 
first sub-sample apply, with the sole difference that the minimum size of US-$ 1,000 
applies to the equity share and not to the total equity. Finally, information on 1,429
2Of the households with an active management interest in private companies, 32% have a manage­
ment interest in more than one company.
3See Kennickell et al. (2000) for more information on the 1998 SCF survey.
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households and 1,925 companies is used.4
The Survey of Small Business Finances has the company as the primary unit of 
interest. It provides information on 3,561 private companies with up to 500 employees 
from the non-farm, non-financial sectors. Financial data on the company, as well as 
information about the largest owner, is available. Although it is known whether the 
company is run by a hired manager, it is not known whether the largest owner is also 
active in the management. The SSBF data differentiates between only three categories 
of total net worth of the owner: the book value of the ownership share, the equity 
value of the primary residence and the remaining net worth.5 As in the SCF sample, 
companies with equity values below US-$ 1,000 are not included in the analysis. This 
survey contains a surprisingly high share of 2 1 % of companies with negative equity 
values. (This issue is explored in more detail in section 3.3.2.2.) Likewise, companies 
are required to have positive sales, positive assets and owners are required to have 
positive private wealth. Since the SSBF data has more extreme values, trimming of the 
return on equity variable is done to the 5% level. 2,337 companies are finally included 
in the analysis.6
Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in tables 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11 in the 
appendix.
3.3.2 Variable Definitions
3.3.2 .1  M easurem ent of U nderdiversification
For the measurement of underdiversification it is important to have information on the 
owner’s equity investment in the company and on the owner’s net worth. The share of 
net worth invested in the company can then be used as proxy for the underdiversifica­
tion. N et w orth  is defined as the sum of all assets minus the sum of all liabilities of 
the owner.
435.6% households have ownership in only one company. 62.8% of households have ownership in 
more than one company, but each has a different legal form.
5Browning et al. (2003) consider problems that may arise when questions about aggregate values 
are asked in surveys. They discuss the usefulness of total expenditure questions as opposed to asking 
for expenditure in different categories. First, rounding can happen, i.e. values may be noisy. However, 
even with rounding, the total expenditure questions still contain valuable information. Second, it is 
possible that total expenditure is underestimated, if only one question about the total is asked.
6More detailed information on the 1998 SSBF survey is available in Bitler et al. (2001).
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Two measures for the share of net worth invested (SNWI) are calculated. The first 
method considers only the value of the equity investment. This variable is denoted with 
SNWI A.
_  (ownership share * total value o f equity) 
net worth
This information is calculated for the largest owner of the company in the SSBF data, 
whereas in the SCF data the responding household needs not be the largest owner. An 
additional difference is that value of equity relates to the estimated market value in the 
SCF data and to the book value in the SSBF data.
The second calculation takes into account that the equity investment is not the only 
way in which the owner’s assets are tied to the company. Owners can also give personal 
guarantees for company loans, they can use private assets as collateral and they can 
extend loans to the company. The second measure for underdiversification, SNWI B, 
takes these possibilities into account. It is calculated according to the following formula:
SN W I B =
(ownership share * total value o f equity) +  guarantees +  collateral +  loans
net worth
The SCF states directly the amount of loans that are guaranteed by the household, 
the value of household assets that are used as collateral and the volume of loans that 
are extended to the company by the household. The SSBF data, having the company 
as primary unit of interest, gives only the sum over all owners for these variables. This 
information is therefore multiplied by the ownership share of the largest owner to get 
an approximation of this owner’s personal involvement.
The measures SNWI A and SNWI B document a considerable degree of underdiver­
sification. For owners with active management interest, SNWI A is on average 33.7% 
(SCF) and 27.7% (SSBF). By additionally considering guarantees, collateral and loans, 
the average value of SNWI B is 3.6% and 5.8% higher, respectively.
If owners exhibit decreasing relative risk aversion, then, at higher levels of wealth, 
they will be less affected by the same degree of underdiversification. Therefore we also 
control for the level of private wealth. P riv a te  w ealth  is defined as net worth minus 
the value of the equity investment. It measures the assets that are not directly invested
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in the company. The D um m y high w ealth  is equal to one, if the owner belongs 
to the highest third of the distribution of private wealth in the respective sample. 
The cut-off point is 3.3 million US-$ for the SCF and 0.6 million US-$ for the SSBF. 
This dummy is interacted with the measures of underdiversification in the empirical 
analysis. The wealth levels in the SSBF axe smaller than in the SCF, since the SSBF 
is restricted to private companies with at most 500 employees. From the descriptive 
statistics in table 3.10 in the appendix it can be seen that households who hold equity 
without an active management interest are considerably richer than households who 
hold private equity with an active management interest. Private equity as a pure 
financial investment opportunity is especially attractive for richer households. In both 
the SCF and the SSBF data owners with more private wealth have on average a lower 
degree of underdiversification.
We now turn to the discussion of whether SNWI is a good measure for the underdi­
versification and the risk exposure of owners. Owners are exposed to several types of 
risk. For example, there is a concentration of income from one source and the possibil­
ity that the value of the ownership share can fall. These risks certainly increase with 
SNWI. However, some owners have unlimited liability, i.e. they Eire liable for company 
obligations with all their private Eissets. In practise, even owners with unlimited liabil­
ity lose only their equity investment in a bankruptcy, if their private assets are below 
exemption limits stipulated by the bankruptcy law. Fan and White (2003, p. 3) give 
evidence of the limited size of the personal losses in a bankruptcy. They state that: 
“they [entrepreneurs] often have no non-exempt assets”. Therefore also for owners with 
unlimited liability, SNWI is a good proxy for the risk exposure.7
7If a private company goes bankrupt in the USA with obligations still outstanding, an owner with 
unlimited liability can declare personal bankruptcy in order to dispose of the company debt. It is 
possible to give up all assets that are not exempt, but to keep future earnings (chapter 7) or to keep 
all assets and agree to a repayment plan to repay part of the debts (chapter 13). The exemption rules 
differ between states, but typically define an upper limit for home equity as well as for other personal 
assets. If owners agree to keep up payments on loans that are secured on their home or private car, they 
do not lose these assets. Furthermore, if the retirement savings are not excluded from the bankruptcy 
proceeding in the first place, they can be kept if the amount is reasonably necessary for the support 
upon retirement.
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3.3.2.2 Company Profitability
R etu rn  on E quity  (R O E ), defined as pre-tax profits divided by total equity, is used as 
a measure for company profitability The SCF data measures equity with an estimated 
market value and the SSBF with the book value. The profit figures in both surveys 
are reported before the payment of corporate and income tax. To make the numbers 
better comparable across legal forms, we calculate the corporate tax, which has to be 
paid only by C-corporations, and subtract it from the reported profits.8
The average of ROE in the SCF data is at 47.7% quite high. This is an average that 
gives equal weight to all observations. If one calculates an average that is weighted by 
the value of equity, one obtains a substantially lower number of 15.6%, comparable to 
the result of Moskowitz and Vissing-Jprgensen (2002).
As opposed to the SCF, where the value of equity is asked directly, the SSBF calcu­
lates the value of equity as the difference of the company’s assets and liabilities. It is 
likely that company assets and liabilities are measured with error, because most respon­
dents are not required by law to draw up a balance sheet. Any measurement error in 
assets and liabilities is passed on to the book value of equity. In the SSBF data it seems 
that assets axe on average underreported, because a high share of 2 1 % of companies 
have negative equity values. Underreporting of assets is consistent with the relatively 
high values for return on equity. Even the value-weighted average is, at 42.1%, quite 
high. Since SNWI is not well defined if the equity value is negative, only observations 
with positive equity values can be included in the empirical analysis.9
It is important to discuss whether there are problems in the measurement of ROE 
that could lead to a positive relationship between profitability and SNWI that would not 
be driven by higher required returns or higher effort. We first address the influence of 
tax evasion. Longenecker et al. (1996) find in a survey of 424 entrepreneurs that 54% of
8C- and S-corporations are both characterised by limited liability. C-corporations have to pay 
corporation tax for profits that are paid out to the shareholders. In contrast, profits of S-corporations 
are only charged with the personal income tax rate of their owners. Corporate tax rates differ according 
to the size of profits and have changed over the years. For our calculations we use the historical rates 
according to tax brackets which can be found at www.taxpolicycenter.org and, for 1994 onwards, at 
the home page of the American Internal Revenue Service, www.irs.gov.
9The analysis was also done with share of net worth invested set equal to zero for observations with 
negative equity or negative net worth. A dummy for negative equity and a dummy for negative net 
worth were included. The results are robust with respect to this modification.
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them have faced the issue of underreporting taxable income. However, the survey does 
not contain information on the size of underreporting. The question is to what extent 
the survey data used in this analysis can be affected by tax evasion. King and Ricketts 
(1980) and Parker (1984) conclude from an evaluation of the 1977 economic census that 
households report their true income to surveys, if the surveys don’t use tax forms as 
a basis. The SCF is not based on tax forms, whereas the SSBF refers respondents to 
tax statements for the company details but not for the wealth questions. Tax evaders 
will report lower values of ROE and also lower values of SNWI to the extent that they 
saved the gains from tax evasion. Therefore a positive relationship between SNWI and 
ROE can be influenced by tax evasion. However, since SNWI is a stock variable shaped 
by many other factors, this effect is likely to be too small to drive the results.
As the surveys provide only cross-sectional information, it is not possible to control 
for entry and exit. There is a higher probability that a company exits shortly after 
the survey has taken place, if the entrepreneur was overoptimistic when starting the 
company. Overoptimism likely leads to a high investment volume and to low returns, 
i.e. overoptimism yields a negative relationship between SNWI and ROE. This makes 
it more difficult to identify an underdiversification effect.
Investments of venture capitalists may reduce the underdiversification of the other 
owners. For venture capitalists, the capital gains from selling the company are an 
important source of income, whereas the profitability of the company during the in­
vestment period may be low. This could lead to a positive relationship between SNWI 
and ROE. However, overall less than 1% of all private equity (i.e. equity in sole pro­
prietorships, partnerships and corporations in private ownership) in the USA is held 
by venture capitalists (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jprgensen, 2002). This is also reflected 
in the SSBF data, which provides information on equity increases. Out of the 3,561 
companies covered, only 4 raised equity from a venture capital firm in the year prior to 
the survey.
3.3.2.3 O ther Characteristics o f Com panies and Owners
Following are definitions for the other control variables. Most variable names speak for 
themselves, but there are differences in the precise definition of the variables across the 
two surveys.
We consider the company-related variables first.
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Com pany size is the logarithm of the number of employees in the SCF data. The 
SSBF data covers only companies up to 500 employees. For this data set, company size 
is measured directly as the number of employees.
Com pany age is defined as the number of years since the company was started or 
acquired.
Industry  dum m ies in the SCF data differentiate between six industries. There 
is no industry information if the value of the equity that the household owns is above 
US-$ 100 million. The SSBF data identifies nine different industries. Tables 3.12 and 
3.13 in the appendix give an overview on the distribution of the companies according 
to industry.
D um m ies legal form  differentiate between sole proprietorships, partnerships, S- 
and C-corporations.
D um m ies type  of com pany acquisition indicate whether the company was 
founded, purchased or inherited.
It is important to know that the SCF data includes information on assets, such as 
private businesses, only at the household level, whereas education and job characteristics 
are included separately for the head of the household and the spouse. To be able to 
control for individual characteristics, we determine whether the head of the household 
or the spouse is the main owner according to the job characteristics. If only one person 
is working for the business, then this person is the main owner. If both are working 
for the business, then the single person being self-employed in the main job is the main 
owner. If both are self-employed in the main job, then the main owner is the one with 
the higher number of weekly hours worked in the main job. If both are working for 
the business, but neither is self-employed in the main job, then the single person being 
self-employed in the second job is the main owner. If both are self-employed in the 
second job, then the main owner is again the person with the higher hours of work in 
the second job.
The owner-related variables listed below are used in the analysis.
Value p rim ary  residence refers to the market value of the owner’s primary resi­
dence in the SCF data. In the SSBF data only the equity value (i.e. market value minus 
mortgages) is available. The value of this variable is set to zero, if the owner is renting 
the primary residence.
D um m y home owner has a value of one if the owner owns the primary residence.
Experience is calculated in the SCF data from the information on the work history
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of the head of the household and the spouse. Years in full-time employment are counted 
as such and years in part-time employment are weighted with a factor of 0.5. The 
variable refers to all kind of occupations. In the SSBF data experience is defined as the 
number of years owning or managing a company.
H ours worked is only available in the SCF data. It is the self-reported hours of 
work in the main job in a normal week. This information is used for the empirical 
analysis if, first, the owner states to be working in or participating in the operation of 
the company and, second, the owner states to be self-employed in the main job.
Ow nership share refers to the share of equity owned. In the SCF data the house­
hold is not necessarily the largest owner, whereas the SSBF data always refers to the 
largest owner.
Ow ner age is the age of the owner measured in years.
E ducation  dum m ies in the SCF data differentiate between a high school degree, 
a bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree, a PhD, or another higher degree. For the SSBF 
data the classification is no high school degree, a high school degree, some college but 
no degree, an associate degree, a vocational programme, a college degree, and a post 
graduate degree.
E thn icity  dum m ies in the SCF data set are available for White, Hispanic, African- 
American and Other. The SSBF data additionally covers Asian, Native Hawaiian or 
other Pacific Islander and American Indian or Alaska Native.
D um m y sex of owner is equal to one if the owner is female.
Year dum m ies are included in analyses using the SCF data. The distribution of 
observations according to year is given in table 3.14 in the appendix.
3.4 Development of H ypotheses
3.4.1 Influence on Required Returns
In this subsection we present a simple theoretical model in order to show how a posi­
tive relationship between underdiversification and profitability can be driven by higher 
required returns. This model will be also used to derive the regression specification of 
the empirical analysis. In the model there are two periods. Individual i invests initial 
wealth Wu in period 1 and returns realise in period 2. Investment is possible in a safe 
asset and in a risky asset. The safe asset has no minimum investment requirement and
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a return of To- The risky asset can be thought of as establishing a company. The size of 
the minimum investment and the expected return vary depending on the business idea. 
The minimum investment requirement of the risky asset for individual i is denoted by 
ki. The expected return of the risky asset is denoted by E fa ), and the realised return 
of the risky assets is tv The final wealth of individual i in period 2 depends on whether 
investment in the risky asset was chosen and, if this is the case, on the realised return 
of the risky asset.
= ki( 1 +  r*) +  (w u -  fci)(l +  r0) (3.1)
Utility is derived from consumption of W2i. Individuals have a utility function with 
constant relative risk aversion.
U(w2i) =  w £ -p)-, p > 0 ,  p /  1 (3.2)
In order to compute the minimum expected return that individual i requires for an 
investment in the risky asset, E(rimin), suppose the individual is indifferent to investing 
in the safe asset only or in the safe and the risky asset. The expected utility from both 
possibilities is then identical:
E  U | only sa fe  asset = E  U \ sa fe  and risky asset (3.3)
This condition can be written with the resulting wealth levels inserted into the utility 
function.
(wu (l +  r0))(1_p) =  E{ki{ 1 +  rimin) +  (wu -  fe)( 1 +  r0))(1_p) (3.4)
We rearrange this expression to arrive at:
( 3 5 )
From a second-order Taylor expansion around 7*0, we obtain an equation describing 
the determinants of the minimum expected return.
^ (^ im in ) =  *^0 T  1 /2  * 1/(1 +  T*o) * ki/Wu * p * F /(r jmjn T*o) (Tf>)
Individual i will invest in the risky asset, if E(ri) is larger than E(rirnin). The in­
dividuals underdiversification, ki/wu, increases the minimum expected return required 
for investment. If the expected returns axe not high enough for the given underdiver­
sification, then the risky asset will not be chosen -  the potential entrepreneur will not
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establish the company. Furthermore, the required return is increasing in the relative 
risk aversion, p, and in E(rimin — ro)2. This last term can be decomposed into the 
variance of the returns, E{rimin -  E(rirnin))2, and a bias term, (E{rimin) -  r0)2.
In the empirical implementation of equation (6 ) we use the realised return as a proxy 
for the required return. For this approach to be valid, it is important that realised 
returns and required returns are monotonically related. This can be shown as follows:
The expected return for individual i is an increasing function of the minimum ex­
pected return.
E(ri) = a + (3E{rimin) +  ??*; P  > 0  (3.7)
And the realised return for individual i is equal to the expected return plus an error 
term.
n  = E(ri) +  jii (3.8)
The realised return, r*, is therefore monotonically related to the minimum expected 
return, E(rimin).
T'i = Ot T P E ^ V im in ) ~\~ Pi P  > 0 (T9)
To derive the regression specification we substitute the expression for E(rimin) from 
equation (6 ) into equation (9). After linearising we obtain the following regression 
specification:
ROE = a + p iS N W I + P2dummy high wealth + P3S N W I * dummy high wealth 
-\-p4c0mpany size +  Pscompany age -I- p§industry dummies +  e (3.10)
SNWI is the empirical counterpart of ki/wu  in the model. From our theoretical 
model we expect a positive relationship between the underdiversification of the owner 
and the profitability of the company. Since it is not possible to observe the risk aversion 
of owners in the data, we employ the common assumption that richer owners are less 
risk averse. A dummy for high wealth levels allows a different treatment of richer 
owners. As an overall effect of high wealth, we expect that the compensation for 
underdiversification will be smaller. The theoretical model also gives importance to 
risk, but there is no measure of risk at company level available in the surveys. The 
included industry dummies control for risk insofar as it is the same in one industry. 
The controls for company size and company age also account partly for the influence of
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risk. The final empirical specification includes additional controls that do not appear 
in the simple model, for example dummies for legal form and education of the owner- 
manager.
The simple theoretical model does not allow for an investment in the stock market. 
Investment is only possible in a save asset and in one risky asset. This is a simplification 
that should not affect the main insights of the model. Heaton and Lucas (2000c) show 
that growth in proprietary income has a high variation in its correlation with returns 
to the stock market. As we cannot observe this correlation on a company-basis, we 
cannot control for it in the empirical analysis. Insofar as it is related to the industry, 
the industry dummies will control for it.
3.4.2 Influence on Effort
Why can there be a positive relationship between the underdiversification of an owner 
with an active management interest and the effort he is exerting? By working a bit 
harder the owner-manager can increase company profitability and thereby reduce the 
probability of company failure. The more the owner-manager is financially dependent 
on the success of the company, the higher are the incentives for effort. The incentive to 
work harder is especially high if the company is in difficulties, since a company failure 
has a big impact on the income and wealth of the owner-manager. After bankruptcy, 
labour income may be lost if a period of unemployment ensues; intangible assets, such 
as customer relationships, are destroyed and tangible assets can often only be sold with 
a loss. The effort cost of working longer hours may be small compared to the financial 
cost of a company failure. We expect that underdiversification has a smaller effect on 
effort for richer owner-managers, since, in absolute value, they have more assets to fall 
back on.
A positive relationship between underdiversification and effort is supported by stan­
dard utility functions, but utility functions using consumption relative to a reference 
point are an especially good description of the situation of an owner-manager confronted 
with the possibility of a bankruptcy (see, for example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). 
The utility function is flatter for consumption levels above the reference point than it 
is for consumption below the reference point, i.e. there is a kink at the reference point 
which makes losses relatively more painful. The reference point can be the consumption 
level of the last period or an expectation about future consumption. A company failure
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may have such pronounced effects on the financial situation of the owner-manager that 
he may be forced below the former reference point. Again, higher effort exerted to avoid 
this negative outcome may be worthwhile.
3.4.3 H ypotheses
This section describes the hypotheses that are tested in this chapter. The first two 
hypotheses concern the existence of an underdiversification effect.
Hypothesis 1: There is an underdiversification effect, i.e. there is a positive relationship 
between the owner’s degree of underdiversification and the profitability of the company. 
This effect can either work through higher required returns or through increased effort.
Hypothesis 2: The underdiversification effect is smaller for owners with higher private 
wealth. The required returns are smaller if owners exhibit decreasing relative risk 
aversion and the incentive effect of underdiversification is smaller if the owner-manager 
is less dependent on the success of the company.
The next two hypotheses describe a specific channel through which underdiversification 
affects profitability. It should be noted that the channels are not mutually exclusive.
Hypothesis 3: A positive relationship between the owner’s degree of underdiversification 
and the profitability of the company is driven by higher required returns.
Hypothesis 4• A positive relationship between the owner’s degree of underdiversification 
and the profitability of the company is driven by increased effort.
3.5 Empirical Analysis
3.5.1 Dealing W ith Endogeneity
In order to identify whether there is a positive relationship between underdiversification 
and company profitability that is driven by higher required returns or higher effort, it 
is necessary to deal with the problem of endogeneity. Several regressors used in the 
analysis are potentially endogenous. In general, we will use instrumental variables to 
deal with this problem. The variable for underdiversification, SNWI, is affected by 
reverse causality. Owners who know that a company is of high quality are willing to 
invest more. In this case there is a positive effect of the equity return on the share of net
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worth invested. The same effect is possible for ownership share. Owners may be willing 
to buy a higher share of a good company. Effort can also be influenced by profitability. 
Since the reward of working for a good company is higher, the owner-manager may work 
longer hours. However, an opposite effect is also possible. The owner-manager may 
work longer hours to keep a company of low quality alive. This could lead to a negative 
relationship between effort and performance in an OLS regression. In order to get 
consistent coefficient estimates, we instrument the potentially endogenous regressors. 10
The following instruments are used for the endogenous regressors: the value of the 
primary residence, a dummy for home ownership, the age of the owner, the sex of the 
owner and dummies for the type of company acquisition. The instruments are only 
valid, if there is no relationship between them and the profitability of the company.
We discuss first the validity of the value of the primary residence. Owners with 
profitable companies will accumulate wealth over time, which may be used to buy a 
more expensive house or to pay off the mortgage faster. For example, Gersick et al. 
(1997, p. 157) describe that the handing down of the company from parents to children 
can be at a time when the parents want to move to a larger house. A high value of 
the house would be related to high profitability. However, as is shown in the first-stage 
regression for SNWI, the direction of the effect in the empirical analysis is opposite. 
We find that a high value of the house is related to low profitability. If there is a 
relationship between instrument and dependent variable, then the coefficient for SNWI 
will be underestimated and we obtain a lower bound on the true effect. The use of this 
instrument for ownership share is more problematic. The value of the primary residence 
is positively related to the ownership share and the ownership share is positively related 
to profitability. If a larger home is bought in response to good company profitability, 
then the instrument has a direct relationship with the dependent variable. In this case 
the influence of ownership share on profitability will be overestimated. This possibility 
cannot be excluded. However, since the number of instruments is greater than the 
number of endogenous regressors, it is possible to test for overidentifying restrictions. 
The results of this test are reported along with all regressions. 11
10Instrumenting of SNWI is important for a second reason. In the SSBF data it is likely that equity, 
which enters into the calculation of SNWI, is measured with error. If the instruments are not related 
to this measurement error, then it will cause no bias.
11 The results of the second-stage regressions are qualitatively identical when the value of the primary 
residence is omitted from the instrument list.
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It can be argued that age of the owner itself is unrelated with profitability. When 
using it as instrument, it is, however, important to include a control for work experi­
ence of the owner in the main regression, because work experience can be related to 
profitability. Since age is correlated with experience, age can be related to profitability, 
if no explicit control for experience is included. 12
The sex of the owner should have no direct relationship with profitability. Also, the 
way the company was acquired, i.e. being founded, purchased or inherited, should be 
unrelated to profitability.
Table 3.1 presents the first stage results to determine the instrumented values. 13 
The determinants for SNWI A are shown in columns (1) and (2) for the SCF and 
SSBF data. The natural logarithm of the value of the primary residence has a negative 
effect. This is as expected since home owners have part of their wealth tied up so that 
it is not possible to invest it in a company. The dummy for home ownership has no 
significant effect. Older owners have a smaller share of their total net worth invested 
in the company. They have had more time to accumulate other assets and may have 
passed on part of their stake to children or new owners. Women tend to invest a smaller 
share of their net worth. The dummies for the way they company was acquired show 
no clear pattern across the data sets. There is also no clear presumption on the sign 
that they should have. As can be expected, SNWI is higher for larger companies. For 
company age the effect differs between the data sets.
Columns (3) and (4) cover the determinants for ownership share. The value of the 
primary residence has a positive effect and the dummy for home ownership a negative 
one. Home owners have part of their assets bound in the home. They have fewer assets 
available to invest in a large ownership share. The age of the owner is insignificant and 
the sex of the owner does not have an identical effect across the data sets. Owners have 
the highest ownership share, if they have founded the companies themselves. ‘Company 
founded’ is the base category in the regression. Company size has a negative influence 
on ownership share and company age has differing effects.
12Good instruments should have a higher correlation with the endogenous regressor. The finding 
by Heaton and Lucas (20006) suggests that this is the case for age. The authors document that the 
portfolio composition of individuals is influenced by their age. Individuals above the age of 65 have a 
smaller share invested in private equity. This is also reflected in our first-stage regression.
13The SCF data includes imputations for missing values. Five different imputations are given for 
each missing value. The reported results are calculated for the average of the imputed values.
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Table 3.1: Determining the Instrumented Values
Dep. variable: SNWI A Ownership share Ln hours
(i) (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
SCF SSBF SCF SSBF SCF
Ln value primary -3.12*** -2.91*** 1 7 3 *** 1.05*** -0.026***
residence (0.377) (0.322) (0.394) (0.310) (0.0093)
Dummy 0.360 5.09 -5.14** -10.9*** 0.096*
home owner (2.13) (3.24) (2.23) (3.12) (0.053)
Owner age -0.381*** -0.270*** -0.0060 -0.063 -0.023***
(0.054) (0.059) (0.056) (0.057) (0.0015)
Dummy -4 72*** -3 14*** 1.98* -1 .1 2 -0.189***
sex of owner (1.04) (1.17) (1.09) (1.13) (0.026)
Dummy purchased -1.33 -4.02*** -1.51 -0.042**
(0.829) (1.18) (0.867) (1.14) (0 .0 2 0 )
Dummy inherited -0.712 7.90*** -1 1  9 *** -3.27* -0.057
(1.46) (1.94) (1.52) (1.87) (0.037)
Company size 4.58*** 0.098*** -5.25*** -0.076*** 0.034***
(0 .2 2 2 ) (0.0087) (0.232) (0.0084) (0.0055)
Company age 0.189*** 0.051 0.235*** -0.152*** 0 .0 0 2 0 **
(0.037) (0.047) (0.039) (0.045) (0.00094)
No. of observations 4,324 2,337 4,324 2,337 3,335
F-test of excluded 49 2*** 55.7*** 17 8 *** 3.10*** 63.3***
instruments F(6 , 4291) F(6 , 2304) F(6 , 4291) F(6 , 2304) F(6 , 3302)
Shea’s partial R2 0.055 0 .1 2 1 0 .0 2 1 0.0077 0.043
R squared 0 .2 0 1 0.228 0.478 0.430 0.168
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions contain additional controls for industry, year (only 
SCF), education, experience, ethnicity and legal form.
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In column (5) we report the results for hours worked. This information is only 
available for the sub sample of the SCF including owners with an active management 
interest. Here it is interesting to note that owner-managers with a more valuable 
primary residence work shorter hours. This could be due to an income effect on labour 
supply. In contrast, owner-managers who own their primary residence work longer 
hours. Here it could have also been expected that owner-managers who own their 
primary residence have more security and are less under pressure to work long hours in 
order to secure the survival of the company.
The instrumenting of SNWI controls for problems of reverse causality, but not for 
owner-managers with a high degree of underdiversification exerting more effort. As 
found in the first-stage results for SNWI, an owner-manager with a primary residence 
of little value has, on average, a higher share of net worth invested in the company. 
In this case the owner-manager is more dependent on the success of the company as 
there are fewer assets to resort to and may therefore work harder. Indeed, this was 
found in the first stage for hours worked. We therefore need to split the sample into 
owners with and without management interest in order to separately identify influences 
on profitability stemming from higher required returns and higher effort. However, the 
division into sub samples of owners with and without a management interest can also be 
endogenous, since the decision whether to be active in the management can be related 
to the profitability of the company. For example, if the company is very good, then 
the owners may have become so rich that it is not worth any more for them to work. 
Or, if the company is very good, owners want to work, since returns on effort are high. 
However, even if the selection into the group is endogenous, we can still test whether 
there are specific relationships within the groups that are predicted by our hypotheses.
3.5.2 Is Underdiversification Related to Company Profitabil- 
ity?
This subsection discusses the existence of an underdiversification effect. It is anal­
ysed whether underdiversification of owners has a positive effect on the profitability of 
companies. For the moment we do not try to identify separate channels of the underdi­
versification effect, i.e. the effect can be driven by higher required returns or by higher 
effort.
Table 3.2 presents the results of the test of hypothesis 1, which postulates the exis­
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tence of an underdiversification effect in general. The regressors SNWI and ownership 
share can be endogenous and are instrumented as shown in table 3.1. There are four 
different specifications. Data from the SCF as well as the SSBF is used and both 
measures of underdiversification, SNWI A and SNWI B, are employed.
Regressions (1) and (2 ) use the underdiversification measure SNWI A and show 
results for the SCF and the SSBF data. SNWI A takes only the equity investment 
into account and disregards other ways in which owners’ assets could be tied to the 
company. There is a positive relationship between SNWI A and return on equity that 
is significant to the 1% and 5% level, respectively.14 This provides strong evidence for 
hypothesis 1. It is interesting to see whether the economic significance is of about the
Table 3.2: Underdiversification and Profitability
Dep. variable: Return on equity
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4)
SCF SSBF SCF SSBF
SNWI A SNWI B
SNWI 1.13*** 1.40** 1.05*** 1.31**
(0.260) (0.591) (0.244) (0.562)
Ownership share 0.769** 5.99** 0.614 5.64**
(0.401) (2.63) (0.384) (2.54)
Company size -2.37 0.233 -3.16 0.180
(2.17) (0.224) (2.19) (0 .2 2 0 )
Company age -0.468** 0.687 -0.377** 0.776
(0.186) (0.594) (0.177) (0.589)
Number of observations 4,324 2,337 4,324 2,337
Overidentification test, x 2 
(dof, p-value)
1 .8 8  
(4, 0.76)
6.89 
(4, 0.14)
2.46 
(4, 0.65)
7.71 
(4, 0.10)
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. Robust 
standard errors that are adjusted for the 1st step estimation are in parentheses. The regressors SNWI 
and ownership share are instrumented. Columns (1) and (2) refer to SNWI A and columns (3) and (4) 
refer to SNWI B. The regressions contain controls for industry, year (only SCF), education, experience, 
ethnicity and legal form.
14The results for SNWI remain qualitatively identical when the sample is split into companies with 
limited and unlimited liability.
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same order in both data sets. The change in return on equity when SNWI A is in­
creased by one standard deviation is 28.2 percentage points for regression (1) and 34.8 
percentage points for regression (2). However, because one return measure refers to 
the market value of equity and the other to the book value of equity, it is more mean­
ingful to examine the change in the distribution. Starting from the median of return 
on equity, a one standard deviation change in SNWI A brings the return on equity up 
to the 76th percentile in regression (1) and up to the 62th percentile in regression (2). 
Underdiversification has therefore a sizable effect on company profitability. 15
The ownership share has also a significant positive effect on profitability. This is 
plausible, since owners who obtain a higher share of the profits have an incentive to 
work harder. It is remarkable that the relative size of the coefficients for SNWI A and 
ownership share is opposite to the finding with the SCF data. Due to the differences 
in variable definition it is, however, difficult to interpret this finding. In the SCF data 
the household is not always the largest owner, whereas the SSBF data refers only to 
the largest owner. With the controls for SNWI and ownership share, we are able to 
separately identify a positive underdiversification effect and a positive incentive effect.16
Company size and company age are added as further controls. The only significant 
effect is a negative influence of age in the SCF data. The regression also includes 
controls for industry, year, education, experience, ethnicity, sex, legal form and type of 
company acquisition included. Their coefficients are not shown for brevity.
Since there are more instruments than endogenous regressors, it is possible to test 
the overidentifying restrictions. The test of the statistical validity of the instruments is 
passed with a p-value of 76% for the SCF data and with a p-value of 14% for the SSBF 
data.
Columns (3) and (4) of table 3.2 show the results for SNWI B. This measure of 
underdiversification takes the equity investment, guarantees, private assets used as 
collateral and personal loans to the company into account. We do not discuss the 
results here, because they are very similar to the results obtained with SNWI A.
We now turn to the test of hypothesis 2. This hypothesis states that richer owners
15The SSBF data provides also information on total assets. When we use ‘return on assets’ as 
dependent variable, we also obtain a significant positive coefficient for SNWI.
16The quadratic terms of SNWI and ownership share have been included in the regression to allow 
for a more flexible functional form. Because the quadratic terms were not significant, we only use the 
linear form of SNWI and ownership share.
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are less affected by underdiversification, because the absolute amount of wealth not tied 
up in the company is higher. We would therefore expect a smaller effect of underdi­
versification for richer owners. Since only a subset of the observations can be used for 
the identification of this effect, it will be more difficult to obtain a clear result. Indeed, 
when we include the dummy for high wealth and its interaction term, both coefficients 
are statistically not different from zero, although the results suggest lower returns for 
richer owners. In an attempt to obtain a sharper result from the data, we restrict the 
level effect to zero and work only with the interaction variable.
Table 3.3 presents the results for SNWI interacted with the dummy for high wealth. 
The estimates show that, indeed, the effect of underdiversification is smaller for richer 
owners. This is true for all four regression specifications. Again, both data sets and 
both measures of underdiversification are used. The coefficient on SNWI that obtains 
for richer owners is calculated as the sum of the coefficient for SNWI and its interaction 
term. It is separately displayed in table 3.3. This coefficient is only significant for 
regression (1). For the other specifications we observe no effect of underdiversification 
for richer owners. In order to test hypothesis 2 we also need to know whether there 
is a statistically significant difference between the effect of underdiversification for the 
groups of richer and poorer owners. This is not the case. Only for column (3) is the 
difference between the coefficient of SNWI for both groups significantly different to the 
1 0 % level.
To sum up, the underdiversification effect is not significantly smaller for richer own­
ers, rather there is no significant influence of underdiversification at all. It is, however, 
difficult to judge whether there is genuinely no effect or whether it can not be identified 
with the limited number of observations. Overall, the evidence that richer owners are 
less affected by underdiversification is consistent with hypothesis 2 , although the results 
are not significant.
Compared to the results without interaction terms, the coefficients of ownership 
share remain similar in size, but are generally more precisely measured. Concerning 
the other controls, it is sufficient to note that company size now has a marginally 
significant positive influence on company profitability.
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Table 3.3: Controlling for Private Wealth
Dep. variable: Return on equity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SCF SSBF SCF SSBF
SNWI A SNWI B
SNWI 1.04*** 1.25** 0.918*** 1 .1 1 **
(0.274) (0.581) (0.250) (0.559)
SNWI * dummy high wealth -0.326 -1 .0 0 -0.338** -0.830*
(0.206) (0.658) (0.173) (0.516)
Ownership share 1 .0 1 ** 5.67*** 0.912** 5.58***
(0.407) (2.03) (0.394) (1.99)
Company size 0.526 0.334* 0.448 0.317*
(2.79) (0.185) (2.82) (0.190)
Company age -0.482*** 0.766 -0.403** 0.812
(0.186) (0.511) (0.176) (0.520)
Coeff. SNW I high wealth 0.718*
(0.423)
0.248
(1.08)
0.580
(0.370)
0.285
(0.949)
Number of observations 4,324 2,337 4,324 2,337
Overidentification test, x 2 10.5 7.09 12.4 7.37
(dof, p-value) (9, 0.31) (9, 0.63) (9, 0.19) (9, 0.60)
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. Robust 
standard errors that are adjusted for the 1st step estimation are in parentheses. The regressor SNWI 
and its interaction term as well as ownership share are instrumented. Columns (1) and (2) refer to 
SNWI A and columns (3) and (4) refer to SNWI B. The regressions contain controls for industry, year 
(only SCF), education, experience, ethnicity and legal form.
In table 3.4 we additionally control for effort. This is a first attempt to test whether 
more underdiversified owner-managers require higher returns independently of any effect 
of effort. If this is not the case, then SNWI should become insignificant once effort 
is controlled for. The SCF data includes information on the owner-manager’s self- 
reported hours of work in a typical week, which can be used as a proxy for effort. The 
variable is a noisy proxy, because effort is multi-dimensional, whereas hours worked 
only covers the time dimension. It is, however, plausible that owner-managers who 
work longer, will, for example, also acquire more information and make better decisions. 
Regression (1) includes only the logarithm of hours worked and does not control for
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SNWI and ownership share. There is a significant positive effect of effort, but the test 
of overidentifying restrictions is not passed. Regressions (2) and (3) contain SNWI and 
the ownership share as further controls. The results now show an insignificant effect for 
effort, but SNWI and ownership share remain significant. This is a first indication that 
there is a separate channel of higher required returns, but since hours worked is only 
an imperfect control for effort, we cannot conclude that the remaining positive effect of 
SNWI is only due to higher required returns. It is possible that SNWI proxies for the 
parts of effort that are not covered in the time dimension. 17
Table 3.4: Controlling for Effort
Dep. variable: Return on equity
(i) (2 ) (3)
SCF SCF SCF
SNWI A SNWI B
Ln hours worked 27 4 *** -2.90 -5.32
(1 0 .0 ) (19.3) (20.4)
SNWI 1.19** 1.18**
(0.545) (0.546)
Ownership share 1.57** 1.38**
(0.678) (0.628)
Company size -3.14** 1.14 -0.057
(1.39) (3.31) (3.34)
Company age -0.244 -0.661** -0.559**
(0.194) (0.288) (0.267)
Number of observations 3,335 3,335 3,335
Overidentification test, x 2 15.4 0.67 0.94
(dof, p-value) (5, 0.009) (3, 0.88) (3, 0.82)
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. Robust 
standard errors that are adjusted for the 1st step estimation are in parentheses. The regressors SNWI, 
ownership share and hours worked are instrumented. Column (2) refers to SNWI A and column (3) 
refers to SNWI B. The regressions contain controls for industry, year, education, experience, ethnicity 
and legal form.
17An OLS regression with the specification from column (1) was also calculated. The coefficient on 
ln hours worked was positive, but insignificant. This is consistent with the potential endogeneity of 
hours worked. If owner-managers of companies with poor quality work more, then the relationship 
between effort and profitability is not necessarily positive.
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3.5.3 Do Under diversified Owners Require Higher Returns?
This subsection covers the first proposed channel of the underdiversification effect. Ac­
cording to hypothesis 3 we test whether owners of private companies who are more 
underdiversified require higher returns on their investment. The second sub-sample of 
the SCF, including only owners who are not at the same time managers, is used for 
this test. This excludes the possibility that a positive relationship between underdiver­
sification and profitability is caused by higher effort. The SSBF data cannot be used 
for a test of hypothesis 3, because it does not allow a clear distinction between owners 
who are and who are not active in the management. Although 10.7% of the companies 
have a hired manager responsible for the day-to-day management, it is not possible to 
exclude that the largest owner is also involved in the management.
Table 3.5 shows the regression results for the SCF data. The first- and second-stage 
regressions contain only variables relating to the household, since it is not possible 
to select one member of the household as main owner. In the first-stage regression 
(not reported) the value of the primary residence has a negative coefficient which is 
significant to the 1% level, whereas the dummy for home ownership is negative, but 
insignificant. The tests for overidentifying restrictions indicate the statistical validity of 
the instruments. For this subset of the SCF data we cannot calculate SNWI B, because 
we have no information on the financial engagement of the household besides the equity 
investment.
The regression in column (1) shows a positive relationship between SNWI A and 
return on equity that is significant to the 5% level.18 There is therefore evidence that 
more underdiversified owners require higher returns. This effect is also economically 
significant. A change in SNWI A of one standard deviation increases the return on 
equity by 18.8 percentage points, or, in an alternative representation, it increases return 
on equity from its median to its 83rd percentile. It is also instructive to compare the size 
of this effect with the effect of underdiversification calculated by Kerins et al. (2004). 
This comparison can only be very tentative, since both calculations rely on strong 
assumptions. We impose a specific functional form with our regression specification and 
Kerins et al. (2004) rely on the applicability of the CAPM and restrict the investment 
opportunities of the household to a single company and the market portfolio. Kerins
18We tested whether a quadratic form in SNWI A would be appropriate. Since the quadratic term 
was not significant, we dropped it again from the regression.
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Table 3.5: Underdiversification and Required Returns
Dep. variable: Return on equity
(1) (2 )
SCF SCF
SNWI A
SNWI 0.917** 0.899*
(0.430) (0.531)
SNWI * dummy high wealth 0.173
(0.697)
Coeff. SNW I high wealth 1.07
(1.16)
Number of observations 1,925 1,925
Number of households 1,429 1,429
Overidentification test, x 2 0.29 0.59
(dof, p-value) (1, 0.59) (2, 0.75)
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. Robust 
standard errors allowing for heteroscedasticity and correlation within households are in parentheses. 
They are adjusted for the 1st step estimation. The regressor SNWI and its interaction term are 
instrumented. Columns (1) and (2) refer to SNWI A. The regressions contain controls for year and 
legal form.
et al. (2004) calculate for companies with 26 -  100 employees that an increase of SNWI 
from 15% to 25% increases the cost of capital for an underdiversified entrepreneur by 
9.8 percentage points. We come to a quite similar result. An increase of SNWI A by 10 
percentage points is related to an increase of return on equity of 9.2 percentage points.
Two small caveats of our empirical results should be pointed out. First, it is not 
possible to observe the ownership share of the household for this sub-sample. A higher 
ownership share can be related to higher monitoring activities, which can secure higher 
profitability as well. Limitations of the data set prevent us from controlling for this 
possibility. Second, the correlation of returns from other financial assets (for example 
publicly traded equity) with the returns from the private equity investment can influence 
the required returns. Since we cannot observe these correlations, we are also not able 
to control for them.
The regression in column (2) allows for a different effect of underdiversification for 
the highest third in the distribution of private wealth. The coefficient of SNWI is larger
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for richer owners, but it is not significant. A test on the sum of the coefficients for 
SNWI and SNWI interacted reveals that the influence of SNWI is not significant for 
the richer owners. This could be because only one third of the observations is used to 
estimate the effect, or, it could be that richer owners of private companies do indeed 
not require a compensation for underdiversification. There is no statistically significant 
difference between the coefficients of both groups.
Our finding that more underdiversified entrepreneurs require higher returns as a 
compensation for the exposure to idiosyncratic risk has important implications. The 
realisation of a business idea can depend on the net worth of the potential entrepreneur. 
If the investment volume is large relative to the net worth, then the business idea needs 
to have a higher expected return in order to be realised. Furthermore, the available 
volume of additional bank finance can also be crucial, since it allows the potential 
entrepreneur to employ fewer own resources. The influence of underdiversification is 
especially important for projects that are not scalable.
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994a) observe that the probability of becoming an entrepreneur 
increases after an inheritance and note that this observation is consistent with the 
existence of liquidity constraints. Our results suggest an additional interpretation of 
this finding. Since the potential underdiversification decreases through the inheritance, 
the required rate of return on investment projects decreases and therefore more busi­
ness ideas will become worthwhile. This alternative explanation does not require the 
existence of liquidity constraints. Holtz-Eakin et al. (19946) find that an inheritance 
increases the probability of companies remaining in business, which again is consistent 
with liquidity constraints. Again, an improved company survival can also be explained 
by lower required returns after an inheritance.
3.5.4 Under diversification and Effort
We now turn to the second channel of the underdiversification effect. This sub-section 
explores the relationship between the underdiversification of owner-managers and the 
effort they exert, measured as average weekly hours worked. This analysis is solely based 
on the SCF data, since the SSBF data does not provide information on effort. Table 3.6 
presents a tabulation of hours worked according to a partition of SNWI A into the 
lowest, middle and highest third. A positive relationship between underdiversification 
and hours worked can clearly be seen. The difference between the mean of hours
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Table 3.6: Tabulation of Effort With Respect to SNWI A and Private Wealth
Mean (median) of hours worked
SNWI A
Lowest third Middle third Highest third
All owner-managers 
Lowest third private wealth 
Middle third private wealth 
Highest third private wealth
44.3 (45)
44.0 (45) 
45.8 (50)
43.0 (40)
48.4 (50)
49.8 (50)
49.9 (50) 
45.7 (49)
52.8 (50)
54.5 (55)
53.8 (50)
49.6 (50)
Note: The calculation is based on 3,335 observations. The data source is wave 1989 to wave 2001 of 
the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Hours worked is the self-reported hours worked in a typical 
week. The cut-off points for SNWI A are 16.2% and 42.2%. The cut-off points for private wealth are 
0.49 million US-$ and 3.3 million US-$.
worked for the lowest and the highest third of SNWI A is also statistically significant 
at the 1% level. In addition, table 3.6 presents this tabulation separately for owner- 
managers with different levels of private wealth. It is interesting to note that the 
difference in the average of hours worked between the lowest and the highest third of 
SNWI is decreasing in private wealth. This is a first indication that the pressure from 
underdiversification could be smaller for richer owner-managers. Here the differences 
in hours worked between the highest and the lowest third of SNWI are also significant 
at the 1% level.
The incentive effect of ownership can lead to a positive relationship between hours 
worked and the ownership share. Owner-managers who own a larger share of the 
company will benefit more from increased effort -  they obtain a higher share of total 
profits. Table 3.7 shows a tabulation of hours worked according to four categories of 
ownership. The means of weekly hours worked are very similar and the median is 50 
hours for each category. No pronounced pattern emerges in this univariate analysis.
Table 3.8 presents the test of hypothesis 4. It is a test for a positive relationship be­
tween underdiversification and effort. Four different specifications are employed. SNWI 
A and SNWI B are used as regressors with and without an interaction term for especially 
rich owner-managers. In these regressions we cannot instrument SNWI and ownership 
share, since most of our instruments are in the regression in their own right. In regres­
sion (1) we use SNWI A without an interaction term as measure of underdiversification 
and find that it has a positive effect, significant to the 1% level. Hypothesis 4 is therefore
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Table 3.7: Tabulation of Effort With Respect to Ownership Share
Ownership share <50% 50% >50% and <100% 1 0 0 %
Mean of hours worked 49.4 48.7 47.3 48.9
Median of hours worked 50 50 50 50
Number of observations 619 329 366 2 ,0 2 1
Note: The calculation is based on 3,335 observations. The data source is wave 1989 to wave 2001 of 
the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Hours worked is the self-reported hours worked in a typical 
week.
confirmed. There is evidence that underdiversification increases company profitability 
through the channel of increased effort. Underdiversification also has a sizable effect on 
hours worked. If SNWI A is increasing by one percentage point, then hours worked will 
increase by 8 .6 %. Ownership share has a significant positive coefficient as well. Here 
an increase of the ownership share by 1 percentage point will increase hours worked by 
3.1%.
The effects of SNWI and ownership merit a deeper reflection. Incentives emanate 
not only from ownership, but also directly from underdiversification. Owner-managers 
whose financial well-being depends more on the success of their companies work harder. 
This could cast a new light on the literature discussing the incentive effects of stock 
ownership and stock option programmes for employed managers. So far, it was criticised 
that the income of employed managers is not sensitive enough to changes in the value 
of the company and that therefore incentives to exert effort would be too low (Jensen 
and Murphy (1990). However, our results show that ownership can have incentive 
effects through underdiversification, even if the ownership share is quite limited. This 
implication should be tested specifically for a sample of managers of large companies, 
because they are on average richer than the owner-managers in our sample. Also, the 
standard principal-agent models discuss the trade-off between risk and incentives only 
with regard to the variability of the labour income (see, for example, Murphy (1999)). 
Our results suggest that the wealth situation of the manager should be taken into 
account as well. The same compensation scheme can provide more incentives for a 
manager with a lower level of wealth, because the degree of underdiversification is then 
higher.
Some of the other control variables have an influence on effort as well. Owner- 
managers of larger companies work longer hours, but the age of the company mostly
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Table 3.8: Underdiversification and Effort
Dep. variable: Ln hours worked
(1) (2 ) (3) (4)
SCF SCF SCF SCF
SNWI A SNWI B
SNWI 0.086*** 0.095*** 0.084*** 0.094***
(0.013) (0.013) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 2 )
SNWI * dummy high wealth -0.054***
(0.018)
-0.054***
(0.016)
Ownership share 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.029** 0.032***
(0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 2 )
Company size 0.973*** 1 18*** 0.945*** 2 27***
(0.203) (0.213) (0.203) (0.213)
Company age 0.510 0.055 0.055 0.059*
(0.344) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Owner-manager age 1.09*** 2 21*** 1.08*** 1 1 0 ***
(0.186) (0.186) (0.186) (0.185)
Square of owner-manager age -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** •0.014***
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Coeff. SNW I high wealth 0.0 4 0**
(0.020)
0 .040**
(0.018)
Number of observations 3,400 3,400 3,400 3,400
R squared 0.160 0.162 0.161 0.164
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Columns (1) and (2) refer to SNWI A and columns (3) and (4) 
refer to SNWI B. The regressions contain controls for industry, year, education, ethnicity, sex, legal 
form and type of company acquisition.
doesn’t matter. The age of the owner-manager has a significant influence. Hours worked 
increases until the age of 39 and then declines again.
Regression (2) allows for a different effect of underdiversification for richer owner- 
managers. As can be seen from the negative interaction term, richer owner-managers 
respond less to underdiversification. The total effect for the richer owner-managers 
can be calculated as the coefficient of the base category plus the coefficient of the
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interaction term. The sum of the coefficients is 0.04 and is significant at the 5% level. 
Underdiversification has also an effect on effort for richer owner-managers, but it is 
smaller than for poorer ones. The difference between the effects is significant at the 1% 
level.
Regressions (3) and (4) use SNWI B as a measure for underdiversification. Their 
results are very similar to the ones already discussed.
3.6 Conclusions
Owners of private companies are often underdiversified. In this chapter we study 
whether underdiversification of owners increases company profitability. A positive ef­
fect could be driven by two mechanisms: higher required returns and higher effort. 
Kerins et al. (2004) show that underdiversification increases the cost of equity capital 
substantially. On theoretical grounds we would therefore expect that owners require a 
compensation for their exposure to idiosyncratic risk. However, Moskowitz and Vissing- 
Jprgensen (2 0 0 2 ) find that returns to private equity are, on average, not higher than 
returns to public equity. So far, it remains unclear whether owners of private companies 
do not require a compensation for their exposure to idiosyncratic risk or whether other 
reasons are responsible for the relatively low returns to private equity. The Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF, wave 1989 to wave 2001) and the Survey of Small Business 
Finances (SSBF, wave 1998) are used for the analysis.
In our empirical analysis we find, first, a positive, significant relationship between 
underdiversification and the profitability of companies. This can be either due to higher 
effort or to higher required returns. This effect is also economically significant. For the 
SCF data, a one standard deviation increase in SNWI A increases return on equity by 28 
percentage points. The effect of underdiversification is smaller for richer owners, which 
is consistent with decreasing relative risk aversion. Second, for a sub-sample of owners 
without an active management interest, we also find a positive, significant relationship 
between underdiversification and profitability. This supports the view that underdiver­
sified owners require higher expected returns, since higher effort can be excluded as a 
cause. Here the size of the effect is also substantial. A one standard deviation increase 
in SNWI A increases return on equity by 19 percentage points. Third, for owners who 
are at the same time managers we establish a positive relationship between underdiver­
sification and effort, measured as self-reported weekly hours worked. Owner-managers
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who are financially more dependent on the success of their companies have a higher 
incentive to work hard.
The empirical findings of this chapter have important implications for our under­
standing of private companies. We show that underdiversified owners require higher 
returns as a compensation for the exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Since idiosyncratic 
risk is priced in private companies, it follows that the realisation of a business oppor­
tunity depends on the scale of the required investment in relationship to the net worth 
of the potential entrepreneur. If underdiversification drives the required return above 
the expected return of the project, then the business opportunity will not be realised. 
There remains the question of why average returns to private equity are not higher 
than average returns to public equity. Two likely explanations are that owners receive 
nonpecuniary benefits, such as utility from being ones own boss, or that owners are 
overoptimistic with respect to the future success of their companies.
Our finding that more underdiversified owner-managers work longer hours has impli­
cations for the efficacy and the design of managerial remuneration schemes. It has been 
noted that it is difficult to align the interests of managers and shareholders, when man­
agers have a low ownership share (Jensen and Murphy (1990). But when the ownership 
share is high, underdiversification is very costly for managers. The evidence from our 
analysis suggests that underdiversification itself may induce managers to exert more 
effort. The strength of the incentives from a given scheme depends on the share of net 
worth of the manager that is tied to company performance.
The positive relationship between underdiversification and company profitability 
does not imply that underdiversified owners realise a gain. It is more likely that the 
higher profitability is a compensation for the exposure to idiosyncratic risk and for 
higher effort. This observation has an interesting implication for banks extending loans 
to companies. Since the banks do not suffer a disutility of their own from the owner’s 
underdiversification but gain from the higher profitability, it can be concluded that com­
panies with more underdiversified owners should find it easier to obtain bank finance. 
A test of this consideration will be attempted in future research.
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3.7 Appendix
Table 3.9: Descriptive Statistics SCF - Owners With Management Interest
Variable M ean M edian Stdev. M in M ax
Company information
Number of employees 113 6 459 1 5000
Company age 16.4 14 11.9 1 71
Market value total equity
(in m. US-$) 22.9 0.700 394 0 .0 0 1 24,740
Return on equity (in %) 47.7 14.5 106 -18.7 1071
ROE weighted with equity (in %) 15.6
Owner information
Net worth (in m. US-$) 15.1 2.08 41.8 0.003 586
Private wealth (in m. US-$) 8.99 1.27 24.9 0.00003 333
SNWI A (in %) 33.7 29.1 25.0 0.039 99.9
SNWI B (in %) 37.3 32.8 26.6 0.039 99.9
Ownership share (in %) 75.9 1 0 0 32.4 0 .0 0 1 1 0 0
Value primary residence
(in m. US-$) 0 .6 6 8 0.300 1.29 0 2 0
Dummy home ownership 0.932 1 0.252 0 1
Experience 29.6 29 13.2 0 85
Hours worked 48.8 50 18.0 1 133
Owner age 52.1 51 12.4 19 95
Dummy sex of owner 0.173 0 0.378 0 1
Note: Descriptive statistics refer to the sample information without weighting. The displayed statistics 
reflect the variation in the sample, but are not representative for the US economy.
91
Table 3.10: Descriptive Statistics SCF - Owners Without Management Interest
Variable M ean M edian Stdev. M in M ax
Company information 
Market value equity share
(in m. US-$) 3.14 0.300 12.47 0 .0 0 1 2 0 0
Return on equity (in %)
ROE weighted with equity (in %)
18.7
1 1 .1
1 .8 8 61.2 -24.0 634
Owner information
Net worth (in m. US-S) 30.6 8.54 6 6 .8 0.009 1018
Private wealth (in m. US-$) 27.4 7.17 63.17 0.003 1018
SNWI A (in %) 12.4 4.28 18.4 0 .0 0 2 99.8
Value primary residence (in m. US-$) 1.09 0.600 1.74 0 2 0 .0
Dummy home ownership 0.95 1 0 .2 2 0 1
Note: Descriptive statistics refer to the sample information without weighting. The displayed 
statistics reflect the variation in the sample, but are not representative for the US economy.
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Table 3.11: Descriptive Statistics SSBF
Variable M ean M edian Stdev. M in M ax
Company information
Number of employees 29.1 5 59.1 1 482
Company age 15.7 13 12.7 1 104
Book value total equity (in m. US-$) 0.993 0.090 3.77 0 .0 0 1 87.0
Return on equity (in %) 119 41.4 190 -60.0 1006
ROE weighted with equity (in %) 42.1
Owner information
Net worth (in m. US-$) 1.59 0.468 4.55 0 .0 0 2 116
Private wealth (in m. US-$) 1.06 0.325 3.75 0 115
SNWI A (in %) 27.7 20.9 24.8 0.004 1 0 0
SNWI B (in %) 33.5 24.6 29.3 0.041 1 0 0
Ownership share largest owner (in %) 79.6 1 0 0 27.8 1 1 0 0
Equity value primary residence
(in m. US-$) 0.180 0 .1 0 0 0.390 0 15
Dummy home ownership 0.900 1 0.302 0 1
Experience 2 0 .2 2 0 1 2 .0 0 72
Owner age 51.3 51 11.3 21 95
Dummy sex of owner 0 .2 1 0 0.41 0 1
Note: Descriptive statistics refer to the sample information without weighting. The displayed 
statistics reflect the variation in the sample, but are not representative for the US economy.
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Table 3.12: Industry Distribution SCF - Owners With Management Interest
Industry No. of com panies % of com panies
Agriculture 447 10.3
Construction, mining 410 9.5
Manufacturing 477 1 1 .0
Retail, wholesale 670 15.5
Personal and business services 2,228 51.6
Very large companies, not classified 27 0 .6
Industry unknown 65 1.5
Total 4,324 1 0 0
Table 3.13: Industry Distribution SSBF
Ind u stry No. of com panies % of com panies
Mining, construction 230 9.8
Manufacturing 280 1 2 .0
Transportation, communication,
utilities 8 6 3.7
Retail trade 6 6 6 28.5
Services 1,075 46.0
Total 2,337 1 0 0
Table 3.14: Observations per SCF Wave - Owners With Management Interest
Wave N um ber of com panies % of com panies
1989 590 13.6
1992 915 2 1 .2
1995 928 21.5
1998 934 2 1 .6
2 0 0 1 957 2 2 .1
Total 4,324 1 0 0
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Chapter 4
Underdiversification and the  
Financial Structure of Companies
4.1 Introduction
Private companies are restricted in the choice of financial resources they can tap. They 
have to rely on two main sources for their financing. On the one hand, equity is provided 
by a limited number of owners; on the other hand, loans are taken out from banks 
(Berger and Udell (1998)). The equity investment of owners consists often of a high 
share of the owners’ personal net worth. Hence owners of private companies are typically 
underdiversified (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jprgensen (2002)). Since underdiversification 
increases the cost of equity capital substantially (Kerins et al. (2004) and Heaton and 
Lucas (2000a)), we would expect it to have an important influence on the financial 
structure of the company.
In this chapter we investigate the role of bank financing for private companies with 
underdiversified owners. To a certain degree equity and bank financing are substitutes. 
Since the cost of equity capital increases with underdiversification, we hypothesise that 
owners with a higher degree of underdiversification have a higher demand for bank fi­
nance. As we have seen in chapter 3 that companies with more underdiversified owners 
are more profitable, we also expect that supply of loans is increasing in underdiversifi­
cation. From these considerations it follows that underdiversification should be related 
to higher leverage. There is no clear prediction for the equilibrium interest rate, since 
demand and supply effects point in opposite directions. We also hypothesise that liq­
uid asset holdings are lower if owners are more highly underdiversified, because the
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opportunity costs for liquid assets are higher.
Understanding the basic mechanisms in the financing of private companies is impor­
tant, since private companies contribute a large share to the overall economic activity, 
not only in developing countries but in industrialised countries as well. For example, 
about 50 percent of the employees in the US are on the payroll of companies with fewer 
than 500 employees (Small Business Administration (2003)). The overall economic 
performance of a country is therefore influenced by the conditions in which private 
companies do business. In order to be able to provide a good environment for private 
companies, it is important to understand how they work. This chapter is an attempt 
to understand the financing side better.
The empirical analysis is based on the 1998 wave of the Survey of Small Business 
Finances (SSBF). This is the only wave providing information on the personal wealth of 
owners. The survey gives not only a detailed account of the financial structure of private 
companies, but also information on the most recent loan application. This allows us to 
investigate the role of underdiversification on the demand for and the supply of bank 
loans, on leverage and on liquid assets holdings. Empirically, underdiversification is 
measured as the share of personal net worth that is invested in the company.
Our hypotheses are broadly confirmed by the data. More underdiversified owners 
confronted with a higher cost of equity capital have a higher demand for bank loans. 
Underdiversification increases not only the probability of a loan application, it also in­
creases the loan volume applied for. With respect to the supply of loans our expectation 
was not confirmed. Underdiversification has no strong influence on the probability that 
a loan application is approved. As hypothesised, there is a significant positive and large 
effect of underdiversification on leverage. There is no clear prediction on the interest 
rate and in the empirical analysis we also find that underdiversification does not influ­
ence the interest rate. With respect to liquidity, we find a clear negative relationship 
between underdiversification and liquidity. This confirms that the opportunity costs of 
liquid asset holdings are higher for owners with a higher degree of underdiversification.
These findings add to our understanding of how underdiversification of owners affects 
the financial structure of private companies. Owners try to reduce their risk exposure 
from underdiversification with the help of additional bank finance. This also implies 
that the availability of bank finance is important for the scope of business activities 
that private companies engage in.
The remaining part of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the
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related literature, Section 4.3 defines variables that are new to this chapter, Section 4.4 
describes the estimation strategy and develops the hypotheses tested, Section 4.5 shows 
the empirical results, and Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
In this chapter we analyse whether the underdiversification of owners of private com­
panies has an effect on the demand and availability of bank loans. So far, there are no 
studies on the effect of underdiversification on the capital structure of private companies, 
but the general role of personal wealth for company performance and loan availability 
is discussed in the literature.
The personal wealth of owners is found to be important, first, for the decision to 
become an entrepreneur and, second, for the success of the company. Cressy (2000) 
models the decision between self employment and paid work. In a framework in which 
absolute risk aversion decreases with wealth, self employment becomes relatively more 
attractive for rich individuals, since for them the risk of self employment is a smaller 
burden. As further result the model shows that richer entrepreneurs optimally choose 
a larger self-financed capital stock for their companies.
On the empirical side, Cressy (19966) analyses data on bank overdrafts from UK 
start up companies with respect to loan conditions and company survival. It is found 
that the survival probability is increased if the entrepreneur has used personal money 
to start up. Furthermore, banks agree to higher overdraft limits if more collateral, here 
measured as house equity, is available. Therefore owner wealth plays an important role. 
However, Cressy (1996a) warns that human capital needs to be taken into account 
when investigating the role of finance for survival. Once the human capital of the 
entrepreneurs is accounted for in this empirical analysis, there is no influence any more 
of type of financing used for start up and of home equity available as collateral on 
company survival.
Personal wealth also affects the availability of bank loans. This mechanism is studied 
by Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2002). The authors hypothesise that higher private wealth 
improves credit availability, since personal assets can be used as collateral for the busi­
ness loans. Using the 1998 wave of the Survey of Small Business Finances, the authors 
find that higher personal wealth reduces the probability of a loan denial. They can 
therefore confirm their hypothesis.
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Our analysis is also concerned with the role of underdiversification on the equilibrium 
interest rate on bank loans. Up to now, the price for bank loans extended to private 
companies has been mainly discussed by studies with a focus on lending relationships. 
For a sample of US companies, Berger and Udell (1995) find that the duration of a 
relationship reduces the interest rate charged for lines of credit. Also using data from 
the US, Petersen and Rajan (1994) find no significant influence for the length of the 
relationship, but find that borrowing from a number of banks increases the interest 
rate. The authors of this study took several types of credit into account. Harhoff and 
Korting (1998) base their analysis on a survey of German companies. They find that 
neither the length of the relationship nor the number of lenders has an influence on the 
interest rate charged for lines of credit.
4.3 Data
The Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) is used for the empirical analysis. This 
survey is well suited for our study, because it provides detailed information on the fi­
nancing of small companies. Included is information on the most recent loan application 
and on the financial structure of the companies. The investigation is restricted to the 
wave from 1998, since previous waves do not include information on the net worth of 
owners. A detailed description of the data set can be found in chapter 3, section 3. The 
criteria for inclusion of an observation into the sample are the same as in chapter 3. 
The data source for the prime rate, the term structure spread and the default spread 
is the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.1 We only define the variables that are new 
in this chapter.
In terest ra te  is the original interest rate on the most recent loan. This information 
is available if the company obtained a new loan within the last three years prior to the 
survey. The lowest and highest 1% of observations is trimmed in order to eliminate 
implausible values.
R isk prem ium  is the difference between the interest rate on the most recent loan 
and the yield of a US government security with the same maturity as the loan. The 
risk premium is constrained to be non-negative.
1The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis provides the FRED II database (Federal Reserve 
Economic Data II), which contains economic time series. The database can be accessed via 
http: /  /  research.stlouisfed.org/fred2 /.
98
The P rim e ra te  is defined by The Wall Street Journal as “the base rate on corporate 
loans posted by at least 75% of the nation’s 30 largest banks”. The prime rate is the 
risk-free rate plus the risk premium for the bank’s best customers. It is used as a control 
for the overall level of interest rates at the time the most recent loan was applied for.
The Term  stru c tu re  spread is the difference between the yield of a US government 
security of the same maturity as the company loan minus the yield of a US government 
security with a one year maturity. This variable is set to zero for loans with a variable 
interest rate and for loans without fixed maturity.
The D efault spread is the difference between the average yield on corporate bonds 
rated ‘Baa’ by Moody’s and the yield on US government securities with a ten year 
maturity.
Leverage is the sum of all debts and liabilities divided by total assets.
Liquidity is cash divided by total assets. The following assets are included in cash: 
the total amount of cash on hand, in checking, savings and money market accounts, 
certificates of deposit, and other time deposits. For this variable, the lowest and highest 
5% of entries are excluded because of implausible values. For example, 3% of companies 
reported 1 0 0 % liquidity.
4.4 Hypotheses and Estim ation Strategy
The theoretical literature suggests that underdiversification increases the cost of equity 
capital. Since in equilibrium the marginal cost of equity capital should be equal to the 
marginal cost of debt capital, we would expect that owners with a higher degree of 
underdiversification have a higher demand for bank loans. Bank loans can be used to 
reduce the own financial commitment in case the company doesn’t grow or to grow the 
company without additional own investment. From this consideration we derive the 
first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (demand for loans): Owners with a higher degree of underdiversification 
have a higher demand for bank loans.
The data set allows three possibilities to measure demand for loans. It includes 
the information whether an application for a new loan was made in the three years 
preceding the survey, whether credit was needed but no application was made because
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a denial was expected, and it also includes the loan volume applied for in the most 
recent loan.
In chapter 3 we found that underdiversification is related to higher company prof­
itability. The mechanisms identified are higher required returns and better incentives. 
Since the banks do not suffer from the underdiversification of owners but gain from the 
higher profitability, we would expect that banks are more willing to lend to owners with 
a higher degree of underdiversification. From the SSBF data we can use the information 
on whether the applications for new loans were successful in the last three years.
Hypothesis 2 (supply of loans): The probability of a loan denial is lower for more highly 
under diversified owners.
In addition, it would be desirable to test hypotheses about the demand for leverage 
and the supply of leverage as a function of the interest rate. In order to do this, a struc­
tural model would be needed. However, the data set does not include variables that 
would shift only the demand or only the supply curve. It is therefore not possible to
identify the structural model. Nevertheless, it is possible to test hypotheses concerning
the reduced form for leverage and for the interest rate. We can discuss how underdiver­
sification affects equilibrium values of leverage and of the interest rate. Furthermore, 
the reduced form expressed in the structural parameters can be used as a framework for 
the discussion of identified effects in the regressions concerning demand for and supply 
of loans.
In the following simplified demand and supply equation, we consider underdiversifica­
tion as the only shift variable to keep notation simple. The final empirical specification 
is richer and controls for additional influences. The variable lev denotes any potential 
value of leverage that separately fulfills the demand and supply functions. It is not an 
equilibrium value.2
id(lev) =  Oi +  7 ilev +  p iS N W I  +  €\ (4.1)
f  (lev) =  a 2 +  7 2 lev +  fc S N W I  +  e2 (4.2)
The interest rate is written as a function of any value of leverage in the demand and 
supply equation. The empirical analysis does not allow us to identify 7 1 , Pi, 72 and
2We follow here the excellent discussion of simultaneous equations models in Wooldridge (2002, p. 
209ff.).
/?2 separately. We only identify a combination of the four coefficients in the reduced 
form. However, it is helpful to hypothesise about the sign of each of the coefficients 
and from this to deduce a prediction for the sign of the coefficients in the reduced 
form. For standard demand and supply equations, we expect the demand for leverage 
to decrease with the interest rate (71 negative) and the supply of leverage to increase 
with the interest rate (72  positive). Since underdiversification increases the cost of 
equity capital, we expect that more underdiversified owners are willing to pay higher 
interest rates in order to obtain a bank loan ((3\ positive). We have seen in chapter 3 
that underdiversification is positively related to company performance. We therefore 
expect that, in a competitive environment, banks offer cheaper interest rates to more 
underdiversified owners (/% negative).
The data set provides us only with information on the equilibrium interest rate, i, 
and the equilibrium leverage, lev, equating demand and supply.
i = is(lev) = id(lev) (4.3)
Using this equilibrium condition, we can equate demand and supply side interest 
rates in (1) and (2 ) and solve for the reduced form of leverage.
tev =  +  f o ^ A s N W I  + (4.4)
7i ~  72 7i -  72 7 i -  72
Equivalently, introducing new notation for the coefficients that can be identified, the 
reduced form can be written as:
lev = 7Tn +  7Ti2 S N W I  +  v\ (4.5)
Taking together the previous discussion on the signs of 7 1 , Pi, 72 and P2, it follows 
that 7Ti2 will be positive. We therefore expect a positive relationship between underdi­
versification and leverage in the reduced form. Both demand and supply factors work 
in the direction of higher leverage for higher values of SNWI.
Hypothesis 3 (leverage): In the reduced form for leverage, we expect a positive coeffi­
cient for SNWI. Influences from both the demand and the supply side promote higher 
leverage.
These considerations can be repeated for the reduced form of the interest rate. It 
will also be possible to derive the sign of the coefficients of the reduced form from
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the coefficients of the structural demand and supply equation. We solve the structural 
forms (1) and (2 ) for the interest rate by multiplying equation (1) with 72 and (2 ) with 
7 1 . Solving both equations for 7271  lev and setting them equal, we can single out the 
equilibrium interest rate, i.
We thus obtain the reduced form for the interest rate:
. =  72^ 1 - 71^2 +  12^ - i A s n w i  +  72^1 -  71^2 (4 6)
72 -  71 72 -  71 72 -  71
Or simplified:
i — 7T21 +  K2 2 S N W I  +  v2 (4.7)
The sign of 7r22 in the reduced form depends on the relative size of the demand and 
supply shifts due to SNWI. The term 72 — 71 is always positive. 7 2A  relates to the 
shift in the demand function and 71 # 2  relates to the shift in the supply function. If 
the shift in the supply function exceeds the shift in the demand function (7 2A  — 71 #2  
negative), then 7^2 is negative and a lower interest rate is predicted for higher values of 
underdiversification. However, if the shift in the demand function exceeds the shift in 
the supply function (7 2 A — 71 #2  positive), the relationship between underdiversification 
and interest rate will be positive. Intuitively, there are two counteracting influences on 
the interest rate. On the one hand, more highly underdiversified owners face a higher 
cost of capital and are therefore willing to pay a higher interest rate in order to obtain 
bank loans. On the other hand, underdiversification functions as a signal of company 
quality and therefore decreases the interest rate charged by banks.
Hypothesis 4 (interest rate): In the reduced form for the interest rate the influence of 
SNWI is ambiguous. The sign of the coefficient for SNWI depends on whether the 
demand or the supply effect dominates. We hypothesise that the shift in the demand 
curve is smaller than the shift in the supply curve and that therefore SNWI will have 
a negative effect on the interest rate.
The change in the equilibrium value of leverage and interest rate that results from 
a change in SNWI is illustrated in figure 4.1. The original demand and supply curves 
for leverage are denoted by D and S, whereas the demand and supply curves after an 
increase in SNWI are denoted by D’ and S’.
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Figure 4.1: Change in Market Equilibrium
(U*->c
Leverage
It can be seen that leverage increases unambiguously after an increase in SNWI. The 
effect on the interest rate depends on the relative size of the shift in the demand and 
supply curve. The figure depicts a decrease in the interest rate through a relatively 
larger shift in the supply curve.3
In order to complement our understanding of the financial structure of private com­
panies, we also consider liquid asset holdings inside the company. We expect a negative 
influence of SNWI on liquidity. Since owners with a higher degree of underdiversifica­
tion face a higher cost of equity capital, it is more costly for them to keep liquid assets 
inside the company. The opportunity costs of liquidity are higher.
Hypothesis 5 (liquidity): Owners with a higher degree of underdiversification hold lower 
liquidity in their companies.
3The whole analysis is done under the ceteris paribus assumption. For example, the demand function 
shows how the demand for leverage changes for different interest rates with SNWI held constant. In 
practise, the additional loans that lead to an increase in leverage could be used to decrease equity as 
a result of which SNWI would decline. Alternatively, one can say the that the implicit assumption is 
used that additional loans are used to increase the total assets of the company and not to substitute 
equity capital. The shift in SNWI is also considered under the ceteris paribus assumption. Otherwise, 
a change in SNWI that is caused by a change in equity, would also influence leverage if total assets 
wouldn’t change in the same proportion.
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4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1 Endogeneity of Regressors
In the empirical analysis we need to be concerned with the potential endogeneity of 
regressors. We discuss the reasons for potential endogeneity in turn for each specifica­
tion.
When analysing the determinants of leverage we consider the possibility of reverse 
causality. Owners may adapt the share of net worth invested (SNWI) in response to 
the availability of bank loans. If we want to identify the effect of SNWI on leverage, we 
need to instrument the regressor. The ownership share can also be influenced by the 
availability of bank loans and therefore by leverage. If bank financing is not available 
and the original owner has not enough resources to meet to total investment require­
ment, it can be necessary to take on an additional owner. The ownership share of the 
original owner would decrease as a result.
There is a second argument for instrumenting SNWI. Most of the small companies 
included in the SSBF axe not required by law to draw up a balance sheet. We therefore 
need to worry about measurement error in the variables based on total assets. Since 
the book value of equity is not asked explicitly but calculated as the difference between 
total assets and total liabilities, the measurement error is transferred to variables based 
on equity as well. SNWI is therefore affected by the same measurement error as is 
leverage. If we instrument SNWI, we control for measurement error as long as the 
instruments are unrelated to the measurement error. This measurement error is non­
standard, because the same error is affecting both the dependent and an independent 
variable.
For the interest rate specification it is less clear whether instruments are required. 
With respect to reverse causality, it can be argued that owners who only receive bank 
loans with high interest rates will find it relatively more attractive to invest own money 
and will therefore have higher values of SNWI. The effect should, however, only be 
small. It is also not to be expected that the interest rate on the most recent loan will 
have a significant influence on the ownership share of the largest owner. There is no 
need to worry about non-standard measurement error in this specification, since the 
interest rate does not contain the variable total assets. We calculated both OLS and 
IV estimates, but chose to present only the IV estimates, since the results were very
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similar.
When studying the influence of underdiversification on liquid asset holdings inside 
the company, reverse causality is a minor point. Since liquidity can be easily adjusted, 
at least to lower levels, we do not expect that liquidity influences either SNWI or 
ownership share. However, we do instrument SNWI in order to control for non-standard 
measurement error.
We use almost the same instruments as in chapter 3. The only difference is that we 
neither include the value of the primary residence nor a dummy for home ownership. 
Private residences can be used as collateral for business loans and can therefore influence 
the leverage of a company as well as the interest rate that is charged for a business 
loan. However, the instruments age and sex of owner as well as type of company 
acquisition should not be related to leverage, once company characteristics such as age 
of company and size of company are controlled for. These instruments should also not 
be related to the interest rate on the most recent loan, because we control for many 
loan characteristics, such as loan type, dummies for guarantee or collateral required 
and a dummy for a fixed interest rate. For the liquidity regression our most important 
concern is measurement error and not endogeneity. We expect that the instruments are 
unrelated to the measurement error.
Table 4.1 shows the first stage regression results. From columns (1) and (2) it can 
be seen that the age of the owner has a significant negative influence on underdiversi­
fication. Older owners had more time to build up wealth outside the company. Also, 
women are less underdiversified and owners who purchased or inherited the company 
are more underdiversified than owners who founded their company. The instruments 
are individually significant at least at the 5% level and are jointly significant at the 1% 
level. As can be seen from column (3), the instruments are individually significant at at 
least the 5% level and are jointly significant at the 1% level. As also can be seen from 
column (3), the instruments for ownership share are weak. The only significant effect is 
a reduced ownership share for companies that are inherited. From the F-test it follows 
that the instruments are jointly significant to only the 12 per cent level. In addition, 
Shea’s partial R squared is very low at 0.003. From these results it can be expected 
that instrumented ownership share will lack significance in at least some of the second 
stage regressions. However, for the analysis of this chapter the regressor SNWI is of 
most interest.
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Table 4.1: First Stage Regression Results
Dep. variable: SNWI A SNWI B Ownership share
(i) (2 ) (3)
Owner age -.321*** -0.397*** -0.079
(.059) (0.068) (0.053)
Dummy sex of owner -3.34*** -4.67*** -1 .0 2
(1.18) (1.36) (1.07)
Dummy purchased 5 4 7 *** 6.06*** -1.14
(1.19) (1.37) (1.08)
Dummy inherited 6.70*** 4.81** -3.26*
(1.95) (2.25) (1.78)
Number of observations 2,595 2,595 2,595
F-test of excluded 
instruments
17 fi*** 
F(4, 2564)
18 1*** 
F(4, 2564)
1.81 
F(4, 2564)
Shea’s partial R squared 0.027 0.026 0.0028
R squared 0.136 0.178 0.429
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions contain additional controls for industry, education, 
experience, ethnicity and legal form.
4.5.2 Dem and for and Availability of Bank Loans
4.5.2.1 Dem and for Bank Loans
In this subsection we present evidence that relates to hypothesis 1. We test whether 
owners with a higher degree of underdiversification have a higher demand for bank 
loans.
Table 4.2 shows the incidence of loan applications in the three years preceding the 
survey in relationship to the owner’s underdiversification. It is important to note that 
the survey asks specifically for applications for new loans. Loan renewals are excluded. 
The share of companies that have applied at least once for a new loan is increasing in 
SNWI. The difference between the lowest and the highest category of SNWI is significant 
at the 1 percent level. This is a first indication that underdiversification is perceived as 
a burden that can be reduced with bank loans.
Table 4.2 also shows whether a need for credit existed, but the owner did not apply
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Table 4.2: Tabulation -  Demand for Bank Loans
Applied for New Loans in the Last Three Years
Yes (%) No (%) No. of Obs.
Lowest third SNWI A 18.9 81.1 857
Middle third SNWI A 27.2 72.8 856
Highest third SNWI A 32.4 67.6 882
Not Applied for a Loan Because Denial Expected
Yes (%) No (%) No. of Obs.
Lowest third SNWI A 14.2 85.8 857
Middle third SNWI A 18.1 81.9 856
Highest third SNWI A 21.3 78.7 882
Loan Volume Applied For
M ean (US-S) M edian (US-S) No. of Obs.
Lowest third SNWI A 197,512 35,000 132
Middle third SNWI A 245,689 42,000 192
Highest third SNWI A 883,333 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 241
Note: SNWI A is defined as ownership share times total value of equity divided by net worth. The 
cut-off points for the categories of SNWI A are 9.1% and 30.6%.
for a loan because a denial was expected. The share of those companies is also increasing 
in SNWI. The difference between the lowest and the highest category of SNWI A is 
significant at the 1 percent level as well. Together with the results on loan applications 
it follows that a higher degree of underdiversification is related to an increased need for 
bank finance that manifests itself either in more loan applications or, at least, in a need 
for credit even if no application follows.
The loan volume applied for is a further indicator for the demand of bank loans. 
As can be seen in table 4.2 as well, the volume of bank loans applied for is increasing 
in underdiversification. The difference between the middle third and the highest third 
of SNWI is especially pronounced and significant at the 1 percent level. The dollar 
amount of granted loans is similarly increasing in SNWI (not reported).
These results on the demand for bank loans are in line with findings from the theoret­
ical literature. The theoretical models have shown that cost of equity capital is strongly 
increasing in the underdiversification of owners. It can therefore be expected that more
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underdiversified owners have a higher demand for bank loans as an alternative source 
of financing.4 Owners with a higher degree of underdiversification have an interest in 
reducing their financial exposure to the company.
We now turn to the multivariate analysis of the data. Table 4.3 presents probit re­
gressions on the demand for bank loans. Both measures of underdiversification, SNWI 
A and SNWI B, are used as controls.5 Columns (1) and (2) confirm that SNWI increases 
the probability of loan applications. Owners with a higher degree of underdiversifica­
tion approach banks more often in order to obtain additional funds. According to the 
regression specification in column (1), a one standard deviation increase in SNWI A 
leads ceteris paribus to an increase in the probability of a loan application of 5.8 per­
centage points. As in the whole data set the probability of an application for a new loan 
is only 26.2%, the influence of underdiversification is quite substantial. The probability 
of applying for a new loan is decreasing in the ownership share of the largest owner. 
Without further investigation it is not possible to know what drives this result. It could 
be that owners with a high ownership share are reluctant to share control, not only with 
other owners, but also with banks. Companies with higher leverage, i.e. companies who 
have more heavily applied for loans in the past, are more likely to apply for new loans 
in the present as well. As can be expected, larger and younger companies also have a 
higher demand for new loans.
Columns (3) and (4) report the determinants of not having applied for a loan because 
a denial was expected. The probability of not having applied for a loan for this reason is 
increasing in SNWI. Using the result from column (3), a one standard deviation increase 
in SNWI A leads to an increase in this probability of 4.6 percentage points. When 
comparing this figure to the 17.9% of companies in the overall sample that did not apply 
for a loan because a denial was expected, it can be seen that underdiversification has 
an important effect on the need for bank loans. The ownership share is not influential 
for the decision not to apply. The other control variables are as expected. More highly 
levered, smaller and younger companies have a higher probability of not applying for a 
loan because they expect a denial.
4This last point is also reflected in a survey question about the most important business problem. 
Companies in the lowest third of the SNWI A distribution state financing and interest rates less often 
as most important business problem. ,
5SNWI A is defined as ownership share times total value of equity divided by net worth. SNWI B 
adds personal assets used as collateral, guarantees and loans to the company to the equity value.
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Table 4.3: Probit Estimations -  Demand for Bank Loans
Dep. variable Loan Application Not applied - denial expected
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4)
SNWI A SNWI B SNWI A SNWI B
SNWI 0.755*** 0.607*** 0.832*** 0.691***
(0.113) (0.098) (0.133) (0.114)
Ownership share -0.260** -0.274** 0 .1 1 0 * 0.093
(0.130) (0.113) (0.157) (0.159)
Leverage 0 .0 1 2 *** 0 .0 1 0 *** 0.0067*** 0.0052***
(0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 1 1 ) (0 .0 0 1 1 )
Company size 0 .0 0 1 1 ** 0 .0 0 1 1 ** -0.0063*** -0.0065***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Company age -0.0092*** -0.0089*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0049) (0.0050)
No. of observations 2,595 2,595 2,595 2,595
Pseudo R squared 0 .1 0 0 0.099 0.130 0.129
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable ‘loan application’ equals one if an appli­
cation for a new loan occurred in the last three years. The dependent variable ‘not applied - denial 
expected’ equals one if a loan was needed but no application was made because a denial was expected. 
SNWI and ownership share are expressed as ratios. The regression also includes controls for industry, 
education, experience, ethnicity and legal form.
Table 4.4 presents the results of an OLS regression on the factors influencing the 
loan volume applied for. A higher degree of underdiversification leads to demand for 
loans with a higher volume. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in SNWI 
A increases the loan volume applied for by US-$ 229,500. The ownership share of the 
largest owner has a negative effect on the loan volume. Larger companies apply for a 
greater volume, but the age of the company has no effect.
As a summary of the previous empirical results, it can be stated that all univariate 
results are confirmed by the multivariate analysis. We therefore see that the results are 
robust and are not driven by the inclusion of specific controls. More highly underdiver­
sified owners have a higher demand for bank loans, which confirms hypothesis 1. All 
three possibilities to capture demand for loans point in the same direction. A higher 
degree of underdiversification leads to a higher probability of applying for a new loan,
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Table 4.4: Loan Volume Applied for
Dependent variable: Loan volume
(1 ) (2 )
SNWI A SNWI B
SNWI 8.760*** 5.353**
(2.870) (2.144)
Ownership share -10.539*** -10.544***
(3.132) (3.103)
Company size 7.621*** 7.809**
(2.339) (2.483)
Company age 1.774 1.596
(9.602) (9.810)
Number of observations 565 565
R squared 0.234 0.227
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions also include controls for industry and legal form.
a higher probability of needing credit but not applying because a denial is expected, 
and finally, higher loan volumes applied for.
4.5.2.2 Availability of Bank Loans
The success of loan applications can also be influenced by the underdiversification of 
owners. Since underdiversification increases the profitability of companies, we expect a 
positive effect. It is possible to differentiate between loan applications always approved, 
always denied, and both approved and denied. Table 4.5 shows that there is no clear 
pattern in the data for the relationship between SNWI and loans always approved. 
The percentage of loans always approved remains almost constant. The percentage of 
loans always denied is slightly decreasing in SNWI. The difference between the SNWI 
categories is rather small, however, and the variation is mostly driven by the both 
approved and denied case.
The multivariate analysis in table 4.6 gives a similar picture. SNWI A has a weakly 
negative influence on the success of loan applications, but SNWI B has no significant 
effect at all. There is therefore no strong relationship between underdiversification and
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Table 4.5: Tabulation -  Success of Loan Application
Always 
approved (%)
Always 
denied (%)
B oth
(%)
No. of 
Obs.
Lowest third SNWI A 76.5 17.3 6 .2 162
Middle third SNWI A 78.1 15.0 6.9 233
Highest third SNWI A 76.2 15.0 8.7 286
Note: SNWI A is defined as ownership share times total value of equity divided by net worth. The 
cut-off points for the categories of SNWI A are 9.1% and 30.6%,
Table 4.6: Ordered Probit -  Success of Loan Application
Dep. variable Approved
(1) (2 )
SNWI A SNWI B
SNWI -0.838* -0.525
(0.437) (0.365)
Ownership share 0.036 0.029
(0.482) (0.485)
Leverage 0.0052 0.0067*
(0.0039) (0.0038)
Company size 0.0097*** 0.0093***
(0.0034) (0.0033)
Company age 0.040*** 0.041***
(0.015) (0.015)
Number of observations 681 681
Pseudo R squared 0.148 0.146
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. ‘Approved’ is coded as three if loan applications have always been 
approved, as two if they have been approved and denied and as one if they have always been denied. 
SNWI and ownership share are expressed as ratios. The regression also includes controls for industry, 
education, experience, ethnicity and legal form.
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loan approvals. Hypothesis 2 proposed a positive effect of underdiversification on loan 
approvals. This hypothesis cannot be confirmed with the data. We have already seen 
that underdiversification has a positive influence on the likelihood of a loan application. 
If owners with a higher degree of underdiversification apply more often for a loan, it 
is possible that their average quality is lower in ways that we cannot observe. This 
would explain why we do not find a positive influence of SNWI on the probability of 
an approval. The other control variables show that larger and older companies have a 
higher approval rate as could be expected.
Of the other regressors, both company size and company age have a positive influence 
on loan approvals.
4.5.3 Equilibrium Values o f Leverage and Interest R ate
In this subsection we discuss the results for the reduced form specifications for leverage 
and the interest rate. The number of observations in the two reduced forms differ, 
because the interest rate on the most recent loan is only available, if the company has 
taken out a new loan in the three years preceding the survey. The leverage information, 
on the other hand, is available for all companies.
Table 4.7 displays the effect of share of net worth invested on leverage. SNWI has 
a positive, significant coefficient. Owners with a higher degree of underdiversification 
choose a higher level of leverage. This is to be expected, since a higher degree of under­
diversification increases the cost of equity capital. Owners may be willing to pay higher 
interest rates in order to obtain additional bank loans. In addition, we found in chap­
ter 3 that underdiversification increases company profitability. Banks may therefore 
increase their supply of loans to such companies. The influence of underdiversification 
on the equilibrium value of leverage is quite large. A one standard deviation increase 
in SNWI A leads ceteris paribus to an increase in leverage of 16.5 percentage points. 
These results confirm hypothesis 3.
It is of interest to discuss this result in light of the previous results on the demand 
for and supply of bank loans. Referring to the structural form of demand and supply 
of leverage (equations (1) and (2 )), it is conceivable that the coefficient p2 is zero, since 
we found no relationship between loan approvals and underdiversification, fy  gives 
the influence of SNWI on the interest rate charged by banks. We can deduce that 
underdiversification may also have no influence on the interest rate. However, even if
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Table 4.7: Reduced Form for Leverage
Dep. variable: Leverage
(1) (2 )
SNWI A SNWI B
SNWI 0.627*** 0.562***
(0 .2 1 1 ) (0.156)
Ownership share 0.895 0.529
(0.735) (0.644)
Company size 0.081 0.040
(0.071). (0.065)
Company age -0.115 - 0.111
(0.140) (0.117)
Number of observations 2,595 2,595
Overidentification test, x 2 0.974 0.856
(dof, p-value) (2 , 0.61) (2, 0.65)
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. The regressors SNWI and ownership share are instrumented. The 
regressions contain controls for industry, education, experience, ethnicity and legal form.
/?2 is zero, we still obtain a positive 7ri2 in the reduced form (5).
Ownership share has a positive but insignificant influence on leverage. The insignif­
icance of the coefficient can be influenced by the weakness of the instruments with 
respect to ownership share.6 The controls for company size and company age have 
also no influence on leverage. The test of overidentifying restrictions is passed for both 
regressions. The instruments are therefore valid from a statistical point of view.
Table 4.8 presents a tabulation of the interest rate on the most recent loan according 
to the three categories of SNWI A. The univariate analysis shows an inverse relationship 
between underdiversification and the interest rate. The difference in the interest rate 
between the lowest and the highest third of SNWI A is significant at the 5 percent level. 
As chapter 3 has shown, underdiversification indeed increases company profitability. If 
banks then see high underdiversification as a signal for company quality, it is to be
6Ownership share has a significant negative effect on leverage, if the regressor is not instrumented. 
This fits well with the previous results showing a negative effect of ownership share on both the 
probability of a loan application and on the loan volume applied for.
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expected that owners with a higher degree of underdiversification obtain cheaper loans. 
However, it was already shown that owners with a higher degree of underdiversification 
have a higher demand for loans. If they are also willing to pay a higher interest rate in 
order to obtain a loan, then it is a priori not clear in which direction the relationship 
between underdiversification and the interest rate goes.
Table 4.8: Tabulation -  Interest Rate on Most Recent Loan
M ean (%) M edian (%) No. of Obs.
Lowest third SNWI A 9.20 9.00 132
Middle third SNWI A 8.94 8.95 192
Highest third SNWI A 8.70 8.50 241
Note: SNWI A is defined as ownership share times total value of equity divided by net worth. The 
cut-off points for the categories of SNWI A are 9.1% and 30.6%.
Table 4.9 shows the reduced form for the interest rate. Columns (1) and (2 ) use 
only the risk premium of the most recent loan as dependent variable, whereas columns 
(3) and (4) use the interest rate as a whole. The results in columns (1) and (2) are 
quite similar. In contrast to the univariate results, there is no significant effect from 
underdiversification on the interest rate. The coefficient of SNWI is, however, negative. 
Hypothesis 4 considers the case that the shift in the demand curve is smaller than 
the shift in the supply curve and that therefore SNWI will have a negative effect on 
the interest rate. This cannot be confirmed. The effect of SNWI on the demand for 
and supply of leverage leads to a new equilibrium situation where the interest rate 
remains largely unchanged. When taking as given from the previous discussion that 
02 is zero, then it follows that the supply curve in figure 4.1 will not be shifted by an 
increase in SNWI. For this to be consistent with an unchanged interest rate, we need 
to have a supply function that is almost flat, i.e. a value of 72 that is close to zero. 
Banks may be unwilling to increase interest rates for higher level of leverage, because 
this would aggravate problems of moral hazard (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). This in 
turn implies that the coefficient of SNWI in the reduced form (7) will be close to zero. 
We can therefore conclude that underdiversification has no strong effect on the size of 
the interest rate in the structural equation describing the supply side influence on the 
interest rate. The ownership share of the largest owner has a positive influence on the
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Table 4.9: Reduced Form for Interest Rate
Dependent variable: Risk Premium Interest Rate
(i) (2 ) (3) (4)
SNWI A SNWI B SNWI A SNWI B
Company controls
SNWI -0 .0 1 0 -0 .0 2 1 -0.003 -0.018
(0.036) (0.031) (0.047) (0.040)
Ownership share 0.062 0.070 0.097* 0.105*
(0.047) (0.049) (0.059) (0.061)
Company size 0 .0 0 1 0.003 0.003 0.005
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Company age -0.014 -0.014 -0.004 -0.004
(0.014) (0.015) (0 .0 2 0 ) (0 .0 2 0 )
Interest rate controls
Default Spread 0.607* 0.600* 0.230 0.263
(0.320) (0.332) (0.576) (0.591)
Prime Rate 1.072 1.133
(0.692) (0.704)
Term Structure Spread 1.026 1.151
(0.781) (0.808)
Number of observations 565 565 565 565
Overidentification test x 2 1 .8 6 1.32 1.38 1.14
(dof, p-value) (2, 0.395) (2, 0.518) (2, 0.502) (2, 0.566)
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. The regressors SNWI and ownership share are instrumented. The 
regression contains the following characteristics of the loan: loan type, compensating balance required, 
guarantee required, collateral required and loan has a fixed interest rate. The regression also includes 
controls for industry, education, experience, ethnicity and legal form.
interest rate, which is only marginally significant, however.7
As further control, the variable default spread captures the market price for risk in 
corporate bonds. The default spread is defined as the difference between the average 
yield on corporate bonds rated ‘Baa’ by Moody’s and the yield on US government
7Ownership share has a marginally significant, positive effect on the interest rate, if the regressor 
is not instrumented.
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securities with a ten year maturity. This variable has a positive effect on the risk 
premium that private companies have to pay for their loans. Of the company control 
variables neither company size nor company age has a significant effect on the risk 
premium.
Columns (3) and (4) show regressions with the interest rate itself as dependent 
variable. As in the specification with risk premium as dependent variable, there is no 
effect of SNWI on the interest rate of the most recent loan in these specifications. The 
prime rate is included as additional control for the overall level of interest rates. As 
expected, this variable has a positive coefficient. It is, however, only significant at the 
11 to 12 percent level. The variable ‘term structure spread’ captures the differences 
in interest rates for loans of differing maturities. This variable also has a positive but 
insignificant effect.
The overall picture that emanates from the analysis of demand for and supply of 
bank loans suggests that underdiversification increases the demand for loans strongly. 
The banks, however, do not use this situation to increase interest rates. The higher 
demand for loans does result in higher leverage for the companies.
4.5.4 Underdiversification and Liquidity
To provide a more complete insight into underdiversification and the financial structure 
of companies, we also investigate the influence of SNWI on liquidity. Companies hold 
liquid assets, because they allow flexible reaction to upcoming opportunities. Also, 
liquid assets are needed to meet short-term expenses. The disadvantage of liquid asset 
holdings is their low return. If the funds are invested in company projects, they normally 
earn a higher return. Liquid assets have therefore high opportunity costs.
Table 4.10 shows the results with respect to liquidity. SNWI has a negative and 
significant influence on liquidity. The size of this effect is also non-negligible. A one 
standard deviation increase in SNWI A reduces liquidity ceteris paribus by 7.1 percent­
age points. The empirical results therefore confirm hypothesis 5. Since underdiversifi­
cation increases the cost of equity capital and therefore the opportunity costs of liquid 
assets, it was expected that owners with a higher degree of underdiversification keep 
less liquidity in their companies.
116
Table 4.10: Underdiversification and Liquidity
Dep. variable: Liquidity
(1) (2 )
SNWI A SNWI B
SNWI -0.285*** -0.253***
(0.103) (0.088)
Ownership share -0.013 0.147
(0.331) (0.327)
Company size -0.0050 0.013
(0.030) (0.032)
Company age -0.0053 -0 .0 1 1
(0.059) (0.058)
Number of observations 2,426 2,426
Overidentification test, x 2 2.62 2.52
(dof, p-value) (2, 0.270) (2, 0.284)
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. The regressors SNWI and ownership share are instrumented. The 
regressions contain controls for industry, education, experience, ethnicity and legal form.
The ownership share of the largest owner has no effect on liquid asset holdings.8 The
other company characteristics, size and age, are also not influential.
4.6 Conclusions
Private companies rely on two main sources for their financing: they are typically fi­
nanced with equity provided by a limited number of owners and by bank loans. The 
equity investment amounts often to a substantial share of the owner’s total net worth, 
which leads to an underdiversification in the owner’s overall portfolio. Since underdiver­
sification increases the cost of equity capital substantially, it possibly has an important 
influence on the financial structure of private companies. Whether this is the case is 
tested in this chapter.
Using survey data on private companies in the US, it is found that underdiversi­
fication increases the demand for loans -  both measured as the probability of a loan
8If the ownership share is not instrumented, it has a significant positive effect.
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application and measured as the loan volume applied for. Although it was found in 
the previous chapter that companies are more profitable if their owners have a higher 
degree of underdiversification, there is no evidence that underdiversification increases 
the supply of bank loans. The higher demand for new loans manifests itself in the 
capital structure of the companies -  underdiversification strongly increases leverage. A 
potential influence on the interest rate of the most recent loan is also investigated, but 
no effect is found. In order to deepen our understanding of the financial considerations 
in private companies, we also analyse liquid asset holdings. Liquidity is lower in com­
panies whose owners are more highly underdiversified, which can be explained with the 
higher opportunity cost of liquid assets due to the higher cost of equity capital.
These findings add to our understanding of how the financial structure of private 
companies is determined. They provide evidence that owners try to reduce the risk 
exposure from underdiversification with the help of additional bank finance. Since 
underdiversification increases the cost of equity capital, it influences the hurdle rate that 
investment opportunities need to pass in order to be realised. We can therefore conclude 
that the underdiversification of owners of private companies has real consequences for 
the business activities that the companies engage in.
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4.7 Appendix
Table 4.11: Descriptive Statistics
Variable M ean M edian Stdev. M in M ax
Loan volume applied for 
(in ’0 0 0  US-S) 506 50 1,698 0 .1 24,000
Interest rate (in %) 8.90 8.75 2.04 2 .0 0 16.0
Prime rate (in %) 8 .2 2 8.25 0.332 7.75 9.00
Term structure spread (in %) 0.30 0.23 0.31 -0.16 1.40
Default spread (in %) 2 .0 1 2 .1 2 0.36 1.45 2.65
Risk premium (in %) 3.52 3.31 1.96 0 1 0 .8
Leverage (in %) 33.3 27.3 30.8 0 99.8
Liquidity (in %) 17.0 8.99 19.8 0 8 8 .2
Note: Only variables are shown that are not already reported in the appendix of chapter 3, table C.
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Chapter 5
M anagerial Ownership and 
Company Performance
5.1 Introduction
The economics profession has been interested in contract theory since the 1930s (see 
e.g. Williamson (1985)). One important insight of this theory is that the firm is seen as 
a governance structure, whereas approaches within the neoclassical framework charac­
terise the firm by a production function. The view of the firm as a governance structure 
changed the whole analysis of economic organisations. Especially, the incentive litera­
ture and the transaction cost approach emphasise that ownership matters. This chapter 
is concerned with one branch of the incentive literature, the agency literature and, more 
precisely, with the principal-agent problem.
The main subject in the principal-agent literature is the separation of the ownership 
of a firm from the control rights. This separation is supposed to create agency costs 
because owners (principals) and managers (agents) have different objective functions. 
Berle and Means (1932) provide a seminal work in this context. They state that with the 
large size of modern firms and the diffuse ownership which often resulted, management 
took over effective control. As a consequence, it seems very likely that management 
operates the firm in its own interest. Then, the main focus of the literature is how 
‘ managerial discretion could be brought under more effective control.
This chapter studies the effect of a firm’s ownership structure on its performance. 
Specifically, we concentrate on the effect of managerial ownership on performance. We 
expect to find two opposing effects -  the incentive and the entrenchment effect. Man­
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agerial ownership is one way to align the objective functions of the owners and the 
managers. It is one way of ex ante incentive alignment that puts constraints on the 
managerial discretion to reduce the ex post misallocation of resources (e.g. Holmstrom 
(1979)). From this incentive effect we expect a positive relationship between manage­
rial ownership and firm performance. The entrenchment effect is especially important 
for high shares of managerial ownership. If managers hold large shares of the equity, 
it becomes more difficult for outside owners to exercise control. In this case managers 
will probably not maximise firm value and a negative relationship between manage­
rial ownership and firm performance is possible. We also investigate the relationship 
between managerial ownership and the risk exposure of a firm. In risky environments 
the management is reluctant to hold high ownership shares in order to diversify their 
assets. But the size of managerial ownership also has signalling effects, indicating firm 
quality.
We address these questions empirically for a sample of small and medium-sized pri­
vate companies with limited liability (GmbHs) in the German business-related service 
sector. 1 There are only a few empirical studies so far that examine issues of corporate 
governance for small and medium-sized companies, in particular for private companies 
(see e.g. Bennedsen et al. (2000)). However, there is a large literature on small and 
medium-sized companies covering issues of productivity (see e.g. Aghion et al. (2004)) 
and venture capital financing (see e.g. Hellmann and Puri (2002)). Most empirical stud­
ies of corporate governance look at large firms that are listed on the stock market (see 
e.g. Jensen and Murphy (1990), Kaplan (1994a) and Kaplan (19946)). However, the 
distortions caused by the separation of ownership from control are also present in pri­
vate companies with limited liability. Moreover, although listed firms play a large role 
in the United States, their overall importance in Europe is much smaller. In Europe, 
incorporated firms not listed on stock markets are much more important. In Germany, 
for example, GmbHs accounted for 32 percent of total turnover in 1998 and their overall 
importance has increased steadily in the last thirty years.2
GmbHs axe characterised by limited liability of the owners, which means that owners 
can lose at most the amount they contributed to the firm’s equity capital. They are not
1The counterpart of German GmbHs are limited companies (Ltds) in the UK and close corporations 
in the USA.
2See table 5.4 in the appendix. Also see Harhoff and Stahl (1995) for a detailed description of the 
increasing importance of GmbHs in Germany in the seventies and eighties.
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liable for the company’s debt with their personal assets. In general, they share profits 
according to the proportion of the firm’s equity capital they own. The GmbH is run by 
managers who can hold a stake in the firm as well. The managers have plenary power 
of representation to do business on behalf of the firm. Although it is not possible to 
limit this power of representation with respect to third parties, other arrangements can 
be made within the firm. The legal form of the GmbH is quite flexible. The respective 
rights of managers and owners are agreed upon in the company contract, for which the 
law stipulates only minimum requirements. For example, an owner always has the right 
to see the accounts of the firm and a change in the company contract always requires a 
minimum of three quarters of the vote. The distribution of profits is also regulated in 
the company contract. Usually it occurs according to ownership share, but the company 
contract can specify any other rule.
Due to management’s unrestrictable power of representation, the agency problem 
associated with the separation of ownership and control can be a serious phenomenon 
for firms in the legal form of a GmbH. This issue may be reinforced by the relatively 
low audit and public announcement requirements. Disclosure rules have been intensified 
since 1987, but de facto they are still quite weak (see e.g. Harhoff and Stahl (1995)).
Compared to existing empirical work on ownership structure and company perfor­
mance, our work has the advantage that we cover a panel of nearly 1400 companies of 
the business-related service sector from 1997-2000. The companies were drawn from a 
stratified random sample according to their distribution in the population.3 Usually, 
empirical studies cover cross-sections of the biggest companies in an economy, which 
are in general around 500 firms. In our sample, the average firm has only 39 employees.
Our performance measure is obtained from a quarterly business survey in the business- 
related service sector conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) 
in Mannheim, Germany, since 1994. The companies are asked on a quarterly basis 
whether their profits have increased, stayed the same or decreased in the last three 
months. On the basis of these quarterly answers, we construct a performance measure 
that takes seasonal and sectoral effects into account.
We use this performance measure since there is no balance sheet information and 
no stock market price available for small private limited liability firms in Germany. It 
might be criticised for giving only the direction of change but not the size of the change.
3For details on the data set and on the stratification design see sub-section 5.3.1 below.
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But this measure also has advantages, for example, we avoid the reliance on accounting 
data that is often generated with tax considerations in mind. Also, the companies have 
no incentive to misrepresent results since the questionnaire answers have no effect on, 
for example, credit decisions by banks or on their reputation. We also avoid the use 
of Tobin’s Q .4 This measure relies on the efficiency of financial markets. In practise, 
stock valuations are sometimes very volatile, and in this case, Tobin’s Q can be a poor 
measure of company performance.
Since we use panel data, we are able to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity, 
e.g. manager ability.
Our main finding is that a managerial ownership share up to around 80 percent has 
a positive effect on firm performance and a negative effect thereafter. We conclude 
that the first effect is due to better incentives and that the second effect is due to 
entrenchment. We also find that companies that are totally owned by managers do 
especially well.
In the context of our analysis it is very likely that firm performance influences the 
size of managerial ownership. We address the question of reverse causality and of en­
dogeneity by estimating lagged specifications as well as providing estimations using 
instrumental variables. These estimations confirm our previous result of an inverse 
U-shaped form of the influence of managerial ownership share on firm performance. 
Moreover, we apply the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimation technique in order to 
take effects of past firm performance into account. We find that firms that were more 
successful in the past tend to perform better in the future. Furthermore, this speci­
fication also confirms the inverted U-form relationship between managerial ownership 
share and firm performance.
Since the ownership structure of companies is a crucial question in the corporate 
governance literature, we also investigate the relationship between managerial owner­
ship and the risk exposure of firms. Here we find a non-linear relationship between risk 
and managerial ownership share. The negative effect might reflect risk-averse managers 
whereas the positive effect might be due to signalling or commitment requirements.
In a last step, we take into account the fact that managerial ownership and firm 
performance influence each other by estimating a system of simultaneous equations. 
This analysis confirms qualitatively the results from the single equation estimates.
4Tobin’s Q is equal to the ratio of the firm’s market value to the replacement cost of its physical 
assets. It is a proxy for the firm’s valuable intangible assets like, for example, management performance.
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This chapter is structured as follows: In section 5.2 we describe the theoretical 
considerations and previous empirical results. Section 5.3 gives a data description, 
section 5.4 presents the estimation results, and section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Related Literature
5.2.1 Theoretical Considerations
Managerial Ownership Share and Firm Performance
One of the major topics in corporate governance deals with the difficulties suppliers 
of finance to firms may have in getting returns on their investment. Of particular 
interest are the agency conflicts resulting from the separation of ownership and control. 
This separation is said to create agency costs to the extent that owners (principals) 
and managers (agents) have different objectives. For example, managers may invest 
funds in low-value projects to expand their empire instead of distributing these funds 
to the owners, who might have better investment opportunities. The main focus of the 
literature is how managerial discretion could be brought under more effective control, 
with special attention to difficulties caused by asymmetric information. The manager is 
generally better informed than the owner about the potential of a company. Incentive 
contracts are a way to mitigate the problems of asymmetric information. Since effort is 
not observable, it is not possible to contractually define how much effort the manager 
should expend. In this context, managerial ownership is one way of ex ante incentive 
alignment.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) distinguish between inside and outside suppliers of fi­
nance. The insiders manage the firm, and are able to augment their stream of cash-flow 
by consuming additional amenities of office. As noted above, managers have an in­
centive to adopt investment strategies that benefit them but reduce the payment to 
outside suppliers of funds. Thus, the performance of the firm depends on the fraction 
of managerial ownership. The greater this fraction, the greater the value of the firm.
According to Demsetz (1983) it is not clear whether owner managers or employed 
managers consume more on the job. The compensation scheme of managers who are 
at the same time owners has three components: pecuniary wage, profit of owners and 
amenities of office. The compensation scheme of employed managers consists only of 
pecuniary wage and amenities of office. Since the managers objective is to maximise
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utility and not to maximise profits, the amenities of office may have a great importance, 
especially if one takes into account that managers typically spend most of their day at 
work. In a competitive environment the managers have to pay for their on-the-job 
consumption by a reduction in their pecuniary managerial compensation. That is, in a 
competitive world with zero monitoring costs, there is an inverse relationship between 
take-home wages and on-the-job consumption. As a consequence, the managers will 
not consume while on the job unless the cost of doing so is less than if they consumed 
at home. Positive monitoring costs weaken this relationship. The ownership structure 
of an organisation is an endogenous outcome that is an optimal response to company 
specific advantages and disadvantages of different ownership structures. Therefore, no 
relationship between ownership structure and profitability is to be expected.
The entrenchment hypothesis, on the contrary, states that there is a negative rela­
tionship between managerial ownership and profitability, especially at very high levels 
of managerial ownership. The higher the ownership stake of the manager, the more 
difficult it is for outside owners to control the management.
Taking the incentive hypothesis and the entrenchment hypothesis into account, we 
expect a non-linear relationship between management’s ownership share and firm per­
formance. At low levels of ownership we expect the incentive effect to be dominant, 
that is, we expect a positive effect. However, at very high levels of ownership the 
entrenchment effect might be more important and the effect of ownership could be 
negative.
The literature also affords special interest to the role of banks in raising funds with 
emphasis on the control rights attached to this. For Germany (and Japan), the financial 
system is often classified as bank-based. This is due to the observation that banks have 
close links with and a strong influence on firms they finance. Moreover, German firms 
are said to maintain only a few bank relationships with a great degree of reliance on 
one bank, the so-called ‘Hausbank’.5 One role of banks is to monitor the firms they 
finance. In the case of debt, banks (or creditors in general) have to pay more attention 
to the risks that managers take, whereas the effort level is not negatively influenced by
5 Some studies question these distinctive features of the German and Japanese financial systems in 
comparison to the market-based Anglo-American system. Mayer (1990) observes, that in Germany 
bank finance accounted only for 20 percent of total sources, which is the same fraction as in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, whereas in France, Japan and Italy bank finance accounted for 40 
percent of total sources.
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debt. These issues are related to the question of the optimal financial structure of the 
firm. Every capital-structure is linked to a certain kind of governance structure .6
Managerial Ownership Share and Risk
Theoretical considerations about the relationship of managerial ownership and risk show 
two opposing effects. On the one hand, since managers are risk averse, one would expect 
a negative relationship between company risk and managerial ownership. The utility 
loss of concentrating money in one investment is higher if the investment is riskier. On 
the other hand, Leland and Pyle (1977) show that managerial ownership can also serve 
as a signal for company quality. A manager will only be willing to invest large amounts 
of his wealth into the company if he is convinced that the company will be successful. 
This is taken into account by banks when deciding on loan applications. Since banks 
are especially reluctant to lend to risky companies, we expect that managers of risky 
companies need to make more use of this signal. Therefore there can be a positive 
relationship between company risk and managerial ownership. This chapter attempts 
to analyse empirically which of the opposing effects dominates for which risk levels.
5.2.2 Previous Empirical Results
As explained in the previous subsection, economic theory reveals many counteracting 
mechanisms concerning the relationship between managerial ownership and firm per­
formance, without any hint as to which effects might be dominant. As a consequence, 
empirical work is needed to identify the main effects. But, as will be shown in this 
study, the empirical evidence is also contradictory.
First of all, to the best of our knowledge there are no studies that investigate the im­
pact of managerial ownership on firm performance for small and medium-sized German 
firms.7 However, there are some interesting empirical results for firms in the United 
States and the UK.
Mprck et al. (1988) investigate the relationship between management ownership of
6Unfortunately, we do not have information about the capital structure of the firms in our sample. 
For this reason, we do not look at these arguments in more detail. For more information on this issue 
see e.g. Aghion and Bolton (1989), Aghion and Bolton (1992), Williamson (1988) and Harris and Raviv 
(1991).
7There are some studies dealing with corporate governance in Germany, see e.g. Kaplan (19946), 
Januszewski et al. (2002) or Koke (2000), but their main focus is different.
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the firm’s equity and Tobin’s Q in a cross-section of 371 Fortune 500 firms in 1980. They 
find that Tobin’s Q rises as managerial ownership increases from 0 percent to 5 percent, 
as ownership share increases further up to 25 percent it falls, and then continues to rise 
again as ownership share exceeds 25 percent. The increasing Tobin’s Q supports the in­
centive effect, whereas the decreasing Tobin’s Q supports the entrenchment hypothesis. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) confirm the non-linear relationship but with a different 
form. They find a positive relationship up to a managerial ownership share of 40 to 50 
percent, and a negative relationship for higher shares.
Mehran (1995) tests the relationship between executive compensation structure, own­
ership and firm performance. Using 153 randomly-selected manufacturing firms in 1979- 
1980, he finds that managerial ownership has a positive impact on firm performance 
measured both by Tobin’s Q and by return on assets (ROA). He also estimates re­
gressions with various dummy variables for different levels of managerial ownership, 
like Mprck et al. (1988). However, the results favour a linear relationship over non- 
linearity.8
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find no significant linear relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance as measured as accounting profit rate.
The empirical studies surveyed up to now show contradictory empirical evidence. 
One explanation could be that there are differences in managerial ownership data. This 
issue was investigated by Kole (1995), who examines three commonly used data sets 
in the United States and focuses especially on the results of Mprck et al. (1988) and 
McConnell and Servaes (1990). His study concludes that the different results on the 
relationship of managerial ownership and firm performance are not due to differences in 
ownership data. There are other variables that have to be controlled for, in particular 
the firm size.
Himmelberg et al. (1999) investigate the determinants of managerial ownership and 
the relation between managerial ownership and firm performance in a panel regression. 
They address the endogeneity problem associated with simple regressions of firm per­
formance on managerial ownership share. Their result is that managerial ownership
8They also find a positive relationship between Tobin’s Q/ROA and equity-based management 
compensation. But the relation between equity-based compensation and managerial ownership turned 
out to be negative. This last result coincides with a study by Ofek and Yermack (2000), who find 
that high-ownership managers tend to sell more of the shares they get from equity compensation to 
diversify away the idiosyncratic risk associated with ownership concentrated in a single asset.
128
depends on the contracting environment a firm acts in, especially on the riskiness of 
the firm, which determines the managers’ scope for moral hazard. In a risky environ­
ment, where monitoring activities by the owners are relatively expensive and the scope 
for moral hazard for the managers is big, managers must have greater ownership stakes 
to align the respective objective functions.
Harhoff and Stahl (1995) investigate the impact of managerial ownership on firm 
survival and on firm employment growth in German SMEs. They find that an increasing 
share of managerial ownership has a positive impact on firm survival whereas there is 
no significant effect of managerial ownership share on employment growth.
The effect of outside shareholders is studied by Nickell et al. (1997). They investigate 
the impact of product market competition, financial market pressure and shareholder 
control on firm productivity. Using panel data from 580 UK manufacturing firms they 
find that dominant external shareholders have in general no positive effect on company 
performance. However, if the dominant shareholder is a financial institution, then a 
positive effect of monitoring is found.
Harhoff and Korting (1998) study the interaction between borrowers and lenders in 
small and medium-sized German firms. They find that firms with more concentrated 
borrowing and long-lasting bank relationships are able to negotiate better contract 
conditions in terms of collateral requirements, interest rates, and credit availability.
Ang et al. (2000) study the relationship between a firm’s ownership structure and 
its agency costs for a sample of small US companies. Two efficiency measures proxy for 
agency costs: the ratio of operating expense to annual sales and the ratio of annual sales 
to total assets. They find that companies with an owner-manager have lower agency 
costs, that agency costs decrease with the managerial ownership share, and that agency 
costs increase with the number of outside shareholders. The results with respect to the 
monitoring role of banks were less clear cut.
This chapter improves on the existing literature by looking at the influence of man­
agerial ownership on the profitability of private companies. So far only company growth 
and efficiency measures have been considered. This is due to limitations on data avail­
ability. Since balance sheets and profit and loss accounts are not available for German 
private companies, we resort to the use of survey data. The availability of panel in­
formation is also novel to the study of German private companies. This allows us to 
control for firm specific effects.
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5.3 Data
5.3.1 D ata Sources
The data basis for the estimation is derived from a business survey in the German 
business-related service sector carried out since 1994 by ZEW and Credit reform, Ger­
many’s largest credit rating agency. Since there is no exact definition of ‘business-related 
services’ in the literature, this industry is defined by enumerating certain sectors as 
done, for example, by Hass (1995). The sectors as well as their industrial classification 
codes are displayed in table 5.5 in the appendix.
The survey is carried out quarterly. A single page questionnaire is sent to about 
4000 firms and the response rate is approximately 25 percent. In 1994, when the survey 
was launched, a stratified sample covering all companies included in the Creditreform 
database was taken. The stratification was done according to company size, region and 
sector affiliation. A sample refreshment takes place annually.
The questionnaire is divided into two parts. The first part contains questions on the 
business development of the firms in the current quarter with respect to the previous 
quarter and on their expectations for the next quarter. The second part is devoted 
to questions of current economic or political interest. The survey is conducted as a 
panel.9 More precisely, in the first part, firms are asked about the development of their 
returns, sales, prices, demand, and number of employees. They indicate on a three 
point Likert scale whether these variables have decreased, stayed the same, or increased 
in the current quarter compared to the previous quarter. For the purpose of the current 
research the variable of most interest is the assessment of the firm’s returns. 10
The data derived from the survey is merged with company information from the 
Creditreform database. This database contains detailed information on the ownership 
structure of firms. It also contains the size of the stakes that managers hold in a firm and 
we know the identity of outside owners. Furthermore, the number of bank relationships 
a firm holds is displayed. Other information is the number of employees, the age of a 
company, and the number of business fields a company is active in. These variables 
have been gathered on a yearly basis since 1997.
The main estimations are based on 2797 observations referring to 1351 firms. The
9 For more details on the sample design and the data set see Kaiser et al. (2000).
10The exact question is: in comparison to the last three months, have your profits increased, stayed 
the same or decreased?
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number of observations and firms per sector is displayed in table 5.6 in the appendix. 
It is an unbalanced panel data set that includes observations from 1997 to 2000. The 
participation pattern of the firms is as follows: 5 percent of the firms participated in 
all 4 years, 25 percent participated in at least 3 years, and 50 percent of the firms are 
observed twice.
Is our dataset representative for companies in the German business-related service 
sector? There are several possibilities how biases could be introduced. As mentioned, 
the population for the questionnaire is all companies covered by Creditreform. Since 
Creditreform aims to include.all registered companies in their database, this should not 
pose a problem. A second source of bias is the response pattern of the companies to 
the questionnaire. If the non-responses are related to the topic we want to investigate -  
the effect of ownership structure on performance -  then our results will be biased. This 
seems, however, unlikely. Survivorship bias is possible in our sample since we can only 
observe profitability for companies that are still alive. In an annual sample refreshment 
all companies are deleted that haven’t answered in the six preceding waves. The last 
source of bias is the frequency with which Creditreform updates company information. 
Companies for which there are more inquiries are updated more often. Again, if the 
updating frequency is not related to our analysis, we face no problem.
5.3.2 Variable Definitions
Our first regression explains the links between ownership characteristics and company 
performance. Since it is not possible to obtain balance sheet information for German 
private companies, we construct a performance measure on the basis of survey answers. 
Every quarter, participating firms indicate whether their returns decreased, stayed the 
same or increased in the current quarter in comparison to the previous quarter. The 
performance variable (Relative perform ance) is measured as the difference of the 
number of times a company has answered that its returns have increased and the number 
of times a company has reported that its returns have decreased in comparison with 
the average ‘increased’ and ‘decreased’ responses from its industry. The performance 
measure is calculated annually. The exact formula is:
131
R elative performance:
#  of ‘increases’ per company per year — #  of ‘decreases’ per company per year
#  of ‘increases’ per sector per year — #  of ‘decreases’ per sector per year
#  of companies in the sector
Compared to the direct use of the quarterly categorical answers of the firms, this 
relative performance measure has several advantages. First, it avoids the estimation of 
fixed-effects in panel ordered probit or logit models. Second, transforming the quarterly 
data into annual data eliminates seasonal effects and sector effects are eliminated by 
the normalisation.11
The relative performance measure is a continuous variable and the estimation of 
linear panel models is feasible. Concerning the choice of our estimation method, the 
question whether we want to estimate probabilities for specific outcomes or whether we 
are interested in average developments is important. Since our aim is to identify the 
latter we use linear panel models.
The definitions of the variables determining performance are as follows (descriptive 
statistics are displayed in table 5.7 in the appendix):
Ownership share of managers (Share) is the sum of ownership stakes held by the 
management of the firm. It is measured between 0 and 1. We expect a non-linear effect 
on performance due to the incentive and entrenchment effect.
We construct a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the stake that the manage­
ment holds is 100 percent (D_shl00). The share of companies that are totally owned 
by managers varies with sectors between 31 percent and 59 percent. The average in the 
whole sample is 45 percent. Excluding companies that are totally owned by managers 
the distribution of ownership share is approximately normal, centred around 55 percent 
and with relatively more observations above the mean. This distribution does not vary
11 We also work with a second performance measure constructed on the basis of the survey answers 
that took only the number of ‘increased’ answers into account. We decided to concentrate on the 
reported measure since the second measure may be subject to seasonality and does not take all the 
available information into account. Nevertheless, we estimated the specifications reported below with 
both performance measures with very similar results. This suggests that the results are robust to 
different specifications of the performance measure.
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substantially across sectors. We expect a positive sign since companies that do not 
experience a separation of ownership and control should perform better.
The number of managers who hold ownership shares (O w nerjm an). We expect 
a negative sign since for more managers it is more difficult to come to an agreement. 
Furthermore, the incentive for a single manager is diminished, if the ownership is divided 
between several managers.
The number of a firm’s external equity holders (E xtern). Larger external equity 
holders have a bigger incentive to monitor. Therefore we expect a negative sign.
The number of a firm’s bank relationships (Bank). We expect a positive sign. If 
there are fewer banks, they will have a bigger loan volume to the company and therefore 
more incentives to monitor.
The natural log of number of employees (Size). Regarding the number of employees, 
the firms are relatively small. 78 percent of the firms have less than 50 employees, 14 
percent have between 50 and 100 employees and only 9 percent have more than 100 
employees. It is not clear in which direction the relationship between profitability and 
size goes.
In a second regression we explain the ownership share of managers (Share). The 
regression includes the following variables:
The standard deviation of the responses to the profitability question by company 
(Risk I). The profitability variable takes the value two if profitability has gone up, 
the value one if profitability has stayed the same, and the value zero if profitability has 
decreased.
The forecasting error for returns by company (Risk II). The absolute value of the 
deviation of coding of forecasted return from coding of realised return for one period, 
divided by the number of periods for which we have this information. We expect a 
non-linear relationship between risk and managerial ownership due to risk-aversion of 
managers and signalling of company quality.
A dummy variable that takes the value 1 for West German firms (W est). This is a 
control variable. We are not having a certain expectation with respect to its sign.
The natural log of number of employees (Size). Because of wealth constraints we 
expect that there is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and the size 
of a company.
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5.4 Empirical Analysis
5.4.1 Determ inants of Company Performance
Our first specification estimates the relationship between relative firm performance and 
the ownership share of managers, a dummy for ownership exclusively by managers, 
the number of managers who hold ownership stakes, the number of outside owners, 
the number of bank relationships, and the size of the company. We also include the 
quadratic term for the ownership share of managers to allow for non-linearities. Due to 
the panel structure of the data set, we are able to control for unobserved firm-specific 
effects, e.g. managerial ability, by estimating fixed effect models.
The results of the first specification are displayed in table 5.1, column l .12
The effect of the ownership share on performance has the form of an inverted ‘U’. 
We find that managerial ownership has a positive effect up to an ownership share of 
around 50 percent, then the effect becomes negative. The positive effect might reflect 
higher incentives for managers. The negative effect of high ownership shares might be 
due to an entrenchment effect. If managerial ownership exceeds a certain share then 
outside owners find it more difficult to make managers accountable for their activities. 
These effects on firm performance axe statistically significant.
We find that companies with exclusive managerial ownership perform better than 
companies that include outside owners. It seems to be the case that managers do 
better if there is no interference from outside. Moreover, firms perform better when 
fewer managers with ownership stakes are involved.13
The positive effect of exclusive managerial ownership is somewhat striking since the 
difference in incentives for ownership between 90 percent and 99 percent of a company 
compared to 1 0 0  percent are not big enough to explain the difference in performance. 
The difference cannot solely be due to incentives. There might be other effects at
12 We also estimated random effect models. The random effect method is rejected by the Hausman 
test. This rejection of the random effect model indicates that the firm specific effects are correlated 
with the regressors.
13We regress the change in profits on the level of managerial ownership share. Our results do not 
imply that better companies will grow faster than the worse for ever. Nickell et al. (1997) find that 
competitive pressure has a positive influence on productivity growth. Companies that grow faster 
build up market share over time, but then they face less competitive pressure to innovate and hence 
their productivity declines.
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Table 5.1: Estimation Results -  Performance
Dep. Variable: Relative Performance
(i) (2 ) (3)
Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Arellano-Bond
Share 3.54*
(2.16)
5.52*
(2.90)
Share (lag) 7 3 4 *** 
(2 .8 8 )
Share squared -3.17*
(1.78)
-5.86**
(2.41)
Share squared (lag) -4.32**
(2.16)
Owner_man -0.13
(0 .1 1 )
-0 .0 1
(0.14)
Owner_man (lag) -0.50**
(0 .2 1 )
D_shl00 0.79**
(0.40)
1.24**
(0.57)
Extern 0.19** 0.15* 0 .1 2
(0.08) (0.09) (0 .1 2 )
Bank -0 .1 1 * -0.18** -0.14
(0.15) (0.08) (0 .1 1 )
Size -0 .2 1 -0.23 -0.43*
(0.15) (0.26) (0.26)
Relative performance (lag) 0.13***
(0.05)
Number of observations (firms) 2797 (1351) 1434 (777) 1143 (612)
F-Test
(degrees of freedom)
2.06 
(7, 1439)
3.10 
(6 , 651)
Wald x2(8 )-test 22.06***
Arellano-Bond test for first-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals: -10.17*** 
Arellano-Bond test for second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals: 0.55
Note: ***,**,*=significant on the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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work. One effect could be of a psychological nature. A manager who is the sole owner 
might feel more involved with his company and might therefore work harder. Another 
explanation might be that this result is driven by reverse causality. Managers might 
only elect to take 100 percent ownership of the very best companies. If companies do 
not perform very well they might prefer shared responsibility. In the latter case, they 
could shift the blame for bad performance onto the influence of the other owners.
We test the appropriateness of the quadratic specification with regressions where 
we include dummies for every 10  percent interval (and 2 0  percent interval) of share 
ownership. This regression confirms the inverted U-shape of the influence of ownership 
share. It also confirms the extraordinarily good performance of companies with 100 
percent managerial ownership. Figure 5.1 in the appendix illustrates these results. Fig­
ure 5.2 displays the results of a regression with dummies for every 20 percent managerial 
ownership share. The figures also contain 95 percent confidence bands.
The number of managers with ownership stakes has a negative influence on perfor­
mance as expected, although the effect is not significant in the regression. If there 
are several managers it becomes more difficult to agree on the company strategy and, 
furthermore, the incentive due to the ownership stake is smaller for each single manager.
With regard to the effect of outside owners we find that the more outside owners, the 
better the performance. This finding is in contrast to corporate governance literature, 
which pronounces the importance of monitoring activities, best performed by concen­
trated ownership. In contrast, widespread ownership leads to the free rider problem 
since there are only weak incentives for individual investors to seek information about 
the managers’ work. We, in turn, do not find that owners with a big share would 
be more effective in monitoring. In this context, this estimation result confirms the 
previously mentioned notion that it is better to leave the manager alone. Ownership 
changes through inheritance can be used to illustrate this point. For example, after the 
death of the founder it is often the case that family members who are not involved in 
the management of the company become owners. It can be harmful if these new owners 
try to influence important decisions.
This result might also be driven by reverse causality. It might be necessary for badly 
performing companies to find several owners because no one is willing to take on sole 
responsibility.
We find that monitoring by banks has a positive effect. The more bank relationships 
a company has, the worse its performance. This is compatible with the argument that
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banks with a high loan volume to one company will spend more resources on monitoring 
than banks with a small loan volume. But it also confirms the view that companies with 
a poor performance need to seek loans from several banks because no bank wants to 
make a big commitment. It is not possible to differentiate between these two arguments.
We also include measures of market concentration and import competition in the 
regression to control for the effects of competitors on performance. For market con­
centration we calculate the Herfindahl index on a sectoral level with (partly estimated) 
turnover figures of the companies in our sample. For import competition we use a 
question from the survey on whether the company faces competition from foreign com­
panies. However, both measures turn out to have little explanatory power. The results 
are not shown in the tables.
As already noted above, the regression potentially suffers from a problem of reverse 
causality. It is possible that the performance of a company has an influence on the 
size of the ownership stake a manager is willing to take. Managers tend to be very 
well informed about the potential of a company before they decide on the stake. This 
could lead to higher ownership stakes in well performing companies and lower ownership 
stakes in badly performing companies. But it is also necessary to take the price that 
managers need to pay for the stake into account. If a company is known to be good, the 
former owners will charge a high price and the stake the new manager is going to buy 
will be consequently lower. Nevertheless, if managers are better informed about the 
potential of a company than the owners, our results might represent an overestimate of 
the effect of ownership on performance.
It is also necessary to consider the managerial owners’ dilemma regarding the optimal 
date of selling the stakes. Managers might sell when the company is doing very well 
because they then get a high price for the stake, but managers might also sell when the 
company is doing badly because they need to raise additional capital. In both cases, 
the share of managerial ownership will fall but the relationship to the performance of 
the company is undetermined.
To study the dynamic effects of managerial ownership share on performance and to 
address the endogeneity problem, we estimated lagged specifications. The use of fixed 
effect estimation helps to control for endogeneity as long as the effect is time-invariant, 
because in this case it will be captured by the fixed effect. The lagged specification 
additionally controls for endogeneity due to a correlation of the time-invariant error term 
with regressors of the same time period. Table 5.1, column 2, reports the estimation
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results of the regression including lagged specifications of the share variables.
The specification with lagged explanatory variables confirms the inverted U-form. 
The maximum point increases to around 80 percent, i.e. we find a positive effect of 
managerial ownership share up to 80 percent, then the effect becomes negative. Tak­
ing lags increases the level of significance of the share and share-squared coefficients, 
moreover, the values of the coefficients increase.
Figure 5.3 in the appendix illustrates how (ceteris paribus) performance changes 
as managerial ownership share changes from zero to 100 percent. Firm performance 
increases steadily up to around 80 percent managerial ownership share. Afterwards, the 
performance measure decreases slightly. Nevertheless, due to the way the performance 
measure is constructed, it is not possible to relate these index values to growth rates.
The estimated influence of our further regressors remains unchanged. Firms with 
fewer managers perform better. In the lag specification this effect turns out to be 
significant on the 5 percent level. Widespread outside ownership has a positive effect. 
We also still find that firms with fewer bank relationships have a better performance. 
In this specification we did not include the dummy for exclusive managerial ownership 
because it was not significant.
Thus, the results of our first specification reported in table 5.1, column 1, seem 
not to be driven by reverse causality. The general effects are confirmed by the lagged 
specification. We can also show that the effect of managerial ownership on performance 
needs time to take full effect. Changes in incentives and entrenchment need some time 
to be reflected in the performance of the company.
Due to the panel structure of our data set we are able to investigate the impact of 
past firm performance on current firm performance. It is very likely that firms that 
were successful in the past continue to perform better.
We study the persistence of firm performance by applying a General Method of Mo­
ment (GMM) estimator that, in the context of dynamic panel estimation, is proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). Further lags of the level and the difference of the dependent 
variable are used to instrument the lagged dependent variable included in a dynamic 
panel model. Lags of the performance measure going back to 1994, the year when the 
survey started, were used. Estimation results are displayed in table 5.1, column 3.
The results confirm the persistence of firm performance. Firms that were more 
successful in the past tend to perform better in the future. This effect is significant 
on the 1 percent level. Moreover, the inverted U-form specification of the influence of
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managerial ownership share and firm performance is still appropriate, with a maximum 
point of around 50 percent of managerial ownership share. The signs of the other 
regressors remain unchanged compared to the fixed-effect results, although the level of 
significance drops considerably for some of them.
Arellano-Bond tests for first and second-order autocorrelation in the first differenced 
residuals are also reported. The null hypotheses of no first-order autocorrelation in 
the differenced residuals is rejected, but it is not possible to reject the null hypotheses 
of no second-order autocorrelation. Given first differences, the presence of first-order 
autocorrelation in the differenced residuals does not imply that the estimates are in­
consistent, whereas the presence of second-order autocorrelation would imply that the 
estimates are inconsistent.14
5.4.2 Determ inants of M anagerial Ownership
Managerial ownership is determined by several firm characteristics of which risk expo­
sure of a firm is especially important. Because managers are risk averse, we expect a 
negative relationship between risk exposure and managerial ownership. However, man­
agers also use their ownership stake to signal firm quality to banks. Since banks axe 
especially reluctant to lend money to risky firms, there can also be a positive relation­
ship between risk exposure and managerial ownership. The results will show which 
effect dominates for which risk levels.
We use the tobit regression model to find the determinants of managerial ownership 
because our dependent variable -  the managerial ownership share -  is censored to lie 
between zero and one hundred percent. We do not use a fixed-effect estimator because 
most of our regressors do not vary much over time. Managerial ownership is explained 
by company risk, firm size, sector, and region. The results of the share regression are 
given in table 5.2 below. Column 1 shows the result of the first risk measure (Risk I); 
in column 2, the result of the second risk measure (Risk II) is reported.
Both risk measures indicate a polynomial functional form of the influence of risk on 
the managerial ownership share. We find that ownership share first decreases with risk 
and then increases, finally, it decreases again. The negative relationship between risk 
and managerial ownership share indicates that managers are risk-averse. They prefer 
to diversify risk by investing their financial assets elsewhere, especially as they already
14See Arellano and Bond (1991, p. 281f.) for a discussion on this point.
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Table 5.2: Estimation Results -  Ownership
Dep. Variable: Managerial Ownership Share
(i) (2) (3)
Risk measure Risk I Risk II Risk II
Risk -1.00*** -0.26* -0.47***
(0.20) (0.14) (0.20)
Risk squared 2.04*** 0.34* 0.61**
(0.41) (0.21) (0.30)
Risk cubed -0.98*** -0.11 -0.20*
(0.23) (0.07) (0.11)
Size -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
West 0.07*** 0.06** 0.02
Financial restriction
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
0.15***
(0.05)
Number of observations 2478 1841 792
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.04 0.08
LR-test 139.1*** 102.1*** 99.3***
Note: ***,**,*=significant on the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Standard errors are in parentheses. All 
equations contain industry dummies and year dummies.
have their human capital in the firm. After a certain point, banks could be reluctant 
to lend to risky companies because they are afraid of losing their money. The only way 
a manager can convince the bank that even though the company is risky it is of high 
quality is by holding a big personal stake. This finding is in contrast to the theory of 
optimal risk sharing, which predicts that risk-averse managers will hold smaller stakes 
in riskier companies because the advantage of aligned incentives is outweighed at a lower 
level of ownership by the higher cost of risk bearing. For that reason, it is not surprising 
that our estimation results suggest that, after a certain level of risk, the cost of risk 
bearing exceeds the advantage of aligned incentives, i.e. in high risk companies the 
relationship between risk and managerial ownership share tends to be negative again.
This functional form was also confirmed by a dummy variable regression (see fig-
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ure 5.7 in the appendix).
As expected, the size of a company has a negative influence on managerial share 
holdings. Big companies need more outside owners because of the limited wealth of the 
managers.
Although not reported, there is considerable sectoral variation of managerial own­
ership across sectors. Five out of ten sectoral dummies are significant. The difference 
between East and West Germany is also significant. In West Germany ownership stakes 
are 5 percent higher.
In order to investigate possible reasons for the positive relationship between risk and 
managerial ownership, we exploit information from the survey through the question: 
“Have your business activities been hindered by financial restrictions?”. This question 
was asked in the second quarter of 1995. This was before our sample starts, therefore 
the results must be interpreted with this limitation in mind. The answers are coded 
in a dummy variable with the dummy being equal to one if companies encountered 
problems of obtaining finance. Inclusion of the dummy in the cubic specification of the 
share regression shows that companies with difficulties of obtaining finance have higher 
managerial ownership (see column 3 of table 5.2). The higher managerial ownership 
might already be a reaction to overcome those difficulties.
5.4.3 Simultaneous Determ ination of Ownership and Perfor­
mance
In the last two subsections we analysed the determinants of firm performance and man­
agerial ownership share in single equation specifications. Concerning firm performance, 
we addressed the problem of reverse causality and of dynamic effects. Moreover, by es­
timating fixed-effect regressions, potential time-invariant correlation between regressors 
and the disturbance term have been eliminated.
In this subsection, we estimate the performance equation and the managerial own­
ership equation in a system of equations using a three-stage least squares regression 
method. This method is an instrumental variable approach and takes potential en­
dogeneity of managerial ownership as well as of firm performance into account. This 
endogeneity is due to unobserved firm-specific forces, e.g. managerial ability or man­
agerial motivation that influence the endogenous explanatory variable as well as the 
outcome variable. Compared to our fixed-effects regression in sub-section 5.4.1, which
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eliminates endogeneity by controlling for unobserved firm characteristics via the fixed- 
effects, this instrumental variable approach also controls for endogeneity due to the 
time-varying component of the error term. Moreover, the three-stage least squares re­
gression method allows for correlation of the disturbances of the two equations, which 
increases efficiency compared to the two-stage least squares regression method.
Table 5.3 displays the regression results. The first structural equation explains firm 
performance. In this equation managerial ownership is instrumented by its lag, the 
lag of relative performance, the number of managers holding ownership stakes, the 
number of external owners, the number of bank relationships, the riskiness of the firm, 
the size and various year dummies. We also included quadratic terms for the lagged 
share variable and the relative performance variable. Risk is included in a polynomial 
form of third order. The same holds for the instrumentation of the quadratic term of 
managerial ownership.
The second equation explains managerial ownership. We use the same set of in­
struments as in the first structural equation to instrument relative performance and its 
square.
For the performance equation the panel structure of the data set is taken into account 
by using fixed-effects (see Baltagi (1995, p. 113ff.)).15
These estimations with instrumental variables (IV) confirm our previously derived 
results although the coefficients of some regressors increase considerably.
The effect of managerial ownership on firm performance still has the form of an 
inverted ‘U’, with the maximum point lying at around 80 percent managerial ownership 
share. The signs of the other regressors remain unchanged.
The single equation results of the share equation are also confirmed. Relative per­
formance in the first as well as in the second order has a positive effect on managerial 
ownership. This means that managers hold higher stakes in better performing compa­
nies. The effect of firm risk on managerial ownership share has a polynomial functional 
form, with share first decreasing with risk, then increasing and finally decreasing again. 
The signs of the other regressors also remain unchanged compared to the results in
15As is described by Baltagi (1995), one has to eliminate the fixed effects by generating deviations 
from firm-specific means for all variables. In the first step one regresses the mean deviation of the 
endogenous regressors on the mean deviation of the instruments. The second step is a regression of 
the mean deviation of the dependent variable on the mean deviation of the exogenous and predicted 
endogenous regressors.
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Table 5.3: System Estimation of Ownership and Performance
Dep. Variable: Relative Performance
Share 60.05***
(22.45)
Share squared -36.33***
(13.71)
Owner_man -0.71**
(0.30)
Extern 1.23***
(0.45)
Bank -0.29***
(0.10)
Size -0.91**
(0.37)
Partial R2 for instruments in the first stage 0.25 (share) /  0.22 (share squared)
F-test for instruments in the first stage, F(8, 1087) 44.13 (share) /  33.75 (share squared)
Dep. Variable: Managerial Ownership Share
Relative performance 0.10***
(0.03)
Relative performance squared 0.20***
(0.02)
Risk -0.88***
(0.17)
Risk squared 1.04***
' (0.25)
Risk cubed -0.29***
(0.09)
Size -0.01
(0.01)
West 0.03
(0.03)
Partial R2 for instruments in the first stage 0.13 (rel. perf.) /  0.04 (rel. perf. squared)
F-test for instruments in the first stage, F(8, 1087) 21.11 (rel. perf.) /  5.90 (rel. perf. squared)
Number of observations per equation 1102
Wald x 2-test 47.96 to 6 dof (performance equ.) /  7859.44 to 20 dof (share equ.)
Note: ***,**,*=significant on the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Standard errors are in parentheses. The 
performance equation accounts for the panel structure of the data set. The managerial ownership share 
equation contains industry dummy variables as well as year dummy variables.
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table 5.2.
Although IV estimates are usually seen as the main method of dealing with endoge­
nous explanatory variables, their application should be carried out cautiously because 
weak correlation of the instruments with the endogenous explanatory variables leads to 
inconsistency in IV estimates, even if the sample size is relatively large (Bound et al. 
(1995)). The authors emphasise the importance of examining the ‘first stage’ estimates 
which generated the instruments and propose the partial R2 and the F statistic of the 
regressions of the first stage as useful indicators of the quality of the IV estimates.
In table 5.3, we report the partial R2 and the F statistics of the regressions for the 
instruments of the first stage. Although comparable results are lacking, a partial R2 
of around 25 percent for the share instruments seems to be quite good. The reported 
F statistics for the share instruments are highly significant. The statistics for the 
performance instruments are weaker, however.
It is hard to say which of the employed estimation techniques is best suited to deal 
with the problem of reverse causality. However, since all methods come to the same 
conclusion with respect to signs and point of maximum effect, we are confident that 
these are correctly identified.
5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we investigate the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance.
We use an unbalanced panel data set of private limited liability firms in the German 
business-related service sector. This is the most important legal form in Germany. Up 
to now, most studies on corporate governance have concentrated on companies that 
are listed on the stock market. However, the distortions caused by the separation of 
ownership and control are also present in private limited liability firms.
The main conclusion from our analysis is that ownership does influence company 
performance. We find a positive effect of managerial ownership share up to around 80 
percent on firm performance, then the effect becomes negative. Companies that are 
totally owned by managers do especially well. Further results show that there is no 
gain from monitoring by outside owners. We also find that companies with many bank 
relationships do worse, which may be due to the monitoring effect.
We address the question of reverse causality and of endogeneity by estimating lagged
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specifications as well as instrumental variable methods. Furthermore, we investigate the 
dynamic structure of the panel using the Arellano-Bond GMM estimation technique. 
The results of these specifications confirm the previous findings.
With respect to the determinants of managerial ownership,, we find that the influence 
of the risk of the firm’s business on managerial ownership share is non-linear. Managers 
in risky companies can use the ownership stake to signal the quality of their company 
to the market. Without this signal it would be more difficult to attract outside funding. 
However, the relationship is also partly negative, indicating that risk-averse managers 
prefer to diversify their assets.
Since company performance and managerial ownership influence each other, we also 
estimate a simultaneous equation system with lagged endogenous variables as instru­
ments. The results from the single equation specifications axe qualitatively confirmed.
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5.6 Appendix
Table 5.4: Turnover According to Legal Form
Turnover in % of to ta l turnover
Legal form 1972 1986 1990 1998
AG 19.1 21.2 20.2 21.5
GmbH 17.1 25.5 29.1 32.0
OHG 6.8 6.8 6.1
KG 24.0 23.9 22.4
Sole proprietor 23.8 15.4 14.9 13.3
Other 7.9 7.2 5.1 4.7
Note: AGs are companies that are allowed to issue shares. They may or may not be listed on a stock 
market. GmbHs have one or more owners with limited liability. The OHG is a private company that 
has several owners with unlimited liability. The KG has at least one owner with unlimited liability 
and at least one owner with limited liability. A sole proprietor is a single owner with unlimited 
liability. Other includes companies owned by the state and cooperatives. The data is obtained from 
Statistisches Bundesamt, 1972 to 1998.
Table 5.5: The Business-Related Service Sector
Sector W Z 93
Computer Services 72100, 72201-02, 72301-04, 72601-02, 72400
Tax Consultancy &, Accounting 74123, 74127, 74121-22
Management Consultancy 74131-32, 74141-42
Architecture 74201-04
Technical Advice h  Planning 74205-09, 74301-04
Advertising 74844, 74401-02
Vehicle Rental 71100, 71210
Machine Rental 45500, 71320, 71330
Cargo Handling & Storage 63121, 63403, 63401
Waste and Sewage Disposal 90001-07
Note: The WZ93 industrial classification code is a classification system developed by the German 
Federal Statistical Office in accordance with the European NACE Rev. 1 standard.
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Table 5.6: Distribution of Observations
Sector No. of O bservations No. of Com panies
Computer Services 337 161
Tax Consultancy & Accounting 275 144
Management Consultancy 265 127
Architecture 420 208
Technical Advice & Planning 405 171
Advertising 263 132
Vehicle Rental 225 113
Machine Rental 211 106
Cargo Handling &: Storage 185 87
Waste and Sewage Disposal 211 102
Total 2797 1351
Table 5.7: Descriptive Statistics
V ariable M ean St. Dev. M in M ax
Relative performance -0.10 1.44 -4.75 4.50
Share 0.73 0.31 0.00 1.00
D_shl00 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Owner_man 1.58 0.87 0.00 11.00
Extern 4.63 2.47 2.00 30.00
Bank 1.41 0.73 1.00 6.00
Age 11.97 8.05 1.00 87.00
Size 3.04 1.07 0.00 7.56
West 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00
Risk I 0.54 0.30 0.00 1.41
Risk II 0.54 0.51 0.00 2.00
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Figure 5.1: Functional Form of Share -  Division in 10% Intervals
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Note: The graph represents the coefficients of dummies for 10% intervals of managerial ownership 
share in a regression with relative performance as dependent variable. 95 percent confidence bands are 
indicated.
Figure 5.2: Functional Form of Share -  Division in 20% Intervals
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Note: The graph represents the coefficients of dummies for 20% intervals of managerial ownership 
share in a regression with relative performance as dependent variable. 95 percent confidence bands are 
indicated.
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Figure 5.3: Functional Form of Share (Lag)
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Note: The graph represents the functional form of share (lag) in a regression with relative performance 
as dependent variable.
Figure 5.4: Functional Form of Risk I
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Note: The graph represents the coefficients of dummies for 10 roughly equal intervals of Risk I in a 
regression with managerial ownership share as dependent variable. 95 percent confidence bands are 
indicated.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
Private companies make an important contribution to overall economic activity in terms 
of both employment and turnover. They differ from public companies in many respects. 
It is therefore important to study them separately in order to understand their specific 
mechanisms. Historically, researchers have concentrated on public companies, not least 
because data were more easily available.
Private and public companies have both advantages and disadvantages. The man­
agers of private companies often have significant ownership shares, which mitigates 
agency conflicts. On the downside, the concentrated ownership exposes managers to 
idiosyncratic risk. The dispersed ownership structure of public companies facilitates the 
raising of additional capital and allows the diversification of risk. But agency conflicts 
between owners and managers can be more pronounced in public companies, because 
managers only typically hold a small ownership share. In practise, we see both or­
ganisational forms. The choice of organisational form depends on a comparison of the 
advantages and disadvantages for the specific situation. For our understanding of the 
economy, it is important to study both organisational forms.
This thesis investigates some of the determinants of company performance specifically 
in the context of private companies. Since private companies are complex systems, it 
is not possible to discuss all interesting aspects in one thesis. The scope of the thesis is 
therefore restricted to the empirical analysis of issues of control, risk and incentives.
In chapter two we study the influence of the private benefits of control on the cap­
ital structure and the growth of private companies. Control is approximated by the 
probability that the largest owner would win a hypothetical vote. Potential loss of con­
trol is the decrease in this probability after a hypothetical equity increase. There is a
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clear indication that potential loss of control has a negative effect on the size of equity 
increases. Concerning leverage, the influence of potential loss of control is positive. 
Finally, there is a negative relationship between potential loss of control and company 
growth. Overall, the finding is that owners try to maintain control. They are willing 
to give up growth opportunities for this purpose.
In chapters three and four we investigate the influence of owners’ underdiversifica­
tion on company characteristics. Chapter three focuses on the relationship between 
underdiversification and company profitability. We find a positive, significant relation­
ship that can be ascribed to two mechanisms. First, owners require higher returns as 
compensation for exposure to idiosyncratic risk. They therefore select only very prof­
itable projects for realisation. Second, owners who are at the same time managers exert 
more effort if they have a higher degree of underdiversification. Effort is measured as 
weekly hours worked. Since their financial well-being depends more on the success of 
the company, they have better incentives to work hard.
Chapter four studies the influence of an owner’s underdiversification on the financial 
structure of the company. Higher underdiversification is related to a higher demand for 
loans and to higher leverage. Bank loans are therefore used as an alternative source 
of financing that reduces the exposure of the owner to company-specific risk stemming 
from the equity investment. Underdiversification reduces liquidity, since the opportu­
nity costs of liquid asset holdings are higher.
Finally, chapter five analyses the effects of the share of managerial ownership on 
performance. Up to an ownership share of around 80%, we find a positive relationship 
between ownership share and performance. This result can be explained as being due 
to better incentives. For ownership shares exceeding 80%, the relationship becomes 
negative -  the entrenchment effect dominates. It is difficult for outside owners to 
monitor, if the management holds a very high ownership stake. The determinants of 
the share of managerial ownership are also analysed and we find a non-linear influence 
of risk.
Data availability constitutes a constraint on research into private companies. In 
contrast to public companies, private companies have much weaker publication require­
ments, and, in addition, publication requirements are not always enforced. In Germany, 
for example, private companies with limited liability (GmbHs) are obliged by law to 
publish their accounts. However, in practise, many smaller GmbHs do not observe 
this obligation. Publication requirements are more strictly enforced in the UK. Pri­
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vate companies with limited liability need to deposit their accounts with ‘Companies 
House’. Researchers then have access to these data through commercial data bases. 
When no collections of published accounts are available, researchers have to rely on ev­
idence gathered by surveys. However, the number of observations in surveys is typically 
smaller and the data may be more affected by measurement error.
A further complication of the research on private companies is the close relation­
ship between company and owner. Owner characteristics, such as education and work 
experience, can be important for the success of a company. Personal wealth is also 
relevant, since it influences the amount that the owner can invest in equity, and also 
influences the availability of bank loans through the use of personal assets as collateral. 
The importance of both company and owner characteristics poses huge demands on 
data availability. Not many data sets have such a wide coverage. Typically, data sets 
cover either only company or only owner characteristics.
The investigation of private companies remains an interesting research area and there 
are still many questions open for future analysis. Supported by the availability of new 
data sets, it will be possible to test new hypotheses and to test the robustness of existing 
results by comparisons across countries.
153
154
Bibliography
Aghion, P., Blundell, R., Griffith, R., Howitt, P. and Prantl, S. (2004), ‘Entry and 
Productivity Growth: Evidence from Micro-Level Panel Data’, UCL Discussion 
Paper No. 04-03, London.
Aghion, P. and Bolton, P. (1989), ‘The Financial Structure of the Firm and the Problem 
of Control’, European Economic Review 33, 286-293.
Aghion, P. and Bolton, P. (1992), ‘An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial 
Contracting’, Review of Economic Studies 59, 473-494.
Anderson, R. W. and Nyborg, K. G. (2001), ‘Financing and Corporate Growth Under 
Repeated Moral Hazard’, Financial Markets Group Discussion Paper 376, London.
Ang, J. S., Cole, R. A. and Lin, J. W. (2000), ‘Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, 
Journal of Finance 55, 81-106.
Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1991), ‘Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte 
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations’, Review of Eco­
nomic Studies 58, 277-297.
Baltagi, B. H. (1995), Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, John Wiley and Sons, 
Chichester.
Bank of England (2001), ‘Finance for Small Firms - An Eight Report’, London.
Barclay, M. J. and Holderness, C. G. (1989), ‘Private Benefits from Control of Public 
Corporations’, Journal of Financial Economics 25, 371-395.
Bebchuk, L. A. (1999), ‘A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Con­
trol’, NBER Working Paper No. 7203.
155
Bennedsen, M., Fosgerau, M. and Wolfenzon, D. (2000), ‘Control Dilution and Dis­
tribution of Ownership’, Copenhagen Business School Working Paper 16-2000, 
Copenhagen.
Bennedsen, M. and Wolfenzon, D. (2000), ‘The Balance of Power in Closely Held Cor­
porations’, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 113-139.
Berger, A. N. and Udell, G. F. (1995), ‘Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in 
Small Firm Finance’, Journal of Business 68, 351-381.
Berger, A. N. and Udell, G. F. (1998), ‘The Economics of Small Business Finance: The 
Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle’, Journal 
of Banking and Finance 22, 613-673.
Berle, A. A. and Means, G. C. (1932), The Modem Corporation and Private Property, 
Macmillan, New York.
Bitler, M. P., Moskowitz, T. J. and Vissing-Jprgensen, A. (2004), ‘Testing Agency 
Theory With Entrepreneur Effort and Wealth’, Journal of Finance (forthcoming).
Bitler, M. P., Robb, A. M. and Wolken, J. D. (2001), ‘Financial Services Used by Small 
Businesses: Evidence from the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances’, Federal 
Reserve Bulletin 87, 183-205.
Bound, J., Jaeger, D. A. and Baker, R. M. (1995), ‘Problems with Instrumental Vari­
ables Estimation When the Correlation Between the Instruments and the Endoge­
nous Explanatory Variable Is Weak’, Journal of the American Statistical Associa­
tion 90, 443-450.
Browning, M., Crossley, T. F. and Weber, G. (2003), ‘Asking Consumption Questions 
in General Purpose Surveys’, Economic Journal 113, F540-F567.
Burkart, M., Gromb, D. and Panunzi, F. (1998), ‘Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect 
Minority Shareholders’, Journal of Political Economy 106, 172-204.
Cavalluzzo, K. and Wolken, J. (2002), ‘Small Business Loan Turndowns, Personal 
Wealth and Discrimination’, mimeo.
Cole, R. A. (1998), ‘The Importance of Relationships to the Availability of Credit’, 
Journal of Banking and Finance 22, 959-977.
156
Cressy, R. (1995), ‘Business Borrowing and Control: A Theory of Entrepreneurial 
Types’, Small Business Economics 7, 291-300.
Cressy, R. (1996a), ‘Are Business Startups Debt Rationed?’, Economic Journal 
106, 1253-1270.
Cressy, R. (19966), ‘Commitment Lending Under Asymmetric Information: Theory and 
Tests on U.K. Startup Data’, Small Business Economics 8, 397-408.
Cressy, R. (2000), ‘Credit Rationing or Entrepreneurial Risk Aversion? An Alternative 
Explanation for the Evans and Jovanovic Finding’, Economics Letters 66, 235-240.
Cressy, R. (2002), ‘Introduction: Funding Gaps’, Economic Journal 112, F1-F16.
Cressy, R. and Olofsson, C. (1997), ‘The Financial Conditions for Swedish SMEs: Sur­
vey and Research Agenda’, Small Business Economics 9, 179-194.
Cubbin, J. and Leech, D. (1983), ‘The Effect of Shareholding Dispersion on the Degree 
of Control in British Companies: Theory and Measurement’, Economic Journal 
93, 351-369.
de Meza, D. (2002), ‘Overlending?’, Economic Journal 112, F17-F31.
de Meza, D. and Webb, D. C. (1987), ‘Too Much Investement: A Problem of Asym­
metric Information’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, 281-292.
Demsetz, H. (1983), ‘The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm’, Journal 
of Law and Economics 26, 375-391.
Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K. (1985), ‘The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and 
Consequences’, Journal of Political Economy 93, 1155-1177.
Dey, R., ed. (1994), British Companies Legistlation: Companies Act 1985, Insolvency 
Act 1986, Companies Act 1989 and Related Legislation, Croner CCH Group, Bices­
ter.
DTI (2000), ‘Statistical Bulletin’, London.
Dyck, A. and Zingales, L. (2002), ‘Private Benefits of Control: An International Com­
parison’, NBER Working Paper No. 8711, forthcoming Journal of Finance.
157
Fan, W. and White, M. J. (2003), ‘Personal Bankruptcy and the Level of En­
trepreneurial Activity’, Journal of Law and Economics 46, 543-568.
Felsenthal, D. S. and Machover, M. (1998), The Measurement of Voting Power, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham.
Gersick, K. E., Davis, J. A., McCollom Hampton, M., Lansberg, I. and Gersick, K. E. 
(1997), Generation to Generation: Life Cycles of the Family Business, Harvard 
Business School Press, Boston.
Grossman, S. J. and Hart, O. D. (1988), ‘One Share-One Vote and the Market for 
Corporate Control’, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 175-202.
Harhoff, D. and Korting, T. (1998), ‘Lending Relationship in Germany - Empirical 
Evidence from Survey Data’, Journal of Banking and Finance 22, 1317-1353.
Harhoff, D. and Stahl, K. (1995), ‘Unternehmens- und Beschaftigungsdynamik in West- 
deutschland: Zum Einflufi von Haftungsregeln und Eigentiimerstruktur’, ifo Stu- 
dien 41, 17-50.
Harris, M. and Raviv, A. (1988), ‘Corporate Governance: Voting Rights and Majority 
Rules’, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 203-235.
Harris, M. and Raviv, A. (1991), ‘The Theory of Capital Structure’, Journal of Finance 
46, 297-355.
Hass, H.-J. (1995), ‘Industrienahe Dienstleistungen: Okonomische Bedeutung und poli- 
tische Herausforderung’, Beitrage zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik 223, 3-39.
Heaney, R. and Holmen, M. (2004), ‘Portfolio Diversification and the Cost of Control’, 
mimeo, Uppsala University.
Heaton, J. and Lucas, D. (2000a), ‘Capital Structure, Hurdle Rates, and Portfolio 
Choice - Interactions in an Entrepreneurial Firm’, mimeo, Northwestern University.
Heaton, J. and Lucas, D. (20006), ‘Portfolio Choice and Asset Prices: The Importance 
of Entrepreneurial Risk’, Journal of Finance 55, 1163-1198.
Heaton, J. and Lucas, D. (2000c), ‘Portfolio Choice in the Presence of Background 
Risk’, Economic Journal 110, 1-26.
158
Hellmann, T. and Puri, M. (2002), ‘Venture Capital and the Professionalization of 
Start-Up Firms: Empirical Evidence’, Journal of Finance 57, 169-197.
Himmelberg, C. P., Hubbard, G. R. and Love, I. (2002), ‘Investment, Protection, Own­
ership, and the Cost of Capital’, National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 
25.
Himmelberg, C. P., Hubbard, R. G. and Palia, D. (1999), ‘Understanding the Deter­
minants of Managerial Ownership and the Link Between Ownership and Perfor­
mance’, Journal of Financial Economics 53, 353-384.
Holmstrom, B. (1979), ‘Moral Hazard and Observability’, Bell Journal of Economics 
10, 74-91.
Holtz-Eakin, D., Joulfaian, D. and Rosen, H. S. (1994a), ‘Entrepreneurial Decisions 
and Liquidity Constraints’, RAND Journal of Economics 25, 334-347.
Holtz-Eakin, D., Joulfaian, D. and Rosen, H. S. (19946), ‘Sticking It Out: En­
trepreneurial Survival and Liquidity Constraints’, Journal of Political Economy 
102, 53-75.
Januszewski, S., Koke, F. J. and Winter, J. K. (2002), ‘Product Market Competition, 
Corporate Governance and Company Performance: An Empirical Analysis for 
Germany’, Research in Economics 56, 299-332.
Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. H. (1976), ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305- 
360.
Jensen, M. and Murphy, K. J. (1990), ‘Performance Pay and Top-Management Incen­
tives’, Journal of Political Economy 98, 225-264.
Kahl, M., Liu, J. and Longstaff, F. A. (2003), ‘Paper Millionaires: How Valuable Is 
Stock to A Stockholder Who Is Restricted from Selling It?’, Journal of Financial 
Economics 67, 385-410.
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979), ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk’, Econometrica 47, 263-291.
159
Kaiser, U., Kreuter, M. and Niggemann, H. (2000), ‘The ZEW/Creditreform Business 
Survey in the Business-Related Services Sector: Sampling Frame, Stratification, 
Expansion and Results’, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 00-22, Mannheim.
Kaplan, S. N. (1994a), ‘Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison 
of Japan and the United States’, Journal of Political Economy 102, 510-546.
Kaplan, S. N. (19946), ‘Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany’, 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 10, 142-159.
Kennickell, A. B., Starr-McCluer, M. and Surette, B. J. (2000), ‘Recent Changes in U.S. 
Family Finances: Results from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances’, Federal 
Reserve Bulletin 86, 1-29.
Kerins, F., Smith, J. K. and Smith, R. (2004), ‘Opportunity Cost of Capital for Ven­
ture Capital Investors and Entrepreneurs’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis (forthcoming).
King, C. S. and Ricketts, E. K. (1980), ‘Evaluation of the Use of Administrative Record 
Data in the Economic Censuses’, Proceedings of the Survey Research Methods 
Section of the American Statistical Association.
Koke, J. (2000), ‘Control Transfer in Corporate Germany: Their Frequency, Causes 
and Consequences’, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 00-67, Mannheim.
Kole, S. R. (1995), ‘Measuring Managerial Equity Ownership: A Comparison of Sources 
of Ownership Data’, Journal of Corporate Finance 1, 413-435.
Lambert, R. A., Larcker, D. F. and Verrecckia, R. E. (1991), ‘Portfolio Considerations 
in Valuing Executive Compensation’, Journal of Accounting Research 29, 129-149.
Lang, L., Ofek, E. and Stulz, R. M. (1996), ‘Leverage, Investment, and Firm Growth’, 
Journal of Financial Economics 40, 3-29.
Lease, R. C., McConnell, J. J. and Mikkelson, W. H. (1983), ‘The Market Value of Con­
trol in Publicly-Traded Corporations’, Journal of Financial Economics 11, 439- 
471.
Leech, D. (2002), ‘An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power 
Indices’, Political Studies 50, 1-22.
160
Leland, H. and Pyle, D. (1977), ‘Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure and 
Financial Intermediaries’, Journal of Finance 32, 371-387.
Longenecker, J. G., McKinney, J. A. and Moore, C. W. (1996), ‘Ethical Issues of 
Entrepreneurs’, mimeo, Baylor University.
Mayer, C. P. (1990), Financial systems, corporate finance, and economic development, 
in R. G. Hubbard, ed., ‘Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Invest­
ment’, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 307-332.
McConnell, J. J. and Servaes, H. (1990), ‘Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership 
and Corporate Value’, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 595-612.
Mehran, H. (1995), ‘Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Perfor­
mance’, Journal of Financial Economics 38, 163-184.
Mittelstandsmonitor (2004), ‘Chancen zum Aufschwung Nutzen’, Frankfurt.
Mprck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1988), ‘Management Ownership and Market 
Valuation: An Empirical Analysis’, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293-315.
Morellec, E. (2003), ‘Investment, Compensation, and Risk Aversion’, mimeo, University 
of Rochester.
Moskowitz, T. J. and Vissing-Jprgensen, A. (2002), ‘The Returns to Entrepreneurial 
Investment: A Private Equity Premium Puzzle?’, American Economic Review 
92, 745-778.
Murphy, K. J. (1999), ‘Executive Compensation’, in O. C. Ashenfelter and D. Card, eds, 
‘Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3B’, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2485-2566.
Myers, S. C. (1977), ‘Determinants of Corporate Borrowing’, Journal of Financial Eco­
nomics 5, 147-175.
Myers, S. C. and Majluf, N. S. (1984), ‘Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions 
When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have’, Journal of Financial 
Economics 13, 187-221.
NatWest/SBRT (2002), ‘NatWest/SBRT Quarterly Survey of Small Business in 
Britain’, Small Business Research Trust, March 2002.
161
Nickell, S., Nicolitsas, D. and Dryden, N. (1997), ‘What Makes Firms Perform Well?’, 
European Economic Review 41, 783-796.
Nicodano, G. and Sembenelli, A. (2000), ‘Private Benefits, Block Transaction Premiums 
and Ownership Structure’, mimeo.
Ofek, E. and Yermack, D. (2000), ‘Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the 
Evolution of Managerial Ownership’, Journal of Finance 55, 1367-1384.
Pagano, M., Panetta, F. and Zingales, L. (1998), ‘Why Do Companies Go Public? An 
Empirical Analysis’, Journal of Finance 53, 27-64.
Parker, R. P. (1984), ‘Improved Adjustments for Misreporting of Tax Return Infor­
mation Used to Estimate the National Income and Product Accounts’, Survey of 
Current Business 64, 17-25.
Parrino, R., Poteshman, A. M. and Weisbach, M. S. (2002), ‘Measuring Investment 
Distortions When Risk-Averse Managers Decide Whether to Undertake Risky 
Projects’, NBER Working Paper No. 8763.
Petersen, M. and Rajan, R. G. (1994), ‘The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence 
from Small Business Data’, Journal of Finance 49, 3-37.
Poutziouris, P., Chittenden, F. and Michaelas, N. (1998), ‘The Financial Affairs of 
Private Companies’, Tilney Fund Management, Liverpool.
Small Business Administration (2003), ‘Small Business Economic Indicators for 2002’, 
www. sba. gov /  ad vo.
Small Business Service (2003), ‘Small and Medium Enterprise Statistics for the UK’, 
London.
Statistisches Bundesamt (1998), ‘Finanzen und Steuern, Fachserie 14, Reihe 8’, Wies­
baden.
Stiglitz, J. E. and Weiss, A. (1981), ‘Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Infor­
mation’, American Economic Review 71, 393-409.
Williamson, O. E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Free Press, New 
York.
162
Williamson, O. E. (1988), ‘Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance’, Journal of 
Finance 43, 567-591.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Wren, C. and Storey, D. J. (2002), ‘Evaluating the Effect of Soft Business Support 
Upon Small Firm Performance’, Oxford Economic Papers 54, 334-365.
Zingales, L. (1994), ‘The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock 
Exchange Experience’, Review of Financial Studies 7, 125-148.
Zwiebel, J. (1995), ‘Block Investment and Partial Benefits of Corporate Control’, Review 
of Economic Studies 62, 161-185.
163
